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ABSTRACT 
 Partnerships with foreign security forces is one significant military activity that 
contributes to attaining strategic objectives in great power competition. Military planners 
and practitioners may refine their understanding of how to create and sustain effective 
partnerships through this study’s three-component partnership framework consisting of 
willingness, capability, and effects. The partnership framework draws from 
principal-agent theory to illuminate how to influence a potential partner’s interests, 
business partnership literature to improve a partner’s capability, and deterrence theory to 
understand effects on the rival. This study develops and then illustrates the framework 
through three historical cases that focus on China as a near-peer rival in East Asia; 
however, the possible applications are broad. The partnership framework provides 
insights on what traits in a partner are important, what actions the United States should 
take to develop a partnership, and unique aspects of China’s responses to U.S. 
partnerships. This topic is essential because it is a critical component of the military 
effort in great power competition and one that could use improvement. U.S. partnerships 
can also significantly impact local political environments; military planners and 
practitioners owe it to those partner nations and to the United States to make calculated 
and deliberate decisions on partnerships. 
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This study is a search for effectiveness and efficiency within security cooperation 
and partnerships against near-peer adversaries. The purpose of this study is threefold. First, 
this study aims to develop a mental framework for how the U.S. military should consider 
potential partners. The mental framework will serve to guide thought and action for staffs 
who plan and carry out security cooperation, as well as provide insight into the purpose of 
partnership missions to tactical elements. This framework is intended to guide further 
discussion at lower levels of command, not to dictate specific actions. Second, this study 
aims to develop a base of knowledge on historical interactions with a key and emerging 
near-peer threat, China. The focus on China is increasing for the United States, but U.S. 
competition with China through partners is not new. Many Americans find it challenging 
to understand China culturally, consequently additional background into recent history and 
Chinese decision making may prove useful. Finally, this study aims to provide 
recommendations regarding opportunities to identify and execute effective partnerships in 
the future and will consider potential partnerships to support a specific area of tension with 
China, the South China Sea. 
This study will neither prove a theory of security cooperation partnerships with the 
proposed framework, nor will it provide a comprehensive history of Chinese decision 
making concerning the United States. It offers a qualitative model that is intended as a 
guide for U.S. military planners and military practitioners on the ground, each who has a 
vital role in shaping and recommending future actions in partnerships. The model combines 
existing knowledge and theories into what this study calls the partnership framework. The 
partnership framework is designed to provide the readers with an aid to understanding why 
and how the United States should conduct partnerships and security cooperation with allies 
with the end goal of competing against other “great powers.” If this study aids 
understanding in any way, provides the reader with an appreciation of the complexity of 
the operating environments, or furthers future discussions about security cooperation 
partnerships in great power competition, it will have more than served its purpose. 
2 
A. TOPIC, IMPORTANCE, AND SCOPE 
This study is about partnerships with foreign security forces in the context of great 
power competition (GPC). The primary research question is: How should military planners 
identify and execute resource-efficient partnerships with foreign security forces in support 
of GPC? Secondary or supporting research questions include the following. How can 
military planners analyze who the most relevant and impactful partners are? How can the 
United States develop a chosen partner efficiently? How should the United States consider 
the actions’ impacts on the great power rival? Does China, as a specific near-peer threat, 
have specific or unique reactions to U.S. partnerships? The ability to assess the utility of 
partnerships in order to optimize resources in the current competitive environment will 
remain critical well into the future.  
All of the U.S. strategy documents state the importance of this study’s topic—
partnerships in GPC. Without a doubt, this topic is relevant to U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) elements, which often work by, with, and through partners. This 
topic is also relevant, however, to conventional military planners and any other agencies 
or departments engaging with foreign security forces. The United States’ strategy 
documents and strategic decision-makers have confirmed the importance of this topic.1 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 
and the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS) have all highlighted the reemergence of 
GPC and the importance that competing through partnerships will have. The 2018 NMS 
stated that it “acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic 
source of strength for the Joint Force. Building a strong, agile, and resilient force requires 
better interoperability and enhancing the combat lethality and survivability of our allies 
and partners.”2 The 2018 NDS stated, “Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are 
crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no 
 
1 Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for 
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 4, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 3–4. 
3 
competitor or rival can match.”3 The 2018 NDS also proposed that Indo-Pacific alliances 
and partnerships, specifically, are a priority. The NDS stated, “A free and open Indo-Pacific 
region provides prosperity and security for all. We will strengthen our alliances and 
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring 
aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.”4 All of 
these strategic documents agree that partnerships are a critical component of GPC. 
In addition to the rhetoric from the strategic documents, the NDS strategic 
framework also relies on improving partnership efforts. Two components from the 2018 
NDS’s three-component strategic framework directly reinforce the importance of this 
study. The first relevant component is “Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners,” 
and the second is “Reform the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability.”5 
While the first component represents obvious direction to carry out partnerships and 
security cooperation more effectively, the second component challenges U.S. military 
planners to do so more efficiently. The United States must find ways to choose and 
implement partnerships in order to compete against rivals while also optimizing resources 
and cutting ties with partners that may not be mutually beneficial. Developing the 
right capabilities with willing partners could be a solution to competing below conventional 
conflict.  
Many U.S. strategy documents, and decision-makers, emphasize the importance of 
partnership, but what does this study mean by partnership? This study defines a partnership 
broadly as a relationship with mutually agreed upon cooperation and joint interest between 
organizations. This study looks specifically at partnerships between lethal security forces 
(military, police, national guard, etc.) of different nations. This definition incorporates 
partnerships of a wide range, but primarily, it looks at relationships that the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) would call security cooperation. DOD defines security 
 
3 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2018), 8, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf 
4 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 9. 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8–11. 
4 
cooperation as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments 
to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied 
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide 
U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”6 Joint Publication 
(JP) 1 states, “Security cooperation encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense 
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 
nation.”7 When this study uses the word partnership, it means security cooperation that is 
executed by both DOD and non-DOD lethal entities (military, intelligence agencies, law 
enforcement entities), while omitting non-lethal entities that conduct security cooperation 
(cyber, economic, humanitarian entities). 
The term great power competition (GPC) is just as important to describe for this 
study as the term partnership because U.S. strategic documents only offer a broad 
definition.8 A simple definition of a  “great power” is a nation-state that can exert influence 
in international affairs on a global scale. One of the primary “great powers” that the United 
States is concerned with is China, defined by the 2017 NSS as a revisionist state.9 GPC is 
essentially, “long-term strategic competition” that incorporates all elements of national 
power but is below the threshold of direct conventional military conflict.10  
GPC can be described by many terms: phase zero competition, hybrid-warfare, gray 
zone conflict, ambiguous warfare tactics, salami-slicing, political warfare, military 
 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 257, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2013), I–11, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. 
8 Alexander Boroff, “What Is Great-Power Competition, Anyway?,” Modern War Institute, April 17, 
2020, sec. Commentary & Analysis, https://mwi.usma.edu/great-power-competition-anyway/. 
9 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2017), 2. 
10 Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, 2. 
5 
operations other than war (MOOTW), and competition short of armed conflict.11 All of 
these terms are difficult to define and differentiate because they all essentially describe 
similar challenges, long-term strategic competition between great powers before direct 
conventional military conflict.12 One U.S. Army War College study said it best when it 
stated, “The gray zone is admittedly a broad carrier concept for a collection of sometimes 
dissimilar defense-relevant challenges. In this regard, statically defining the gray zone may 
be far less useful to the defense strategy and policy community than simply describing it 
as it is now and as it likely will be for some time.”13 In general, this GPC environment, the 
so-called gray zone or hybrid warfare, can be described by three broad characteristics: the 
blending of war and peace, the threat to the conventional U.S. military way of war due to 
whole-of-government strategies, and the high risk for both action and inaction.14 The GPC 
environment involves a wide range of military and non-military strategies in order to obtain 
policy goals that are gradual and moderately revisionist.15 
Practitioners should not be overwhelmed by the vast number of terms used to 
describe GPC because, while new terms have emerged, the meanings have not. The 
definitions of the terms have remained fairly consistent by emphasizing whole-of-
government means to achieve political goals without conventional military conflict. Phase 
Zero is a doctrinal military term that describes the initial phase of combat operations, called 
“shaping.”16 The U.S. military initially started using this term in 2006, when it began to 
renew focus on operations to prevent conflict in Africa, but this phase also remains focused 
 
11 O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, 10. 
12 For a visual model of the spectrum of GPC terms direct conventional conflict, see: Frank G. 
Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid 
Modes of War,” The Heritage Foundation, 2016, 29. 
13 Nathan Freier et al., “Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. 
Army War College, 2016), 4. 
14 Freier et al., “Outplayed,” 4. 
15 Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict, 
Advancing Strategic Thought Series (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College 
Press, 2015), 4. 
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 3, Joint Operations 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), V–9, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910. 
6 
on preparing for potential conventional operations.17 MOOTW was also a U.S. military 
doctrinal term that scholars and practitioners occasionally use, though it is not in current 
joint publications because it was replaced by the term “the range of military operations 
(ROMO).”18 Gray zone operations and hybrid warfare are relatively new terms that 
scholars and military practitioners use to describe environments before conventional 
conflict.19 The term gray zone was first formally adopted with a U.S. SOCOM white paper 
in 2015, which defined the term as “competitive interactions among and within state and 
non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.”20 Hybrid warfare 
is used almost interchangeably with gray zone, but scholars, especially Frank Hoffman, 
often specifically use it to describe Russian tactics.21 The term ambiguous warfare has 
been around since the 1980s and, while lacking a formal definition, is described as 
“situations in which a state or non-state belligerent actor deploys troops and proxies in a 
deceptive and confusing manner—with the intent of achieving political and military effects 
while obscuring the belligerent’s direct participation.”22 The term political warfare, 
defined as “the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one’s will,” can consist 
of propaganda, paramilitaries, and subversion, and has been around for even longer than 
ambiguous warfare but also describes GPC before conventional military conflict.23 
 
17 David Broyles and Brody Blackenship, The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global 
Competition (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1, 2016), 7, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1033598. 
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 3, Joint Operations, V–
4. 
19 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone; Antulio J Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: Alternative 
Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 
College Press, 2016), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1318; Van 
Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition: Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts Before War,” Naval War 
College Review 70, no. 3 (2017): 39–61. 
20 Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” Special Warfare; Fort Bragg 28, no. 4 (December 2015): 7. 
21 Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” 
Prism : A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 7, no. 4 (2018): 30–47; Frank G. Hoffman, 
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies, 2007); Timothy Thomas, “The Evolution of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-
Generation, and New-Type Thinking,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4 (October 2016): 
554–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2016.1232541. 
22 Broyles and Blackenship, The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global Competition, 9. 
23 Paul A. Smith Jr, On Political War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 3. 
7 
The age of many of the terms to describe GPC, combined with the similarities and 
consistencies of historical examples of GPC, should show the reader that confusion over 
specific terms, and their evolution, may inhibit real understanding of an old problem. In 
1989 in his book On Political War, Paul Smith, a scholar at the National Defense 
University, used the examples of Aristotle and Alexander the Great to aid understanding 
of unconventional Soviet challenges.24 In addition to his parallels to the distant past, Smith 
also made clear that “political warfare” was likely not going away when he said, “Whether 
any government in Moscow will ever completely abandon political warfare is, in my view, 
doubtful indeed. Nor, to be fair, will any other modern nation.”25 John Arquilla agrees that 
the consistencies of irregular challenges in GPC, or political warfare, throughout history 
should provide a basis for which to understand current tension and that the new term of 
“gray zone” could cloud that understanding.26 Hal Brands has also said, “The basic 
approach of using tactics that fall just below traditional definitions of war is as old as war 
itself” and that “exaggerating the newness of the [gray zone challenges] phenomenon risks 
muddling rather than sharpening our comprehension.”27 Donald Stoker and Craig 
Whiteside, two Naval War College professors, also reject the use of terms like gray zone 
and hybrid warfare because they are poorly defined and unhelpful.28 So, while the gray 
zone may be a relatively new term, the phenomenon is not, and practitioners should not 
allow the sea of terms to obscure the problem. 
While this study does not require a deep dive into any of these specific terms that 
describe GPC, a brief discussion is essential in order to both outline the scope of the study 
and help understand the environment the study is analyzing. GPC involves a wide array of 
tactics and strategies from all components of governments, including covert action, 
 
24 Smith Jr, On Political War, xv. 
25 Smith Jr, xiv. 
26 John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone,” Prism 7, no. 3 (2018): 121. 
27 Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” E-Paper (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, February 1, 2016), 4–5, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2737593. 
28 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two 
Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (January 24, 2020): 3, 
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4. 
8 
propaganda, cyber attacks, and economic coercion to name a few. Nevertheless, developing 
partners is a critical component of U.S. strategy in this environment. A Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) report called The Role of Special Operations in Global Competition 
describes building partnerships as a “traditional” military approach to the GPC 
environment that requires support from all of the elements of national power, and perhaps 
more aggressive military action.29 This study agrees that GPC requires a whole-of-
government approach, as well as other escalatory and de-escalatory military options below 
conventional conflict, but it proposes that the U.S. military can improve when engaging in 
the “traditional” approach of using partnerships.30 Security cooperation partnerships in 
GPC cannot be a successful approach by themselves, but this approach is essential 
nonetheless. Some have smartly pointed out that alliances and aid are what helped the 
United States overcome rivals in past GPC environments.31 If the United States can 
improve efficiency in selecting and executing security cooperation with foreign partners, 
more resources can be used for all the other essential aspects of the U.S. military and the 
U.S. whole-of-government approach to GPC. 
In sum, this study explores how to improve partnerships with foreign security forces 
in the context of GPC. The importance of this topic is clearly stated within the U.S. strategy 
documents. Failure to advance partnerships effectively and efficiently could have long-
term consequences for the United States in the global competition against China. The scope 
of this study focuses on security cooperation partnerships between lethal security forces 
while acknowledging that these partnerships must be carried out alongside other critical 
government and military strategies. Without a doubt, security cooperation partnerships will 
fail if conducted by themselves. Improving security cooperation partnerships, though, may 
enable the United States to produce a sustainable answer to challenges without resorting to 
 
29 Broyles and Blackenship, The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global Competition, iv. 
30 For an overview of the whole of government approach see John G. Griffiths, “Whole of Government 
Approach Through Interagency Partner Development: National Security Professional Development” 
(master’s thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, June 13, 2014), 1, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA611024. 
31 Benn Steil, “How to Win a Great-Power Competition: Alliances, Aid, and Diplomacy in the Last 
Struggle for Global Influence,” Foreign Affairs, 2018. 
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conventional war. In today’s world, where nuclear weapons are prevalent among multiple 
adversaries, nothing seems to be more important than finding a way to stop enemy 
aggression without traditional war. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The intent of this study is to guide decision making and further discussion on 
security cooperation partnerships in GPC. It does this by developing a qualitative, three-
component model or mental framework—called the partnership framework. This model is 
referred to as a “framework” rather than a “theory” because, as one scholar also noted when 
using the term “framework,” it “is not a system of statements of cause and effect.”32 
Instead, the framework is a guide to describe a complex problem set. The partnership 
framework is analytical but not precise, meaning that it attempts to identify the necessary 
variables but does not attempt to place specific values on them. After development from 
existing literature, the partnership framework is then illustrated through three historical 
cases of partnerships in GPC. The framework is not tested or proven, for it does not attempt 
to analyze the data needed, nor is the framework as described truly provable. The case 
illustrations are intended to be examples of how to apply logic and thought from the 
partnership framework to future partnerships. Finally, this study identifies insight for U.S. 
decision-makers in a contemporary vignette of China in the South China Sea.  
The partnership framework has three components—willingness, capability, and 
effects on the enemy—which draw from several bodies of knowledge. The willingness 
component draws on principal-agent theory by looking for incentives needed to make 
partnerships successful. The capabilities component draws from business literature on 
partnerships and existing research on military building partner capacity in order to identify 
structures of interorganizational ties needed to fill a partner’s capability gaps. It also 
informs best practices on reducing friction between new capabilities and partnerships. 
Finally, deterrence theory informs the effects on the enemy. This three-component 
framework is developed and further justified in Chapter II. 
 
32 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Boston, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 55. 
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The qualitative model of partnerships—the partnership framework—is then 
illustrated in three relevant historical cases. The three cases are the Vietnam War (1954—
1964), Laos War (1959—1973), and unconventional partnerships under the Sino-American 
Cooperative Organization (SACO) (1942—1945). These specific cases are relevant for the 
study because the United States was a principal partner in each, all involve a form of 
competition between great powers, all are located in a region or country that is significant 
concerning current challenges in the South China Sea, and all built different capabilities. 
The variety of the three cases represents differences in agents chosen for partnership, the 
nature of the conflict, and the means utilized to implement the partnership. By using cases 
that are regionally relevant as well as which involve the United States and China as 
opposing primary principals, this thesis explores lessons that potentially apply to today’s 
problem sets.  
The early portion of the Vietnam War, specifically from the years 1954—1964, fits 
the criteria for this study. This timeframe was before the United States’ deployment of 
conventional combat units to the region. U.S. military partnerships and security 
cooperation with South Vietnam were extensive in the region following the French 
defeat.33 Prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the United States was putting most of its 
effort into partnering and advising the South Vietnam military forces instead of relying 
primarily on U.S. combat units.34 While there is ample material for looking at the United 
States’ partnership, China’s support to North Vietnam was also significant. Vietnam’s 
interests in the South China Sea today make the conflict even more relevant to the study.  
The war in Laos between 1959 and 1973 also provides a relevant conflict to study 
and analyze partnerships because it can be compared and contrasted with the U.S. effort in 
Vietnam. While facing a similar threat, the United States restricted most overt military 
measures, thereby changing the nature of the war. Laos was a declared neutral state, so the 
United States was officially unable to implement military advisors. The United States did 
 
33 Thomas E. Clinton, “Lessons Learned from Advising and Training the Republic of South Vietnam’s 
Armed Forces” (master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
2007), 11, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA471218. 
34 James Lawton Collins, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese 
Army, 1950-1972, Vietnam Studies (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 8. 
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have, however, several hundred advisors under a Department of State (DOS) group and 
was also paying a large portion of the Royal Laos military budget.35 This conflict also 
involved China directly and indirectly through North Vietnamese forces.36 This case’s 
similarities to Vietnam with respect to the threat faced should provide a useful contrast 
when looking at how the nature of the partnerships themselves differed. 
The two cases above provide useful cases for studying partnering with an 
established government or armed forces, referred to as Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or 
Security Force Assistance (SFA).37 It is also useful to study partnering in denied areas, 
referred to as Unconventional Warfare (UW).38 FID, SFA, and UW all fall in the broad 
category of security cooperation. The U.S. Navy participated in UW in China during 
World War II (WWII) through the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) from 
1942 to 1945. Although SACO primarily was intended to compete against the occupying 
Japanese Empire, this case also involves competition against Chinese communist forces, 
since the United State was focused on supporting Chinese nationalists. This case is unique 
because it involves UW with mostly conventional U.S. Sailors and Marines. The success 
of this partnership is worth investigating because the nature of the conflict and the means 
to carry out the partnership are different from the previous two FID cases. Vietnam and 
Laos both examine partnerships with established governments prior to a war, but this case 
provides an analysis of a partnership that is in a declared war, but not in the priority theater 
where significant American armed forces are operating unilaterally. The fact that it 
is a U.S. experience with security cooperation within mainland China also makes it relevant 
to today.  
With many cases of successful and unsuccessful partnerships throughout history 
and specifically within the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Area of Responsibility 
 
35 Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao 
Government, 1955-1975 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), 18. 
36 Roland A. Paul, “Laos: Anatomy of an American Involvement,” Foreign Affairs 49 (1971): 535. 
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Services of The United States. JP 3-22 (Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), I–2.  
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Services of The United States. JP 3-05 Special 
Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), xii. 
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(AOR), the three cases mentioned above provide a balance to looking at previous U.S. 
experience through varying the nature of the conflicts and the way that the partnerships 
were implemented. By looking at two U.S. FID cases, Vietnam and Laos, along with one 
UW case, SACO, this study will search for useful insights to apply in the current era of 
GPC and will illustrate the utility of the partnership framework.  
C. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This chapter introduced the topic of study by presenting the primary research 
question, outlining the topic’s importance, defining the scope of the study by defining terms 
in the research questions, and justifying the methodology. The study’s topic focuses on 
security cooperation partnerships in GPC, which has been relevant in the past and will 
likely continue to be relevant in the future. Overall, this study focuses on the small military 
component of the whole-of-government challenge of GPC, which this study refers to as 
security cooperation partnerships.  
Chapter II develops the partnership framework with three primary components: 
willingness, capability, and effects. The first component—willingness—draws from 
principal-agent theory and frames the relationship in partnerships as motivated by initial 
interests and incentives. The second component—capability—draws from business 
integration literature and existing literature on building partner capacity. This component 
helps identify potential partners’ initial capabilities and weaknesses, as well as the structure 
of ties that the United States can use to overcome capability gaps. The final component—
effects on the enemy—draws from deterrence theory in order to consider the impact of 
partnerships on rivals’ decision making. The result is the partnership framework, or a 
model, to aid in the understanding of the role of partnerships in GPC. 
Chapters III–V explore three relevant case studies, which illustrate and provide 
examples of how decision-makers can use the partnership framework. Each case represents 
a struggle between great powers using partnerships. Chapter III considers the Vietnam War 
from 1954–1964. This case outlines the U.S. actions, strengths and weaknesses of South 
Vietnam, and China’s decision making before the large-scale intervention by U.S. 
conventional combat forces. Chapter IV considers the conflict in Laos from 1959–1973. 
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This case is a unique contrast to the Vietnam War because of the different U.S. actions in 
the face of a similar communist threat. Chapter V considers the partnerships under the 
Sino-American Cooperation Agreement (SACO) from 1942–1945. This case is relevant 
because the United States carried out extensive efforts in the China theater of WWII 
through partners and without direct U.S. troops.  
Chapter VI identifies implications from the study. The first section of this chapter 
offers eleven total observations from the cases on identifying partners, improving U.S. 
efforts, and considering China’s responses. The second section offers a critique of the 
framework by challenging the partnership framework’s completeness. The critique of the 
framework offers several additional factors that can contribute to successful security 
cooperation partnerships in GPC and relates each additional factor to cases from the study. 
The third section is an application of the framework on a contemporary vignette. This 
section considers the tensions in the South China Sea by looking at China’s interests in the 
region, and possible opportunities and considerations for the United States. This section 
proposes that China has strong interests in the South China Sea, and that the United States 
may benefit from developing the surrounding nations’ paranaval security forces. The 
following chapter outlines the relevant literature and the proposed partnership framework. 
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II. BUILDING A FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS PARTNERSHIPS: 
THE THEORY AND APPLICABILITY 
This study proposes that willingness, capability, and effects are the most critical 
components to consider when evaluating partnerships with foreign security forces. This 
chapter outlines a framework for evaluating partnerships with foreign security forces in 
GPC by using theory and existing literature to develop three primary components: 
willingness, capability, and effect on the rival. This chapter will explain each of the 
principal components by first outlining the foundational theory or literature and then 
deriving the relevant evaluation criteria for assessing partnerships. The evaluation criteria 
for each component relates the foundational theories to the framework and is what the study 
will use for illustration in the cases.  
The first component of the framework, the willingness of the partner, draws on 
principal-agent theory in order to guide the initial assessment and shaping of the interests 
of partners. The first component proposes four evaluation criteria that are relevant to 
partnerships: initial overlap of interests, incentives, uncertainty, and information 
asymmetry. The second component of the framework, capability, draws on business 
integration theory and existing literature on building partner capacity. The second 
component derives four evaluation criteria from the literature that are relevant to 
partnerships: the strategy, initial capabilities, structure of the interorganizational ties, and 
the principal’s techniques. Finally, the third component of the framework, the effects on 
the rival, draws from deterrence theory to analyze enemy responses to U.S. partnerships. 
The third component proposes three evaluation criteria: type of cost, means of 
communication, and the impact on the cost-benefit analysis.  
A. FIRST COMPONENT: WILLINGNESS  
Principal-agent theory, or simply agency theory, explores the problems that 
originate from relationships when one organization or actor (the principal) contracts work 
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to another organization or actor (the agent).39 When a global power executes a partnership 
with a smaller power’s security forces, the partnership can be thought of as a contract of 
work, where the global power is the principal and the smaller power is the agent. Agency 
theory has been applied outside of business and economics in a similar context 
successfully. One study by Major Tyler Van Horn found value in the use of principal-agent 
theory in explaining the continuation of partnerships in unconventional warfare through a 
lens of looking at the overall positive expected value.40 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
partnerships can also be analyzed with this method, as the success of partnerships is often 
affected by how willing the agent is to execute the principal’s desires. Principal-agent 
theory can provide a framework to analyze differing interests between the United States 
and its partners, the problems that arise when interests differ, and methods to reduce this 
friction. The goal of this approach is to guide thought, not to utilize this theory as a precise 
and mathematical approach because modeling incentives of parties “is not precise, and 
cannot be made so.”41  Despite the lack of a precise method, agency theory can provide a 
useful tool to analyze the interests of the agents that the United States employs. 
1. Principal-Agent Theory 
A principal-agent relationship occurs when “one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another (the agent), who performs that work.”42 This theory originated as an 
economic model to explore how individuals or groups with different perceptions of risk, 
goals, and division of labor can share risk.43 The foundation of this theory is rooted in the 
problems that arise from the delegation of work with the presence of differing incentives.44 
 
39 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of 
Management Review: AMR 14, no. 1 (1989): 58, https://doi.org/10.2307/258191. 
40 Tyler G. Van Horn, “The Utility of Freedom: A Principal-Agent Model for Unconventional 
Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 57. 
41 Van Horn, “The Utility of Freedom, 15. 
42 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 58; Feaver, Armed Servants, 55. 
43 Eisenhardt, 58; Kenneth Joseph Arrow, The Economics of Agency (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, October 1984). 
44 Leo J. Blanken, Hy S. Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore, eds., Assessing War: The Challenge of 
Measuring Success and Failure (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 4. 
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The theory states that friction occurs because of differing ideas between the principal and 
the agent on risk, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and information.45 The basis of the 
theory rests in microeconomics, often business scenarios, where the principal seeks to 
maximize the monetary gain of a relationship while the agent seeks to minimize his cost, 
or effort, in completing the task.46 Essentially, we assume that the principal and the agent 
are self-interested and will seek to maximize the benefits while minimizing the costs. This 
assumption of self interest is the primary source of tension between the principal and the 
agent and leaves the principal with the decision of whether to allow the agent freedom to 
act in his own interests, or to accept a cost for either incentivizing or supervising the agent.  
Incentives in principal-agent relationships have two aspects: initial incentives and 
incentives provided by the principal to the agent. The agency problem is when the initial 
desire or interest of the agent may overlap but not perfectly align with that of the 
principal.47 The agent may have different initial motivations than the principal, which 
inherently incentivizes the agent to act outside the principal’s interest. Additionally, the 
incentives that the principal provides the agent can directly impact the success of the 
relationship. There are two different types of incentives outlined in this theory: behavior-
based and outcome-based.48 Positivist agency theory proposes that “when the contract 
between the principal and the agent is outcome-based, the agent is more likely to behave 
in the interests of the principal.”49 Outcome-based incentives reduce the self-interest of the 
agent by rewarding the desired action or outcome as opposed to behavior-based incentives, 
which grant the agent more leeway to act in his own interests. A simple example of 
outcome versus behavior-based incentives is a predetermined payment for the completion 
of a task verse an hourly wage. There is a trade-off between these two systems because 
while an outcome-based incentive aligns interests between the principal and the agent, they 
 
45 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 58. 
46 David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 580. 
47 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 58. 
48 Eisenhardt, 59. 
49 Eisenhardt, 60. 
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do not mitigate the risk of achieving the goal, instead, outcome-based incentives merely 
transfer the risk to the agent.50 
The incentive system affects the risk of the principal and the agent, but initial risk 
preferences can also impact the relationship. Differing risk preferences between the 
principal and the agent can create friction because it can result in a preference toward 
different actions.51 When the agent is risk averse, it can be “expensive to pass risk to the 
agent.”52 Risk adverse agents may demand more compensation for an outcome-based 
incentive but will often seek behavior-based incentives such as wages for hours of work. 
When the principal is initially risk averse, it will seek to transfer risk to the agent by 
offering outcome-based incentives.53 Initial risk preferences of the principal and the agent 
are often affected not only by the incentive systems but also by the outcome uncertainty of 
the task. 
Outcome uncertainty becomes an issue in principal-agent relationships because it 
impacts the ability of the principal to transfer risk to the agent. Outcome uncertainty in the 
completion of the task raises the risk for the agent when engaging in outcome-based 
incentives.54 When the uncertainty is significant, the agent will seek behavior-based 
incentives or ample compensation for outcome-based incentives, which increases the cost 
to the principal. Essentially, if the principal is contracting an agent to conduct a task in 
which either the possibility of completion or cost of completion are unknown, the principal 
will have an increased cost to shift the risk to the agent. While outcome uncertainty can 
impact the risk preferences and costs, information asymmetry also has a critical role in 
principal-agent relationships. 
Information asymmetry is a problem in the principal-agent relationship because the 
agent has an information advantage and it can be costly or not feasible for the principal to 
 
50 Eisenhardt, 61. 
51 Eisenhardt, 58. 
52 Eisenhardt, 62. 
53 Eisenhardt, 62. 
54 Eisenhardt, 61. 
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verify what is actually being done by the agent. Economics professor George Akerlof’s 
famous article “A Market for Lemons” outlines the importance of information asymmetry 
when representing, or misrepresenting, quality of goods or services.55 This idea relates to 
principal-agent relationships by assuming that agents who have private information will 
use it to their advantage to receive better rates from principals.  
Several elements can affect information asymmetry. One is the length of the 
partnership. Long-term partnerships, or multiperiod relationships, tend to have less 
information asymmetry because the principal is able to learn about the agent and typical 
behavior patterns.56 Information systems also play a critical role in reducing risk to the 
principal through the ability to monitor the agent. Information systems can be a variety of 
things, such as reporting procedures, boards of directors, or even technical surveillance.57 
Information systems are a cost to the principal in order to reduce the risk. Task 
programmability and outcome measurability also impact the information asymmetry.58 
Task programmability is the amount of specificity that can initially be outlined in advance 
in the contract. For example, a factory worker’s task can be entirely programmed into the 
contract in a step-by-step procedure, whereas someone hired to be an innovator or manager 
may not have as easily identifiable and measurable tasks. If the task programmability is 
high, the information asymmetry and risk to principal decreases. Additionally, if the 
outcome is measurable, meaning that the end state is easily identified, the risk to the 
principal decreases.59 
Moral hazards and adverse selection are two potential problems arising from 
incentives in principal-agent relationships. When one party makes the decision to accept 
the risk, but the cost of the risk is incurred by the other, this is referred to as a moral 
 
55 George A. Akerlof, “The Market for" Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970): 490. 
56 Richard A. Lambert, “Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard,” The Bell Journal of Economics 14, 
no. 2 (1983): 441, https://doi.org/10.2307/3003645; Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and 
Review,” 62. 
57 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 61. 
58 Eisenhardt, 62. 
59 Eisenhardt, 62. 
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hazard.60 Moral hazard can be a problem for either the principal or the agent. If the agent 
is making the risk decisions for the success of a task while the principal bears the cost, this 
can encourage the agent to take unnecessary risks. The same is true of the opposite 
scenario. If the principal is making risk decisions for the agent while the agent has outcome-
based incentive structures, the principal will be encouraged to take a large amount of risk. 
Adverse selection, or what economist Kenneth Arrow refers to as hidden information, can 
cause sub-optimal agents to be attracted to and obtain contracts with principals because of 
information asymmetry.61 Principals should be aware of these potential problems when 
engaging in principal-agent relationships.  
In summary, principal-agent theory helps to explain a contractual relationship for 
the completion of a task between two entities who have different goals and motivations. 
The principal elements that impact this relationship are incentives, risk preferences, 
outcome uncertainty, and information asymmetry. Scholar Kathleen Eisenhardt notes that 
the heart of principal-agent theory is “the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring 
behavior and (b) the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent.”62 
Despite the theory’s origin in economics, principal-agent theory can be used in a variety of 
settings. For example, Dr. Leo Blanken used the theory as a means to explain the problems 
of assessing war by looking at how incentives, information asymmetry, and operational 
benchmarks can cause friction when measuring the success of campaigns.63 Author Peter 
Feaver also uses agency theory to describe issues with civil-military relations in the United 
States.64 Although both of these examples use the theory to explore problems with internal 
U.S. relationships, similar concepts can be used for the military’s relationships with 
external partners. 
 
60 Arrow, The Economics of Agency, 3; Bengt Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell 
Journal of Economics 10, no. 1 (1979): 74; Stephen A. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The 
Principal’s Problem,” The American Economic Review 63, no. 2 (1973): 134. 
61 Arrow, The Economics of Agency, 6. 
62 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 61. 
63 Blanken, Rothstein, and Lepore, Assessing War, 4. 
64 Feaver, Armed Servants, 55. 
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2. Applying the Theory to Military Partnerships Framework 
This theory’s primary applicability to assessing military partnerships lies in the 
overlap of initial interests between principal and agent, the incentives used by the principal, 
the uncertainty of the outcome, and the information asymmetry. These four elements of 
principal-agent relationships, or evaluation criteria, can help highlight strengths and 
weaknesses in a partner’s willingness to act in line with the principal’s desire. Military 
partnerships often work in conjunction with political partnerships, so partners should be 
assessed at multiple levels. Even if a foreign military unit that is partnered with the United 
States military has incentives built into the partnership to produce the desired behavior, a 
significant overlap of interests, and minimal information asymmetry, the partnership may 
still be unsuccessful if the agent’s political structure and leadership do not employ the unit 
as intended. 
In addition to considering the relationship at the military level, military partnership 
principal-agent relationships can be examined at the government level by looking at the 
principal’s relationship with the agent’s political leaders. The goal of incorporating this is 
to bring the military partnership into the broader context of the complicated relationship 
which often exists between the United States and its partners. The importance of civil-
military relations to the success of military operations is agreed upon by most scholars, 
even while they disagree on how civil-military relationships should be executed. Sam 
Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations provides an argument for objective control 
and the sharp division of civilian and military roles.65 Eliot Cohen, on the other hand, 
offers a new theory which proposes that successful civilian leadership should be intrusive 
because all military operations are political in nature.66 Both, though, agree that political 




65 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 83. 
66 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, 
NY: Free Press, 2002), 225–48. 
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Principal-agent relationships can be examined at the military level by looking at the 
relationship with the military leadership or a specific unit that is partnered with the 
principal. Principal-agent relationships that look at an agent population are less useful than 
relationships at the military or political level because a population is generally not under a 
contract or understanding with the principal. The influence of the population is essential 
though, and can be accounted for when looking at the overlap of initial interests between 
the principal and the agent, particularly where the population’s impact on the political 
leadership is concerned. The argument to analyze partnerships at the military and political 
level is supported by U.S. military officer, Anthony Heisler, who noted that “the lower the 
level of political cooperation, the lower the potential for military cooperation.”67 
Essentially, this study must consider the relationship with two different entities, the 
government, and the military, while incorporating the importance of the population by 
looking at the impact on the political level. 
When looking at overlap of interests, the likely domestic and foreign policy 
objectives of the agent should be taken into account as well as the interests of key 
individuals when applicable. Principal-agent theory assumes that each entity is self-
interested and will have some conflicts with the other due to differing goals. Although 
cooperation is not dependent on complete overlap of interests, the level at which the initial 
interests of the principal and the agent overlap should be a careful point of consideration 
for all military partnerships. The main reason for this is simple: the initial interest overlap 
of the two entities has a direct impact on the cost for the principal. For example, if the 
United States and a potential partner have vastly different initial interests, the United States 
would have to accept high costs or a large amount of risk that the task will not be 
completed. Although initial preferences cannot be measured precisely, the consensus of the 
goals of each player is sufficient for the broad analysis. Therefore, this study will look at 
the initial preferences or goals of each partner at the governmental and military levels.  
 
67 Anthony F. Heisler, “By, With, and Through: The Theory and Practice of Special Operations 
Capacity-Building” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 146. 
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Following this analysis of initial preferences, this study will then look at the 
incentives that the principal implements to align the agent’s preferences with their own. 
When looking at incentives for the agent and their effect on the military relationship, the 
resources and threats utilized by the principal to influence the agent should be analyzed. 
Principal-agent theory utilizes outcome and behavior-based incentives to describe how the 
principal incentivizes the agent but, in reality, incentives are almost always a blend of the 
two with a combination of positive and negative incentives.68 The United States often 
utilizes funding and economic support as a positive influence and sanctions as a negative 
incentive. With respect to military partnerships, this could take place in the form of loans, 
military equipment, or even trade deals and even international recognition. This study will 
look at incentives directed to the security force partner as well as to the political entity 
which controls it. The incentives implemented in the context of the task will offer insight 
into the risks and costs on the United States to execute the partnership.  
When looking at outcome uncertainty, the strategic situation will be analyzed by 
considering the task that is being pursued by both the principal and the agent as well as 
what the assessed probability of task completion is. Is the task assigned to the partner or 
agent clearly identified and communicated, and is that task outcome uncertain? This 
question is crucial because it impacts the interests and motivations of the agent to carry out 
the principal’s desire. If the outcome uncertainty is high, the agent will be more likely to 
act in the protection of its own interests. For example, if a principal asks an agent to develop 
a new capability or technology that has not been proven or established, the outcome 
uncertainty, and therefore the risk, are both high. Imagine NASA’s task to land a human 
on the moon. No one knew if this was possible or how long it would take to complete, so 
for NASA to accept risk in the form of outcome-based incentives would be very 
challenging. Warfare has varying degrees of uncertainty that are worth considering. Even 
 
68 Han Dorussen, “Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives,” 
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (March 1, 2001): 251, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038002009. 
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Clausewitz, the prominent military theorist, observed that war is very uncertain, yet some 
military tasks are more unknown than others.69 
In addition to uncertainty, the information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent should be considered when engaging in military partnerships. The level of integration 
in the partnership and oversight of training and operations will affect the level of 
information asymmetry. The measurability of the outcome and the programmability of the 
task should also be considered. Military strategies can be broad and lack specificity, which 
directly reduces the measurability and programmability or objectives. When partnering in 
combat at the tactical level, tasks can often be specific and direct, but such clarity becomes 
more difficult before direct armed conflict. The information systems which were used to 
monitor the agent will also be considered. These information systems often can come in 
the form of placing advisors in critical areas or accompanying the agent during training 
and operations. Allowing the agent to produce its own assessments without oversight of 
the principal would create the most substantial information asymmetry while 
accompanying the agent on training and operations would create the smallest information 
asymmetry. Agency theory suggests that overseeing all aspects of the agent’s behavior 
is often not practical, but overseeing the most critical aspects is essential. Finally, the 
longevity of the relationship, the level of knowledge, and the degree of trust will 
be considered as they relate to information asymmetry and the costs it imposes on 
the principal.  
In sum, when utilizing principal-agent theory to assess the willingness of a military 
partner, this study will consider four evaluation criteria: overlap of initial preferences, 
incentives, uncertainty, and information asymmetry. Primary documents and official 
correspondence will be used to create a consensus on initial preferences. The incentives 
utilized by the principal to influence the agent’s behavior will be looked at from both a cost 
and risk perspective. Uncertainty will be considered by looking at the agent’s perspective 
of the achievability of the task. Finally, the information asymmetry between the two 
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entities, and the cost and methods the principal uses to monitor the agent will be considered. 
By looking at these four criteria, a hypothesis of whether the willingness of the partner is 
sufficient for a successful partnership can be tested.  
B. SECOND COMPONENT: CAPABILITY 
The capability of the partner, or agent, is a critical component of analysis for 
successful military partnerships. When engaging in any partnership, a principal should 
assess the initial capability of the agent and build or expand capabilities as they relate to 
the desired objective. Is the agent able to affect the environment with current capabilities? 
What are the capability gaps? Does the agent have sufficient quality of capabilities, but 
lack in quantity, requiring expansion of existing programs? In order to consider how new 
resources and capabilities integrate, this study will rely on business integration literature 
and existing military studies on building partner capacity. The goal of this section is to 
build the second component of the framework for assessing partnerships by analyzing how 
best to determine agent, or partner, capability. 
1. Integration in the Business World 
The business community has substantial existing literature that describes 
integrating companies and capabilities through interorganizational ties. These 
interorganizational ties are meant to improve collective efficiencies, defined by professors 
Luiz Mesquita and Sergio Lazzarini as “efficiencies that are unavailable to firms operating 
alone.”70 Gaining advantages through collective efficiencies is not a foregone conclusion 
and cannot be done without continued effort. Authors Yves Doz and Gary Hamel wrote 
extensively on strategic alliances in the business world and noted that “alliances cannot be 
crafted and set on autopilot. They require ongoing management of the relationship within 
a clear strategic framework.”71 The value and logic of partnerships in the business world 
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is clear and is generally pursued through three different avenues. First, partnerships can 
add value through gaining “critical mass globally or in a specific new market.”72 Second, 
partnerships can add value through knowledge gained in specific markets in order to 
become an insider.73 Finally, partnerships can allow access to critical or unique skills.74 
These three motives for partnerships encourage businesses to create interorganizational ties 
in a variety of different structures, including working with a competitor company that 
produces similar products. 
The three motives for partnerships create the need to develop interorganizational 
ties. There are two different types of interorganizational ties, vertical and horizontal. 
Horizontal integration involves ties between groups in the same industry, while vertical 
integration involves ties between groups in different but supporting industries.75 Both of 
these types of interorganizational ties have challenges, benefits, and friction points. 
Companies use vertical integration when they are not in direct competition, such as 
a shipping company partnering with a manufacturing company. Although there may not be 
direct competition, the partnership may still have difficulties due to transaction costs. 
Professor Jeffery Dyer argues that vertical integration in the automotive industry, when 
large auto manufacturing companies integrate with supply chains, can reduce transaction 
costs through investing in long term relationships.76 Japanese auto companies in this study 
had more efficient vertical relationships with their suppliers because of a high level of trust, 
information sharing, self-enforcing standards, and expectation of an enduring relationship. 
The challenges of vertical integration most often come from transaction costs while the 
benefits most often come from speed and increased specialization and expertise. 
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Manufacturing productivity increases in vertical relationships despite the presence of 
“moral hazards” such as free riding, late or low-quality efforts.77 
Horizontal integration benefits are often more challenging to justify at first glance 
because of the potential for direct competition between partners. Mesquita and Lazzarini 
argue that horizontal ties positively impact creation of collective resources and 
innovation.78 Doz and Hamel contribute to developing this idea through their notions of 
“co-option,”79 “co-specialization,”80 and “co-practice.”81 Co-option is described as a way 
to reach critical mass for competition against other competitors. For example, 
telecommunication companies may benefit from an alliance in the face of a growing threat 
from a rival alliance. It is the old notion that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Co-
specialization is a relationship that relies on either unique skills or unique regional access. 
External automakers have often developed a co-specialization relationship with Chinese 
companies in order to gain local access, become an insider, and beat Chinese government 
restrictions and regulations.82 Co-practice relationships rely on a knowledge or skill 
transfer between companies. Knowledge and skill transfers would take place when a 
technology transfer is not simple, or the time to develop the skill or knowledge alone would 
be lengthy and costly.83 While horizontal integration offers benefits through co-option, co-
specialization, or co-practice, horizontal integration challenges often stem from the thought 
of future competition for markets.  
The purpose of integration, both vertical and horizontal, is to create collective 
efficiencies for both parties. In business literature, there are three primary collective 
efficiencies that integration or partnerships aim to achieve. First is the building of collective 
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resources or activities in a “pooled” way.84 Pooled resources often are reflected in 
infrastructure that both parties can freely utilize. These pooled resources can be thought of 
as a public good and are referred to by Wharton School professor, Bruce Kogut, as a joint 
venture.85 Collective resources through pooled goods are often in the form of export 
infrastructure, such as a port, but could take the form of government support that would 
benefit both parties.86 Pooled resources could be a source of motivation for horizontal 
relationships or vertical partnerships to form. The second way companies achieve 
collective efficiencies is when activities or resources are related in a sequential way where 
“one’s input is another’s output.”87 An example of this in the business world would be the 
relationship between production and assembly of an item or the relationship between 
companies in a supply chain. This collective efficiency is clearly seen in vertical integration 
because the relationship involves different industries. The final way companies achieve 
collective efficiencies is when activities or resources are related to each other in a reciprocal 
way where “each agent’s input is dependent on the others’ output and vice versa.”88 This 
approach could be carried out through the co-specialization of knowledge or resources. 
In summary, existing integration literature in the business world identifies two 
broad categories of interorganizational ties, vertical and horizontal, each classified by the 
relationship between the capabilities and markets of the two parties. The existing literature 
identifies three primary ways to achieve collective efficiencies through interorganizational 
ties: to pool resources against a common threat, to gain unique on-the-ground knowledge 
of regions or markets, and to gain access to a critical skillset. How organizations are tied 
and the means utilized to achieve collective efficiencies are the two primary categories 
through which to assess collaboration and partnerships in businesses. 
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2. Existing Building Partner Capacity Best Practices 
While businesses across the world have experience identifying and carrying out 
partnerships in a variety of settings, armed forces also have been partnering to carry out 
their needs throughout history. It is not only essential to consider how new capabilities 
were integrated, but also the techniques utilized to introduce the new capability. Substantial 
literature from U.S. military sponsored studies exist concerning the successful execution 
of building partner capacity and the methods and best practices that should be considered. 
U.S. doctrine outlines best practices for security force assistance and partnering with 
foreign security forces. Additionally, many academics and military officers have conducted 
studies on this topic. Military officers recognize that partnerships with foreign armed forces 
are often carried out in dynamic and unpredictable environments. Anthony Heisler stated 
succinctly in his NPS thesis that “partnerships are tricky. They are intangible, constantly 
evolving, and dangerously susceptible to any number of internal and external factors.”89 
Despite this recognized challenge, studies suggest that there are best practices that raise the 
probability of success. Of the many conclusions that these studies draw, several 
commonalities stand out as they relate to the proper execution of building partner capacity. 
First, partnerships benefit from being implemented at multiple levels. Heisler 
identified that building partner capacity is “not a single act, but rather a series of tactical, 
operational, and strategic engagements carried out over an extended period of time in a 
dynamic and unpredictable partnership environment.” A RAND study in 2013 
recommended that in addition to building a specific capacity with a security force that the 
U.S. should also build sustainment capabilities and ministerial capacity or “the capability 
of a partner’s ministry of defense or ministry of interior to plan for and manage the partner’s 
military and security forces.”90 Major Stephan Bolton concluded that in addition to 
building capacity at the tactical level, capacities must be built “at the operational command 
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and ministerial levels to ensure best employment.”91 Although support through multiple 
agencies to a partner is often necessary for success, the complexity of a sponsor’s support 
can also hinder the overall effort if not executed and appropriately presented. NPS graduate 
students and military officers, Hoover, Self, and Yu stated, “sponsors should strive to shield 
their clients from the tactical disorganization that is inherent in coalition warfare, which 
will hamper unity of command, effort and mission, likely hindering BPC [building partner 
capacity] success.”92 It is a common theme that complex internal structures within the 
principal can often confuse an agent by sending mixed signals. The summary of these 
comments and studies is apparent: a principal partner must build partner capacity at 
multiple levels to ensure success. Building one capability within a single unit generally 
will not successfully accomplish the principal’s end state unless the agent’s command 
structure and sustainment capabilities are also present. 
Second, partnerships benefit from personal and enduring relationships. Heisler 
identified that although building partner capacity is “rife with frustration,”93 it can be 
mitigated through transparency and “open and frank lines of communication.”94 Hoover, 
Self, and Yu stated, “sponsors should deliberately manage personal relationships to 
overcome cultural and national wealth disparities.”95 Colonel Brian Petit argued, through 
a lens of operational art, that small footprint, long-term engagements are the key to 
executing a successful partnership.96 Another 2013 RAND study identified that a lack of 
multi-year authorities to work with partners affects efficient execution adversely.97 Major 
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Bolton agreed, stating that terminating a building partner capacity campaign should not 
mean ending the partnership because a principal must “maintain relationships and ensure 
continuity of partner capability.”98 
Third, introducing new technology to partners without adequate support hurts 
building partner capacity efforts in the long term. Odem stated that “technology imposes 
heavy demands upon partners. Equipping unproven fighters with complex armaments 
requiring layers of additional support, e.g., mechanics, armorers, engineers, and other 
skilled talent, will need external support to survive.”99 The problem of burdening partners 
with expensive technology or equipment can be mitigated by a best practice of including a 
sustainment package with new equipment, but this also increases the cost and degrades 
long term sustainability.100 
In sum, existing literature on building partner capacity indicates the common 
themes and best practices of partnering at multiple levels, establishing enduring 
relationships, and introducing the adequate level of equipment and technology. These best 
practices are agreed upon by studies from military officers and academics alike and can be 
used to guide analysis of past and present partnerships. The studies on building partner 
capacity and the proposed best practices are vast. Still, common themes aid a broader study 
such as this because they provide a basis under which successful partnerships have been 
conducted. 
3. Applying the Existing Literature to the Military Partnerships 
Framework 
This existing literature on business integration and building partner capacity can be 
useful for a framework for assessments on partnerships. Four evaluation criteria that the 
framework derives are the strategy, the initial capability of the agent, the structure of the 
interorganizational ties, and the principal’s techniques to build capacity. The reader must 
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understand the principal’s strategy in order to put partnership efforts into a broader 
perspective. Initial capabilities and limitations in the agent are essential in order to identify 
what will benefit the agent the most. The structure of the interorganizational ties and how 
a new capability is connected into the existing agent framework can be examined using the 
literature from the business community. Finally, the principal’s techniques to introduce a 
new capability can be checked against best practices that have been identified through the 
variety of military studies. 
In order to understand the gaps that arise from a look at the agent’s initial 
capabilities, the principal must understand the strategy in the conflict. Aligning the right 
capabilities to carry out the stated strategy should be taken into effect when looking at the 
capability of partners. This study will outline the stated strategy using the ends, ways, and 
means approach from the U.S. Army War College and then will identify current capabilities 
and capability gaps in the agent.101 Identifying this first in the framework provides context 
to the capabilities being introduced. Following an outline of the strategy and initial 
capabilities of the agent, this study will consider the following items for analysis. First, the 
structure of the interorganizational tie (vertical or horizontal) will be analyzed. Within the 
structure of interorganizational ties, the means with which collective efficiencies were 
obtained (pooled resources, knowledge transfer, or skills transfer) will be considered. 
Finally, this study considers the principal’s techniques of introducing the new capability 
based on best practices (engagement at multiple levels, enduring relationships, and 
appropriate level of technology and equipment that is sustainable). 
The two different structures of interorganizational ties to consider in partnerships 
and collaboration are vertical and horizontal. In the context of partnering with a foreign 
security force, a vertical integration relationship would consist of introducing an entirely 
new capability to the agent that can tie in with existing capabilities. An example of this 
would be the introduction of an air component that was previously not present. It could 
also consist of connecting multiple pre-existing components of the agent’s armed forces 
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that would not collaborate without the insistence of the principal. A horizontal integration 
relationship would be the expansion of an existing capability with either additional 
resources or manpower. This study will look at the structure of the interorganizational ties 
to determine whether it has an impact on the success of the military partnerships as it does 
in business partnerships. 
The structure of interorganizational ties is also affected by how collective 
efficiencies are achieved. Pooled resources occur when the principal and the agent have 
access to military units and resources. Collective efficiencies can also be exchanged 
through a knowledge transfer. This is often the case where mutually beneficial intelligence 
is shared between the partners when the agent often has superior access to local knowledge 
and the principal has access to intelligence globally. Skills transfer can come in the form 
of new tactics or knowledge about operating in specific environments. 
The final aspect of the capability framework will consider the principal’s 
techniques at introducing increased capabilities by comparing them to existing best 
practices. The substantial amount of literature on how to execute building partner capacity 
leads to three primary items: engagement at multiple levels, enduring relationships, and 
appropriate level of technology. A partnership conducted at limited levels of an agent’s 
government is negatively related to partnership success. Short term or episodic 
relationships increase the chance that the partnership will not produce the desired effects. 
Finally, introducing unsustainable technology is negatively related to long-term 
partnership success. 
In summary, when considering the capability of the partner this study will consider 
the strategy, the initial capabilities of the agent, the structure of the interorganizational 
ties (vertical, horizontal, the means with which collective efficiencies were achieved), and 
the principal’s techniques to increase the agent’s capabilities. 
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C. THIRD COMPONENT: EFFECTS ON THE ENEMY AND COERCION 
As the often-repeated military saying goes, the enemy always gets a vote.102 So 
when using partnerships as a tool in GPC, a principal should consider the effects on the 
enemy. What will the reaction of the rival be? Considering that GPC and deterrence 
strategies have gone hand in hand since the conclusion of World War II, deterrence may 
be a useful body of knowledge to determine enemy decision-making. Deterrence literature 
could be helpful in explaining and predicting the reactions of rivals, including great power 
rivals and their sponsored proxies. U.S. doctrine in JP1 identifies the closeness of 
partnerships and deterrence stating, “Security cooperation and deterrence should be 
complementary.”103 If the principal’s effort into the partnership does not change the rival’s 
behavior, is the partnership worthwhile? This section outlines the existing literature and 
then derives evaluation criteria for the effects component of the framework. 
1. Coercion, Deterrence, and Compellence 
The Unitary Rational Actor Model (URAM) is an integral part of understanding 
this body of knowledge because it establishes the foundation cost-benefit analysis through 
a bargaining range and provides reasons why rational states go to war. The URAM holds 
several assumptions that narrow the problem set of explaining inter-state interactions. The 
first assumption is that states act as a unitary actor. Unitary actors are referred to as “billiard 
ball” states that omit internal politics and internal players with different interests.104 It 
allows leaders to focus on the international system and omit internal tensions. This model 
does not view nations’ leadership as representing the population; it instead assumes that 
leadership is entirely secure in their position and ability to make decisions for the nation. 
The second assumption is that states are “rational.” Rational means that states will go 
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through all possible options and choose what is best based on calculated measures. 
Rationality omits any emotional components and non-state interests (individual, 
organizational, political) that could influence decision-makers, including irrational 
decision making or biases. This assumption suggests that all rational states, given the same 
information, should come to the same conclusion. Essentially, different conclusions should 
only occur if nations possess different information.105 
A claim, which is based on the assumptions above, is that all war has costs ex-post 
and, therefore, a bargaining range always exists between two rational nations. This claim 
is central to James Fearon’s arguments in his famous article, “Rationalist Explanations for 
War.” Fearon’s discussion of a constant bargaining range also shows that situations of 
“deadlock” do not exist.106 The situation of deadlock is when no mutually preferable 
bargain exists between two rationalist states. The notion that deadlock is a myth is only 
valid if the previous assumptions are correct. Irrational states and risk-acceptant states may 
have deadlock situations, but those scenarios are outside of this model. Additionally, states 
must be engaged in a conflict in which a continual range of peaceful settlements exists.107 
Essentially, items in dispute must be divisible in some form. 
There are two main reasons why unitary rational states can go to war. The first 
reason is rational miscalculations. Rational actors can reach different conclusions about 
their own nation’s or enemy’s will and power due to “private information” and the 
“incentives to misrepresent information” in the bargaining stage.108 This private 
information can lead nations to rationally misjudge their situation. There are many 
examples of miscalculation of an opponent’s willingness to fight, including nations in both 
world wars. Leaders’ private information and incentive to misrepresent are the root cause 
of disagreements on relative power and uncertainty about an opponent’s willingness to 
fight. Rational nations have incentives to misrepresent information about their power or 
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willingness to fight because they have incentives to obtain the best bargain within the 
bargaining range. Nations’ desire to get the best deal reduces the potential positive impact 
of information sharing because leaders may not believe the shared information even if it is 
clearly communicated. Leaders are hesitant to believe even clear communication because 
they cannot be sure if the country is being truthful or if they are trying to gain the best deal 
by over-representing their power and will.  
The second primary reason rationalist states can go to war is due to commitment 
problems, which stem from international anarchy.109 Even when there is no private 
information and adversaries correctly understand each other’s motivations, two major 
types of conflict can result from commitment problems. The first type of conflict resulting 
from a commitment problem is preemptive war. Offensive advantages can affect the 
bargaining range due to the odds of winning militarily with a first strike or if the cost of 
defending is much higher than the cost of attacking. The second type of conflict that results 
from commitment issues is preventative war. Preventative wars occur when leaders assess 
interstate interaction throughout multiple periods and can result in the inability of states to 
trust each other to keep bargains due to a poor track record. A preventative war may occur 
if the bargaining item in question can have an effect on the relative power of each nation 
in the future.  
State versus state deterrence literature is vast and it has contributed significantly to 
United States foreign policy. Scholar Jeffery Knopf defines deterrence as “a form of 
preventive influence that rests primarily on negative incentives.”110 Fundamentally, 
deterrence aims to prevent an action of a nation by threatening to implement costs if the 
nation takes the undesired action. Professor and strategist Thomas Schelling describes 
these negative incentives as “pain and shock, loss and grief, privation and horror.”111 
Deterrence differs from utilizing brute force to achieve an objective because it holds power 
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to hurt in reserve. Schelling said, “it is the threat of damage, or more damage to come, that 
can make someone yield or comply.”112 
States can traditionally accomplish deterrence by two paths: punishment and 
denial.113 Punishment is the “stick,” or threat of retaliation. Denial is posturing, or the 
ability to resist an undesired action, which would create costs on an enemy that are greater 
than the potential reward. Denial is where Schelling described that sometimes defense and 
deterrence merge.114 Schelling states that the goal of denial is to convince the rival that 
“the conquest would be costly, even if successful, too costly to be worthwhile.”115 This 
calculation assumes that nations are rational actors and deliberately make decisions to 
achieve goals. Fearon also describes the cost-benefit utility calculation for rational actors 
and the description of costs ex-post for conflict with his idea of a bargaining range.116 In 
his bargaining range, Fearon mathematically describes costs and benefits for taking action, 
which directly apply to deterrence thought. 
Signaling intent is a critical component of deterrence and is also one of the most 
considerable difficulties. Communication, either direct or indirect, is required for 
deterrence. The communication of the threat must be credible, meaning that a state should 
have both the capability and the resolve to carry out the threat. Direct communication can 
be accomplished by outwardly stating intent. Outwardly stating intent may not always work 
because nations are often bluffing and overstating their willingness to accept costs in order 
to achieve a better deal in the bargaining range.117 Fearon described this phenomenon as 
“incentives to misrepresent their positions.”118 Here, outwardly communicating will not 
work if the target nation does not believe the threat. 
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Indirectly communicating intent can be more convincing, but indirect actions can 
also be misunderstood or misread. Paradoxically, this can cause a nation to impose costs 
on itself in order to signal resolve. Schelling outlines the ways to self-impose costs, or 
potential costs, by utilizing the concepts of “trip-wires,”119 “burning bridges,”120 and 
“audience costs.”121 Trip-wires put something of enough value in place to ensure the 
undesired action would escalate into an undesired war. Burning bridges is the act of 
establishing a position from which a nation cannot yield or retreat, and will, therefore, fight 
over an undesired action. Audience costs involve a statement or commitment which, if not 
kept, would result in significant loss of prestige and reputation, either domestically or 
internationally. States can use any or all of these self-imposing cost techniques to signal 
resolve. 
When implementing self-imposing costs, a nation does not benefit by acting 
rationally or cool-headed.122 A nation should appear more willing to accept risk than its 
opponent. This apparent benefit of acting irrationally correlates with Schelling’s 
description of brinkmanship, which is “manipulating the shared risk of war.”123 Schelling 
compared brinkmanship to playing a game of “chicken.”124 In order to win a game of 
chicken, an actor must convince the opponent that he is more willing to accept the risk. An 
analogy for signaling this willingness is to dance close to the edge of a cliff in front of an 
opponent, thereby demonstrating a willingness to take things to the edge. Although the 
rationality assumption is critical in deterrence theory, the apparent irrational actor may 
deter an opponent because of his success in this game of brinkmanship. 
Non-state actors prove a different problem set when concerned with deterrence. 
Non-state actors are utilized by our nation-state rivals to inflict costs. Simply put, our rival 
nations often employ their own agents which can be difficult to deter because of difficulties 
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communicating, difficulties implementing costs, and deterrence traps. Non-state actors can 
conduct a provocative action that puts strong states in a lose-lose situation of either 
responding or not responding. This lose-lose scenario is referred to as a deterrence trap by 
Emanuel Adler.125 Not responding to provocative action by non-state actors results in 
losing face and diminished future deterrence capabilities relative to social and international 
norms.126 However, responding to the provocative action of a non-state actor with force 
can result in actually strengthening the group’s credibility with local populations.127 
In summary, deterrence is a form of influence that attempts to alter behavior due to 
the threat of negative impacts. Deterrence theory is rooted in the rational actor model, 
which argues that states go to war because of rational miscalculations and commitment 
problems. States can accomplish deterrence by communicating the intent to punish or deny 
undesired behavior. Communication can be accomplished directly but will have the 
drawback of credibility because of the known incentives to misrepresent one’s position. 
Communication can also happen indirectly through signaling capability or intent to do 
something. In the end, deterrence theory suggests that states rationally calculate perceived 
costs and benefits of particular actions. 
2. Applying Deterrence Theory to Military Partnerships 
Deterrence is vital as a form of influence when developing a framework for 
evaluating partnerships because security forces inherently are focused on adverse effects 
on the enemy, either punishment or denial. So partnerships described in this study go hand-
in-hand with deterrence. The intent of security cooperation partnerships is always to either 
posture by demonstrating a capable and united front with friends, or to use partners to 
punish rivals when it is too expensive or not feasible for the principal to take action directly 
against the rival. The focus on deterrence does not reduce the importance of using positive 
incentives for influencing rival great powers. Without a doubt, the principal partner nation 
must incorporate deterrence efforts into a broader strategy involving positive incentives for 
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the enemy for desired behavior in order to be successful. However, a principal partner 
nation always strives for adverse incentives on rival nations within the scope of security 
cooperation. 
Despite the need for nations to incorporate other forms of influence, deterrence 
theory may be useful to assess effects on the great power rival and its proxies when 
applicable. Indeed, partnerships could produce a deterrent effect on state sponsored non-
state actors and state sponsors alike. Jeffery Record smartly expanded on Andrew Mack’s 
and Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s ideas concerning asymmetric warfare when he noted that 
significant outside support might be required for the victory of a small power.128 In GPC, 
states use proxies to obtain influence, and proxies seem to rely on support from great 
powers for success. This framework will look at how the presence of a military partnership 
impacts great powers rivals’ decisions, including the decision to support irregular warfare 
campaigns. The United States heavily relied on conventional and nuclear deterrence 
throughout the Cold War, yet Record noted that U.S. conventional superiority “yielded 
conventional deterrence, however, it has pushed America’s enemies into greater reliance 
on irregular warfare responses that expose the limits of conventional primacy.”129 Milton 
Miles, the leader of the U.S. SACO partnership discussed in Chapter V, also noted this, 
stating, “so long as we have [atomic weapons], the odds are that we will not have to use 
them.”130 In fact, social scientist Kenneth Waltz famously predicted this in the early years 
of the Cold War when he stated, “mutual fear of big weapons may produce, instead of 
peace, a spate of smaller wars.”131 The rivals of the United States are and have been relying 
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on irregular warfare. This prospect indicates the need to assess deterrent effects at the 
irregular warfare level to deter support to a weak foe.  
There are three primary concerns with utilizing deterrence theory to assess the 
success of military partnerships: communication, non-attribution, and non-state actors. 
First, the difficulty of communicating a clear capability or threat is often a problem. 
Communication can be a problem, especially in unconventional warfare and GPC, because 
the participation of the principal is often concealed by design. Second, the rival can often 
respond in ways that are non-attributable. For example, rivals often use the non-attribution 
in the cyber domain in order to beat traditional deterrence measures.132 Russia and China 
purposefully act below the threshold of traditional deterrence or escalate in a non-
attributable manner that cannot elicit a massive response.133 Third, the use of non-state 
actors in the great power arena makes deterrence difficult. The challenges of deterring non-
state actors do not make it impossible, but the United States should broaden the scope to 
both influence and deterrence, as argued by Paul Davis in his 2002 RAND study on 
counterterrorism.134 Where deterrence is likely to fail, influencing the severity of a rival’s 
action will have to be considered. 
Despite these concerns, this theory is useful in providing a foundation to consider 
the effect on the rival because it provides a cost and benefit decision-making framework. 
This study proposes the following three criteria for analysis in the third component of the 
partnership framework. First, it will consider the type of cost used for influence 
(punishment or denial) and whether this has an impact on success. Second, it will consider 
the means of communication (direct or indirect signaling). Finally, it will consider the 
impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the rivals, including the great power and the proxy. 
The intent of the three criteria, and this component of the framework, is to provide a means 
to explain and predict enemy actions. 
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D. SUMMARY OF THE FRAMEWORK 
This study’s framework for evaluating the potential for a successful partnership 
with foreign security forces in GPC draws from multiple areas of study in order to consider 
the proposed three primary components of willingness, capability, and effects. Each of the 
primary components draw from existing theories or literature and together are refined for 
the application of assessing partnerships with foreign security forces in the context of GPC. 
From the existing theories and literature, this study derived evaluation criteria that may 
help explain and predict the potential success or failure of a partnership. 
The first component—willingness—draws from principal-agent theory to evaluate 
the willingness of a potential partner. The literature offers a foundation to develop four 
evaluation criteria to consider: the initial overlap of interests, the incentives used by the 
principal to influence the desired behavior, the uncertainty of the success of the task, and 
the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.  
The second component—capability—draws from literature on business integration 
as well as existing studies on building partner capacity to evaluate the capability of a 
potential partner. The literature offers several evaluation criteria to consider: the strategy, 
the initial capabilities of the agent, the structure of the interorganizational ties (vertical, 
horizontal, the means with which collective efficiencies were achieved), and the principal’s 
techniques to increase the agent’s capabilities. 
The third component—effects—draws from deterrence theory to evaluate the 
potential effects on the rival. The literature offers a foundation for the following evaluation 
criteria: the type of cost used for influence (punishment or denial), the means of 
communication (direct or indirect signaling), and the impact on the cost-benefit analysis of 
the rivals, including the great power and the proxy. 
In sum, this study proposes a three-component framework, called the partnership 
framework, for evaluating partnerships in GPC. The partnership framework is illustrated 
by three historical cases in Chapters III, IV, and V. In Chapter VI, the lessons from the 
framework and the cases are applied to a current strategic problem relating to China. In 
addition to the three primary components of the framework (willingness, capability, 
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effects), this study explores other potentially relevant factors when applicable. The 
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III. PRE-QUAGMIRE: THE EARLY VIETNAM WAR (1954–1964)  
The early U.S. participation in Vietnam (1954–1964) is essential for this study’s 
analysis of military partnerships in GPC, and specifically against China, for several 
reasons. First, the Vietnam War had a powerful impact on United States foreign policy and 
strategic thinking well beyond the conclusion of the conflict.135 Second, it is a complicated 
case with significant U.S. involvement through support to an agent, South Vietnam. Third, 
many often overlook the early years of the conflict, before significant U.S. conventional 
forces arrived, despite containing important lessons and implications for U.S. military 
strategy.136 Many tend to focus on the failure of the large-scale intervention that brought 
unsuccessful search and destroy operations after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and not on 
how or why the earlier partnership failed to stop China’s and North Vietnam’s escalation. 
Finally, evidence of significant and impactful support from the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) to North Vietnam allows for a look at how the PRC conducted operations in the past 
and how these observations may be relevant to the United States’ competition with the 
PRC today.137 
The U.S. participation in Vietnam leaves many to question why and where it went 
wrong. Strategist Eliot Cohen noted, “Decades after the Vietnam debacle, professional 
soldiers were still debating whether the United States could have won the war and what the 
proper strategy would have been.”138 George Allen, a senior American intelligence officer 
in Vietnam, said, “One of the great mysteries of the American involvement in the Indochina 
Wars is why the Vietnamese army failed to develop into a first-rate military force.”139 This 
 
135 See Cohen’s discussion of the war’s impacts on the view of civilian control and on shaping 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s Doctrine in 1984. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Free Press, 2002), 184–87. 
136 This argument is embedded throughout the Moyar’s book. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The 
Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
137 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, The New Cold War History (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
138 Cohen, Supreme Command, 2002, 180. 
139 George W. Allen, None so Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam 
(Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 99. 
46 
chapter will apply the partnership framework to the early years of U.S. partnership with 
the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and the Government of Vietnam (GVN), which failed to 
shape the environment to prevent the later large scale intervention in 1964, described by 
historian Andrew Krepinevich as a “quagmire.” 140 This chapter will outline the early 
involvement in Vietnam by using the three components of the partnership framework—
willingness, capability, and effects. The intent is to illustrate the utility of the partnership 
framework and to identify specific Chinese methods and responses to the U.S. partnership. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. participation in the Vietnam War from 1954—1964 was a part of a more 
extensive series of struggles in Indochina. The period from 1954 until 1964 is when the 
United States began to play a large role as a partner with the GVN but before the large-
scale intervention by conventional units. 1954 is a significant turning point in the U.S. 
involvement because, following the Geneva Accords, the United States replaced France as 
the primary supporting ally in Vietnam. The focus of this study will end at the year 1964 
when the United States passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which represented the failure 
of the GVN to support itself without significant U.S. conventional forces.  
In order to understand the United States’ involvement, it is crucial to understand a 
brief background of Vietnam in the years leading up to 1954. Prior to WWII, France 
controlled all of Indochina as a colony. Japan and indigenous groups challenged France 
during and after WWII. During WWII, Indochina was under the control of the Vichy 
French government and Japan, but the allied powers supported resistance movements 
against them. One of the leaders that the United States supported was Ho Chi Minh, leader 
of the Viet Minh and the future communist leader of North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh had 
hoped for U.S. support for independence following WWII, but support never came because 
of various political pressures from France.141 An Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer 
who worked with Ho during WWII said that many in the OSS admired the Viet Minh and 
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supported siding with them for independence.142 France forcefully communicated its 
desires to retain control of Indochina to the United States, despite only liberating Paris 
shortly before. In a message to Washington, Paris said, “If the public here comes to realize 
that you are against us in Indochina, there will be terrific disappointment, and nobody 
knows to what that will lead. We do not want to become Communist; we do not want to 
fall into the Russian orbit; but I hope that you do not push us into it.”143 In the end, the 
United States reluctantly supported France, and the French supported the Vietnamese 
Emperor, Bao Dai. 
France’s attempt to reassert control after WWII spiraled into a conflict with the 
various Vietnamese nationalist and communist groups, known as the First Indochina War. 
France’s defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh led to French capitulations 
outlined in the Geneva Accords.144 The Geneva Accords of 1954 had several applications 
that are relevant to the Vietnam War: it split Vietnam into two separate countries at the 
seventeenth parallel, restricted the two Vietnams from obtaining foreign military 
assistance, and stipulated a date for unification elections in 1956.145 North Vietnam would 
be under the control of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, while South Vietnam would be 
under the control of Emperor Bao Dai. Neither Bao Dai’s representatives nor the United 
States signed the Geneva Accords, and neither felt obliged to follow it. 
Emperor Bao Dai quickly conceded control of South Vietnam to Ngo Dinh Diem, 
a Vietnamese nationalist who fought against Japanese and French control. Ngo Dinh Diem 
was a complicated figure representing the political interests of the GVN. Diem maintained 
political control of GVN from 1955 when he won a referendum to become head of state, 
until his assassination in 1963.146 Diem’s control spans the majority of the period of study 
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and is, therefore, a critical aspect of understanding GVN’s political interests. Bao Dai 
specifically asked Diem to become premier and consented to his “total control over all 
civilian and military matters.”147 Many, including the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, 
criticize Diem for being self-interested and corrupt, but many others admired Diem. 
Historian Mark Moyar generally aligns his thoughts on Diem with that of then-U.S. 
military advisor in Vietnam and U.S. military icon of the Philippine partnership effort, 
Edward Lansdale, believing that Diem was a misunderstood but a good man. Moyar cites 
Lansdale who said of the misunderstanding of Diem,  
When someone describes him as an aloof mandarin, I recall how he cried 
on my shoulder when our close friend, Trinh Minh The, was killed, his 
anguish over the loss of Phat Diem province in the North to the 
Communists, and the agony he went through in his final break with Chief 
of State Bao Dai. He simply doesn’t parade his feelings for everyone to see, 
particularly when things are going wrong.148  
Moyar argues that Diem was in an impossible position. He states, 
No ideology that Diem could have chosen would have both satisfied the 
intellectuals and permitted his anti-Communist government to survive, for 
the liberal methods that appealed to the Westernized intelligentsia were the 
opposite of the authoritarian methods needed to control the masses and 
shield them from subversives.149 
Diem may have been in a difficult position; however, his political methods of 
control were sometimes morally questionable. Diem was torn between protecting his own 
power and defending against the communist threat. He certainly wanted to defend against 
communism, but he also wanted to retain Vietnam’s sovereignty and run the country in his 
own way. Diem’s desire to run Vietnam in his own way did not appeal to the United States, 
which often tried to project an image of itself onto Vietnam, an image that did not fit 
correctly.150 Diem’s power over South Vietnam was always tenuous. From the very 
 
147 Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 33. 
148 Moyar, 34. 
149 Moyar, 37. 
150 Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam, 60; Odom, “Broken Mirrors,” 17. 
49 
beginning of Diem’s reign, rumors of coups and plots against him were everywhere.151 
Diem often promoted his political supporters within the ARVN and the GVN because of 
this and placed his brothers and in-laws, the Nhu’s, in the highest positions of 
government.152 In 1956, Diem ended the “ancient Vietnamese tradition that permitted the 
peasantry to elect village officials” and required those positions to be personally appointed 
by him.153 Diem’s actions often went against the United States’ desires but may have been 
necessary for Diem to defend against opposing factions within South Vietnam. 
Despite the use of harsh measures, Diem’s rise to power was impressive when 
considering all of the obstacles he contended with from the very beginning. When Diem 
came to power in 1954 South Vietnam was stripped of the numerous catholic districts in 
the north that would have been a basis of Diem’s support, Viet Minh supporters were spread 
across the countryside, two dominant French-supported armed politico-religious groups 
(Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao) opposed him, and a powerful gangster organization called the 
Binh Xuyen controlled much of the capital of Saigon.154 The ARVN was almost entirely 
incapable of combat operations and was now in a nation with four other competing armies: 
the French Expeditionary Corps, the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen.155 It 
seemed that everyone that had any power in South Vietnam was opposed to Diem; in 1955, 
the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen joined forces, likely with encouragement 
from the French, in order to oppose Diem’s government.156 It is reasonable to assume that 
the French opposed Diem as a way to maintain the ability to manipulate the GVN due to 
Diem’s consistent opposition to French since the end of WWII. Diem secured the support 
of the United States and quickly defeated the immediate non-communist threats to his 
power, but the threats posed by non-communist factions influenced Diem’s regime 
throughout his time in power. 
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Diem contended with several coup attempts throughout his reign. By 1963, support 
for Diem, both within South Vietnam and the United States, began to deteriorate because 
of perceived authoritarianism and inadequacy at addressing the communist insurgency. As 
support for Diem began to deteriorate, a highly publicized confrontation with Buddhist 
protesters in 1963 had significant negative consequences by degrading public support for 
Diem in the United States.157 Shortly after the protests, a South Vietnamese general 
assassinated Diem in a coup that took control of the government. Diem’s assassination 
marked a turning point in the GVN. 
Following Diem’s assassination in 1963, the GVN became very unstable and 
endured several more coups. Vietnam historian Guenter Lewy stated,  
as it turned out, we did not win with Diem’s successors, who shared most 
of Diem’s shortcomings, while in addition they lacked his prestige as a 
nationalist and mandarin-father figure, and therefore never enjoyed the 
respect and support of either the country’s educated elite or the common 
people.158  
The power of the GVN to govern diminished following Diem and contributed to the need 
for the United States to escalate the conflict and introduce large numbers of ground combat 
troops to assist, as opposed to remaining in an advisor and supplier role. 
The United States government, rightly or wrongly, placed an enormous strategic 
value on Vietnam and Indochina because of what is known as the domino theory. George 
Kennan’s “Mr. X” paper in 1947 is what sparked and mobilized the idea of containment of 
communism by arguing that communism would fail on its own if not allowed to expand.159 
Several of Kennan’s ideas were incorporated into National Security Council (NSC) policy 
paper “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” better known as 
NSC 68.160 President Eisenhower aligned his thoughts and actions to the domino theory 
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and NSC 68. He argued for the importance of Vietnam and Indochina in 1954 by 
referencing the effect that Indochina’s fall to communism would have on the rest of 
the region.161 
While the United States may have overstated the importance of Vietnam, many of 
the surrounding nations were, in fact, nervously monitoring the U.S. defense of capitalist 
nations for fear of their own security. Almost all the surrounding capitalist nations were 
facing threats from communist guerrilla movements, including Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.162 Even more powerful independent nations in 
the region, such as India and Japan, were watching the region closely due to potential 
economic impacts. Whether the fall of Vietnam would have led to the eventual fall of all 
the others is irrelevant because the U.S. leaders at the time believed that they would. 
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were believers in the domino theory and the 
strategic importance of Vietnam.  
While Diem was attempting to consolidate his political control and defend against 
the Communists, the United States cycled through different strategies on how to approach 
the GVN politically. The partnership between the GVN and the United States from 1954—
1964 spanned three U.S. presidents, who each had varying approaches to achieve political 
interests with the GVN. Each president during this period increased the amount of aid and 
support to the GVN. Each increase in aid came with a different structure of 
interorganizational ties, which changed the nature of the partnership with GVN. 
President Eisenhower thought that “Indochina was worth saving if the United States 
could save it by sending additional military aid or employing more of its airpower, but it 
was not valuable enough to warrant sending American combat troops.”163 Following the 
Geneva Accords, Eisenhower helped organize and create a regional defense strategy that 
relied on deterrence, the threat of massive retaliation, and supporting indigenous leaders. 
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In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed by Australia, 
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States with Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam listed as protected nations instead 
of signatories due to restrictions from the Geneva Accords.164 This alliance was essentially 
Asia’s version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). SEATO, along with the 
threat of nuclear weapons, air, and naval power, was meant to deter any large-scale war 
and eliminate the need for U.S. ground troops. Eisenhower wanted to conserve resources 
for the long fight against communism. William Rosenau, a researcher, stated, “Conserving 
American resources for this long period of competitive co-existence was central to 
Eisenhower’s national security strategy.”165 Eisenhower had to balance participation and 
support to Vietnam with global security interests, making complete devotion almost 
impossible.  
President Kennedy’s strategic thought on how to support South Vietnam diverged 
from President Eisenhower’s, but he too believed in the importance of defending the nation 
from communism. Kennedy was less reliant on conventional deterrent measures such as 
Eisenhower’s massive retaliation strategy. When Kennedy assumed the presidency in 
1961, the United States had only 685 advisors under the Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) in Vietnam.166 Kennedy immediately increased the number of advisors 
and increased the number of U.S. Special Forces to conduct training on counter-insurgency 
tactics. In 1962, Kennedy stepped-up U.S. involvement again, replacing the MAAG with 
the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V), increasing advisors and material 
support, and approving the use of defoliants to burn the jungle used by guerrillas as 
cover.167 By the end of 1963, the year that both Kennedy and Diem were assassinated, the 
United States had 16,263 military personnel in Vietnam.168 The beginning of Kennedy’s 
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presidency marked a turning point in the partnership; it increased training and support 
while focusing more efforts toward counterinsurgency. 
President Johnson also placed a high priority on defending South Vietnam from 
communism, especially as the threat from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and 
Vietnamese Communists (VC) heightened. Johnson’s presidency also marks a turning 
point that transformed the partnership into a massive U.S. intervention. The change to a 
massive U.S. intervention shows that the United States viewed the previous partnership as 
a failure because the GVN could not stand on its own. So, the priority of this analysis will 
focus on the years before Johnson’s increase in support, but briefly acknowledging the 
events in the post-Kennedy years is useful.  
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, the U.S. Congress granted President 
Johnson the authority to use military force against North Vietnam.169 This led to a massive 
conventional buildup of U.S. forces to protect the GVN. The U.S. buildup continued until 
the Tet Offensive in 1968 when the Vietnam War as a whole came into question.170 After 
the Tet offensive, the U.S. and President Nixon eventually sought peace with honor.171 
The United States, under President Nixon, eventually signed the Paris Peace Accords in 
1973, which allowed for peace and the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Two years after 
the Paris Peace Accords, North Vietnam broke the treaty and achieved a decisive victory 
over the GVN with a conventional military invasion. Ultimately, all the money and effort 
the United States exerted to support the GVN was wasted. Although the efforts, especially 
at the security force level, were eventually for nothing, it is crucial to outline what the 
military and security efforts were from 1954—1964 in order to explore why the early failed 
partnership led to escalation. 
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At the security force level, U.S. support came in a variety of means to police, 
paramilitary, and the military. In addition to training the ARVN for external threats, the 
United States focused considerably on developing internal security in the GVN through 
partnerships with several primary units: Self-Defense Corps (SDC), the Civil Guard (CG), 
and a paramilitary unit called Sûreté (later named Vietnam Bureau of Investigation 
(VBI)).172 These units were “generally poorly equipped, ill-trained, and poorly 
disciplined” with “ammunition that was limited and so old that only about one round in 
seven was likely actually to fire.”173 The United States focused on making the ARVN 
capable of defending against a conventional military invasion from the North, attempting 
to separate the military from internal security. This separation would prove to become a 
problem when the Viet Cong increased guerrilla attacks. Some noted that “while the Viet 
Cong appeared able to hit Civil Guard Posts and grab off officials with apparent ease, they 
usually give the Army and Marines a wide berth.”174 
Beginning in 1955, the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) provided police 
and public administration specialists to advise Vietnam on police, paramilitary assistance, 
and internal security forces through training and advice on organization and 
modernization.175 The group set up a six-week basic training course for the CG and 
advised the GVN to utilize them as a strictly civilian police force. The strict civil police 
role was the opposite of what Diem and the MAAG wanted. Diem wanted the use the CG 
as a loyal army that he could use against disloyal factions, while General Williams viewed 
the MSUG as “police types who don’t see the big picture.”176  
The internal U.S. debate over the role of the CG continued throughout the early 
partnership with GVN, with the MAAG only gaining control over the unit’s training in late 
1960.177 MSUG attempts to improve the CG failed because of two primary factors that are 
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relevant to this study. First, the MSUG advisors had limited operational control over the 
CG.178 Second, the MSUG refused to create the capabilities that the CG needed in order 
to be successful against insurgents because of a desire to build a police force off of the U.S. 
model.179 After the MAAG took control of the CG from MSUG, the CG became 
militarized but “solved none of Vietnam’s military or internal security problems.”180 
MSUG’s problems with the CG carried over to its efforts with other GVN security 
forces. MSUG served as a mediator between the Vietnamese police clients and the aid 
bureaucracy, and would help supply $10 million in resources, which included 
communications equipment, small arms, ammunition, fingerprinting equipment, and motor 
vehicles to various units.181 Sûreté and other GVN police forces were “tainted by 
corruption, incompetence, and an unpalatable French colonial legacy.”182 The corruption 
caused much of the population to lose confidence in the GVN. MSUG recognized other 
problems with Sûreté, including inept leadership, technical and organizational problems, 
inefficient decentralization, and nepotism. Diem resisted some of MSUG’s proposals to 
address these issues because he feared the centralization of the internal security apparatus 
as a threat to his regime.183 Sûreté had a long history of partisanship and of being used as 
a political instrument to retain power, which is why MSUG likely encouraged them to 
change the name to the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (VBI).184 Not surprisingly, 
Washington became concerned about “the ability of university professors to advise and 
train Vietnam’s counter-subversive police.”185 To address this concern, Eisenhower began 
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using agents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to work under the auspices of 
MSUG to improve and oversee training efforts.186 
The MAAG took on the responsibility of training and advising the ARVN. In 1954, 
the MAAG was a small organization, “woefully inadequate to assume the entire burden of 
training [the ARVN],” but steadily grew in personnel, responsibility, and scope of 
engagement.187 General O’Daniel, the MAAG commander in 1955, consistently 
recommended to the ARVN and the GVN to concentrate all of the dispersed units into 
larger divisions so that they could defend against a potential conventional invasion from 
North Vietnam from a few strategic locations.188 This was a consistent flaw in the thinking 
at that time, because it overlooked the need of the ARVN to provide internal security 
functions for GVN supporters against hostile sects and the Viet Cong. The MAAG 
generally did not want to get in the business of internal security, which it viewed as a role 
for police forces. Many would accuse the MAAG, and other U.S. agencies that were 
supporting the GVN, of protecting its own organizational interests instead of U.S. national 
interest.189 The replacement for General O’Daniel, General Williams, also focused on 
preparing for defense against a conventional invasion, viewing guerrillas and insurgencies 
as a diversion.190 
The unimpressive performance of the Self-Defense Corps (SDC), a “rural militia 
established by the Vietnamese president,” was a source of contention between Diem and 
officials like U.S. Ambassador Dubrow.191 The MAAG, however, had high hopes for the 
SDC, envisioning success as a static force to defend the countryside. Although the SDC 
had problems with communist infiltration into its units, competency, and corruption 
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concerns, the MAAG supported militarizing it in order to allow the ARVN to concentrate 
on conventional war preparation with North Vietnam.192 
In 1960, Diem established new elite ranger companies from volunteers from the 
ARVN and CG, and he requested U.S. Special Forces (SF) from the MAAG to assist with 
the commando training.193 Diem’s proposal met resistance from General Williams and the 
MAAG, despite support from DOD’s Advanced Research Project Agency.194 William’s 
concerns about additional SF personnel breaking Geneva Accords restrictions on 
increasing manpower to train the commando units were bypassed by only assigning them 
on temporary duty.195 In August 1960, General Williams was succeeded by General 
McGarr, a commander much more friendly to the development of the ranger units.196 The 
training of the GVN ranger units as mobile strike forces was different from other SF efforts 
made in pacification and counter-insurgency. 
SF units supported the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the Civilian 
Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) until the whole operation was turned over to SF 
beginning in 1962.197 The CIDG program transferred to the Military Assistance 
Command-Vietnam (MACV) under the name Operation SWITCHBACK. This program 
focused on pacifying villages and tribes that were not under substantial GVN control. SF 
personnel, along with the CIA, trained villagers to fortify their towns and developed local 
strike forces that could respond with small arms if anyone in the village came under 
communist attack. SF and CIA focused on ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands area, 
especially the Montagnard tribes. The CIDG focus on pacification was, by many accounts, 
very successful. Krepinevich reports that the CIA “considered the program a rousing 
success, and for good reason: by the end of 1962 the CIDG political action program had 
recovered and secured several hundred villages, some three hundred thousand civilians, 
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and several hundred square miles of territory from the [Viet Cong].”198 The local 
pacification effort had a very high success rate against Viet Cong attacks and villages were 
voluntarily opting into the program.199 Despite the success at local pacification, MACV 
quickly changed the nature of CIDG once it assumed control from the CIA in 1963. 
Operation SWITCHBACK would eventually shift the local tribes’ focus from mutually 
supportive village defenses to offensive operations and border surveillance operations.200 
By late 1963, CIDG forces would be incorporated into the broader military pacification 
effort, the strategic hamlet program.201 
The strategic hamlet program showed initial signs of success at protecting 
government-controlled villages. As opposed to CIDG, strategic hamlets were focused on 
areas where the local population was in theory under the control of GVN. The program 
officially began in February 1962 and attempted to consolidate the rural population into 
areas that the ARVN protected, but earlier strategic hamlet efforts with similar intent were 
initiated in response to Viet Cong escalation in 1959.202 By mid-1962, GVN reported over 
3,000 strategic hamlets. These hamlets were meant to isolate the population from the Viet 
Cong and to protect against communist attacks. The United States’ plan for the strategic 
hamlets was to use the VBI to gather intelligence on the Viet Cong, the CG to patrol and 
secure areas between the hamlets, the SDC to provide security within the hamlets, and the 
ARVN to keep the Viet Cong off balance by using small unit patrols.203 Although not 
necessarily a weak operational plan, the failure in the years before to address the 
ineffectiveness of the VBI, CG, SDC, and the ARVN all contributed to the failure of the 
strategic hamlets. Rosenau stated, “Ultimately, however, the strategic hamlets never 
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proved to be a significant obstacle to the insurgents, who by infiltration and destruction 
managed to ‘liberate’ three-quarters of them.”204 
While the United States implemented partnerships and support programs to aid the 
GVN, the PRC developed plans for the subversion of South Vietnam. Qiang Zhai, the 
author of China & The Vietnam Wars, 1950—1975, stated that Mao’s interest in supporting 
North Vietnam was “motivated by a complex blend of geopolitical, ideological, and 
historical factors.”205 Geopolitically, Mao wanted a security bubble from capitalist 
nations. Mao viewed Vietnam, similar to Korea and Taiwan, as an area from where the 
United States, or even remnant Chinese nationalist forces, could launch invasions.206 
Ideologically, Mao was aligned with the international spread of communism and he 
maintained his revolutionary mindset even after the PRC came into power.207 Mao 
believed that he personally had a “special role to play in reshaping of a future revolutionary 
order in the world.”208 Finally, from a historical sense, Mao viewed North Vietnam and 
Ho Chi Minh as tied to China through recent and distant history. Indochina had been 
“within the tributary system” of China for over 1,000 years, and previous Chinese emperors 
intervened on several occasions to defeat both domestic uprisings and foreign invasions.209 
Before French influence in the region in the 1800s, all influential Vietnamese “learned the 
Chinese language and the cultural and ethical principles embedded in it.”210 Mao not only 
looked back on the long history of China’s cultural and political domination of Vietnam, 
but he also remembered Ho Chi Minh’s and the Viet Minh’s “timely and crucial assistance 
that Ho had provided for their forces in southern China in 1946 when they faced 
annihilation by the KMT [Chinese nationalist] troops.”211 While the PRC under Mao had 
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extensive perceived benefits to supporting North Vietnam, the actual support ebbed and 
flowed under domestic and international pressures. 
Before the Geneva Conference in 1954, Mao provided aggressive support to North 
Vietnam to use against the French. Mao influenced Ho Chi Minh to pursue an aggressive 
Dien Bien Phu campaign in order to enable the communists to negotiate from a position of 
strength.212  After the Geneva Conference, Mao and the PRC temporarily lessened support 
and encouraged North Vietnam to pursue non-violent means to achieve unification. Mao 
wanted to “reduce tensions in Asia and to concentrate on the implementation of the First 
Five-Year Plan [domestic reform plans] at home.”213 Mao’s thoughts immediately 
following the Geneva Conference were in line with Chinese Primer Zhou Enlai’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which supported a moderate policy in Vietnam.214 
Essentially, the PRC “played an important role in the Viet Minh victory over the French” 
between 1950 and 1954 but began to support a more diplomatic and non-violent approach 
to Vietnam following the 1954 Geneva Accords.215 Chinese leaders “advised caution and 
patience, urging the Vietnamese to make preparations and wait for opportunities” when it 
came to unifying the North and South.216  
Despite evidence that domestic concerns drove the PRC’s moderation after the 
Geneva Accords, the United States also influenced the PRC by instilling fear of a sizeable 
Korea-like war. Mao had, on several occasions, showed fear of retaliation by the United 
States and the SEATO alliance. For example, during the second Strait of Taiwan crisis in 
1958, Mao “strictly forbade his generals to engage American warships.”217 This restriction 
is an example of Mao’s desire to limit direct military engagement with the United States, 
conceivably because of the high costs that a conflict presented. Unfortunately, Mao’s initial 
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risk-averse thought process encouraged North Vietnam to build up support for an 
insurgency and refrain from direct military invasion.  
As President Kennedy increased U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, the PRC 
responded with an increase in support to North Vietnam. Policy debate within the PRC in 
1962 resulted from Kennedy’s increased support. While some notable PRC leaders still 
advised international moderation and domestic focus, many within the PRC began to see 
moderation as failing. Most importantly, Mao began to view peaceful coexistence with 
capitalist countries as unrealistic, leading to his decision to support national liberation 
movements with more vigor.218 Mao even had the Korean War as a template to use 
Chinese troops as ‘volunteers’ in the case of a U.S. invasion into the North. In June of 
1964, Mao told North Vietnamese Army officials that “if the United States invaded North 
Vietnam, China would send troops to the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North 
Vietnam] in the form of volunteers.”219  
China and North Vietnam’s interests and support for operations against South 
Vietnam had more success than the United States’ support for the GVN. Despite all the 
initiatives and support that the United States provided to the GVN at the military level, the 
armed forces of the GVN were not adequate and the U.S. effort did not have the desired 
effect on the communist rivals. Vietnam scholar, Andrew Krepinevich, wrote it best when 
he stated, “From 1954 to 1965 the Army failed to generate forces in the [GVN Armed 
Forces] capable of efficiently combating insurgencies.”220 Moreover, the ARVN was also 
not capable of combatting conventional attacks, for even the larger ARVN units did not 
have a high success rate against DRV forces, often throwing away their weapons when 
attacked. The Battle of Ap Bac in 1963 is a classic example of the failures of the ARVN in 
conventional battle, where “vastly superior Vietnamese Army forces [ARVN] supported 
by helicopters and armored personnel carriers were defeated by a battalion of Viet 
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Cong.”221 The following sections will apply the U.S. and GVN partnership to the 
framework to explore why U.S. efforts did not create a capable force nor achieve the 
desired effect on China. This application of the framework provides an example of how 
the framework can be used, tests the framework for usefulness, and explores Chinese 
reactions to military partnerships in the past. The first component of the framework—
willingness—will provide the first look at problems with the partnership. 
B. WILLINGNESS 
There are several criteria to consider when evaluating a potential partner in GPC: 
the initial overlap of interests, the incentives used by the principal to influence the desired 
behavior, the uncertainty of the success of the task, and the information asymmetry between 
the principal and the agent. Overall, the willingness of the GVN left much to be desired. 
The gaps in willingness, as exposed by the partnership framework, seem to stem from an 
overestimation of initial overlap of interests on both sides, weaknesses in incentive 
structures, and substantial information asymmetry. The United States and the GVN did 
have a significant initial overlap of interests, but the overlap led the GVN to believe that it 
had significantly more control over the United States than in reality. The incentive 
structures were loose and behavior-based, which shifted risk to the United States. The 
uncertainty in the ability to obtain the objectives was high and the information asymmetry 
was substantial. 
The United States and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) had a significant initial 
overlap of interests at the political level, but there were also noteworthy gaps. Each wanted 
to prevent South Vietnam from falling into the control of the communists. Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson all placed considerable strategic importance on defending Vietnam 
because of the potential domino effect. However, the overlap of interests and the United 
States’ constant shows of resolve to the communist countries allowed Diem and the GVN 
to believe that the United States would never leave. Lewy stated that “while these shows 
of resolve had little if any effect on the Communists, they did indicate to Diem that there 
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was no danger of the U.S. suddenly abandoning South Vietnam.”222 Diem’s belief that the 
United States’ interests were, perhaps, more overlapped with his own than in reality 
encouraged him to pursue his domestic interests against American advice. Diem primarily 
wanted to retain and consolidate his own domestic power, therefore, he often supported 
unqualified leadership within the government and the armed forces due to their political 
support. The United States, on the other hand, was focused toward balancing global 
security commitments against communism. Many viewed the defense of Europe as more 
significant than that of Asia. This disagreement allowed for the United States to break from 
the GVN and pursue its political interests in other areas, as evidenced by the withdrawal 
years leading up to 1973. 
At the security force level, the initial overlap of interests was often lacking for two 
primary reasons: the U.S. military and other U.S. advisors often had their own 
organizational interests, and the ARVN and GVN security forces were rampant with 
corruption. The MAAG and MAC-V tended to focus on what they knew best, conventional 
warfare. The MSUG focused on what it knew best, civil policing actions. The partnerships 
at the security force level from the American perspective tried to turn the South Vietnamese 
partners into American institutions. The MAAG, MAC-V, and MSUG all focused on 
initiatives that would benefit their own organization and which were in line with their view 
of the conflict. From the South Vietnamese side, some security force partners were devoted 
and successful, but many were corrupt and ineffective. The organizational interests of U.S. 
advisors, combined with the corruption of the GVN units, made the relationships between 
security forces tenuous. 
The incentives used by the United States to influence Vietnam’s behavior were 
ineffective in producing the desired effects despite the considerable power it gave to the 
United States. The incentives consisted of an enormous amount of support through military 
advisors, equipment, loans, and the use of international power to shape the political 
environment. In the later years of the war, the United States provided so much support to 
Vietnam that it became counterproductive. Robert Komer, known as “Blowtorch Bob” 
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during Vietnam for his familiarity with counterinsurgency, said, “The very massiveness of 
our intervention actually reduced our leverage. So long as we were willing to use U.S. 
resources and manpower as a substitute for Vietnamese, their incentive for doing more was 
compromised.”223 In a typical year, the United States would pay for over 80% of all GVN 
military expenditures and almost 50% of all GVN non-military expenditures through some 
form of aid.224 To say that the GVN was reliant on these incentives would be an 
understatement; the GVN would almost certainly have collapsed without the aid. GVN’s 
significant reliance on the United States, unfortunately, had limited effects on controlling 
Diem and the ARVN because of the minor stipulations attached to the aid. The incentives 
that the United States used were behavior-based instead of outcome-based, resulting in 
enough flexibility for the GVN to maintain the status quo in South Vietnam. For example, 
the United States provided military equipment and aid to the GVN up front, with the 
expectation that the GVN would continue resisting communist advances. Weak incentive 
structures did not cause the unwillingness of the GVN alone. Uncertainty in the conflict 
and information asymmetry both contributed to the lack of willingness. 
The uncertainty within partnerships, with respect to the ability to complete and 
monitor objectives, directly impacts the portion of risk sharing between the principal and 
the agent. In the case of Vietnam, both completing and monitoring the objectives were very 
uncertain. The United States’ objectives were to secure the GVN and the population from 
Viet Cong attacks, as well as deter and, if necessary, repel a conventional invasion by a 
Chinese-supported North Vietnam. When considering the vast diversity of ethnic groups, 
the rivalry between South Vietnam’s national factions, and the overall lack of enthusiasm 
for the Diem regime, the uncertainty in repelling Viet Cong attacks was high. All of these 
internal rivalries within the GVN provided opportunities for the Viet Cong to infiltrate and 
conduct operations throughout the country.  
The ability of the GVN to deter or repel a conventional North Vietnamese attack 
was also very uncertain because of the operational sanctuaries outside the borders of South 
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Vietnam and the significant foreign support. The North Vietnamese had extensive military 
support from China and had sanctuary in the countries of Laos, Cambodia, and China. This 
sanctuary gave North Vietnam the initiative and ability to attack when and where it suited 
them. When considering that the United States exercised restraint against North Vietnam 
and other border countries during this period, it adds additional uncertainty to an already 
complicated scenario. In addition to difficulties and uncertainties achieving objectives, 
monitoring objectives was also a problem for the United States because of a variety of 
factors that led to information asymmetry. 
The information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, in this case, was 
considerable for several reasons. First, the cultural differences created problems in 
understanding and encouraged the GVN to mislead the United States. Second, the ARVN 
conducted operations across the entire countryside and it was impossible for the United 
States to monitor everything. Examples of the significant information asymmetry are 
numerous. For example, concerning the reported success of the strategic hamlets, the 
United States eventually found out that the GVN reports were wildly exaggerated and that 
most of the reported hamlets were only on paper.225 Additionally, the CIA realized in 1960 
that Vietnamese reports from provinces were “routinely doctored to make it appear that 
they were continually conducting successful anti-communist operations.”226 Army 
historian Ronald Sector noted that “the deliberate falsification of operational reports plus 
the lack of any reliable and precise method for advisers to assess the effectiveness of their 
units may account for the failure of Americans in the advisory group.”227 The GVN and 
the ARVN consistently misled or lied to the United States to benefit their own interests. 
The vastness of the countryside and the dispersed operations of the Viet Cong made 
monitoring actions of the GVN expensive and challenging. The United States was required 
to take the GVN at their word far too often within the established incentive structures. 
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In summary, this framework exposes the deficiencies in GVN’s willingness. The 
United States and the GVN undoubtedly had sufficient initial overlap of interests, but it 
was an overestimation of the overlap by both sides that led to problems. The United States 
implemented loosely controlled, behavior-based incentive structures, which created 
significant risk. The uncertainty in the ability to obtain the objectives was high and the 
information asymmetry was substantial. Robert Komer stated, “we did not use vigorously 
the leverage over the Vietnamese leaders that our contributions gave us. We became their 
prisoners rather than they ours; the GVN used its weakness far more effectively as leverage 
on us than we used our strength to lever it.”228 Komer’s quote is an accurate summary of 
the problem with the willingness of the GVN. Unfortunately, the low willingness of the 
GVN and the ARVN is only the beginning of the problems with partnership in South 
Vietnam. The GVN and the ARVN also had weaknesses in capability that the second 
component of the framework exposes. 
C. CAPABILITY 
There are several evaluation criteria to consider when evaluating the capability of 
a partner: the strategy, the initial capabilities of the agent, the structure of the 
interorganizational ties (vertical, horizontal, the means with which collective efficiencies 
were achieved), and the principal’s techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities. 
Despite the substantial interorganizational ties, the United States failed to bring the low 
initial capability of the armed forces of GVN to an acceptable level. This is due to a 
combination of several factors, including low initial capabilities, lack of coordination 
between many interorganizational ties, and a failure to use best practices in building partner 
capacity. 
The successes and failures of the strategy in Vietnam are debated, even today. 
Colonel Summers, the author of On Strategy, said in 1982 that “it is indicative of our 
strategic failure in Vietnam that almost a decade after our involvement the true nature of 
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the Vietnam war is still in question.”229 Summers argues that the failure in Vietnam was 
ultimately due to inadequate conventional forces. Conversely, scholars such as Andrew 
Krepinevich argue the opposite, that our defeat was due to our over-reliance on 
conventional methods and failure to prioritize counterinsurgency.230 Despite 
disagreements about the strategy in the later years of involvement under Johnson and 
Nixon, the broad strategy in the early years followed a reasonable path. Even Summers 
said that “from the French withdrawal in 1954 until President Diem’s assassination in 1963, 
the American response was essentially correct. The task at hand was one of assisting South 
Vietnam to become a viable nation state, and the U.S. military advisors contributed to that 
end.”231 Partnership with the GVN was the bedrock of the strategy in Vietnam, at least 
until the escalation years in 1964—1965. 
Immediately following the 1954 Geneva Accords, President Eisenhower developed 
a Southeast Asia strategy that “in order to guard the line, against both conventional invasion 
and covert subversion, the United States would give aid to allies and participate in a 
collective defense organization in the region [SEATO].”232 The aid and the deterrent 
support of SEATO were the means. Utilizing training and various interorganizational ties 
with GVN were the ways. The ends were a free South Vietnam and the containment of 
communism. The risk in this strategy was that the U.S. would place too much effort on a 
nation with a weak foundation. This risk is now painfully obvious when considering the 
eventual downfall of the GVN.  
The initial capabilities of the GVN armed forces were meager at the beginning of 
the U.S. partnership in 1954. On almost all fronts, the GVN and the ARVN had extreme 
deficiencies. The nation itself was in ruins. Diem took control of a South Vietnam that 
“showed all the symptoms of a country despoiled by prolonged warfare.”233 This ruin 
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included blown up bridges, destroyed infrastructure, displaced peasants, overburdened 
public facilities, an exodus of French business and investment, and a deficiency in military 
machinery. Additionally, the political power of the Diem regime was always under 
pressure from internal competition. 
From a military standpoint, GVN’s initial capabilities were equally low. One report 
stated, “The Vietnamese National Army lacks everything which makes a modern army: 
leadership, morale, training, and combat experience.”234 The ARVN had previously relied 
heavily on the French for external security and therefore lacked the structure of a large 
army. Nepotism and corruption also contributed to the weakness of the leadership within 
the ARVN.  
In addition to weakness in the ARVN, the internal security forces also lacked 
capability. The internal security forces were so weak that “the paramilitary forces could 
not even protect themselves.”235 The CG was equipped with obsolete French firearms and 
equipment. Rosenau said of the CG, “Discipline was poor, many guardsmen were illiterate, 
and morale was low. The force lacked experienced officers and instructors, its training 
facilities were non-existent, and its communication network was antiquated.”236 VBI and 
the CG remained corrupt and brutal in the field while lacking the proper equipment and 
procedures necessary for investigative or paramilitary work. To balance out the weak initial 
capabilities of the GVN security forces, the United States created extensive 
interorganizational ties to provide equipment, training, and advice. 
The structure of the interorganizational ties between the United States and the 
GVN was an extensive array of vertical and horizontal ties. The massive effort by the 
United States spread across a variety of GVN security forces and used a variety of U.S. 
personnel. Vertically, the United States did build and create brand new units and 
capabilities that did not exist before. Additionally, the United States provided its own 
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unilateral capabilities for specific missions and deterrent effects. Horizontally, the United 
States trained already existing GVN security forces. 
The CIDG is an example of a vertical interorganizational tie between the GVN and 
the United States. The United States, through the CIA and U.S. Special Forces, created an 
entirely new capability within the central highland tribes to defend themselves and 
eventually conduct offensive operations and reconnaissance missions. The partnership with 
the central highland tribes was one of the few successful partnerships within Vietnam. The 
tribes, although many fought against the French and the Viet Minh previously, benefited 
greatly from the American equipment and training from U.S. Special Forces. 
Additional vertical interorganizational ties existed at higher levels with the United 
States’ use of unilateral forces in several ways. The United States utilized its own forces to 
conduct deterrence shows of force and airstrikes against the enemy. The U.S. Navy was 
positioned in the South China Sea to restrict blatant North Vietnam shipments of war 
material to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Additionally, President Kennedy began to use 
the U.S. Air Force in offensive sorties. Finally, the United States’ push for SEATO 
provided the political leverage needed to support South Vietnam with a vertical 
relationship.  
Horizontal relationships were the most extensive. The United States built upon 
already existing programs and units to improve manning, training, and equipping. The CG 
and the VBI were already existing, albeit weak, security forces. Much of the U.S. effort 
went to building these existing units and their capabilities. The MSUG played a critical 
role in partnering with the CG and the VBI in the late 1950s by providing material and 
training. MSUG created basic training courses and eventually trained more than 14,000 
guardsmen.237 When the MAAG took over responsibility for the CG, training and 
assistance was much more generous, providing for 68,000 guardsmen.238 
The MAAG was also conducting horizontal relationships with the ARVN. The 
ARVN, like the CG and the VBI, already existed before the partnership with the United 
 
237 Rosenau, 63. 
238 Rosenau, 74. 
70 
States. The beginning of this horizontal relationship with the ARVN was primarily 
responsible for providing and managing equipment given to the GVN. The ARVN had a 
significant lack of proper equipment. After the French withdrawal, they “had quickly 
shipped out the best U.S. equipment, leaving what they did not want in unprotected dumps 
of in open fields, where it was corroded by heat and rain until the South Vietnamese army 
scrounged it up.”239 The primarily equipping relationship eventually evolved into one with 
more training, advising, and even accompanying ARVN units.  
The United States fell short on some, but not all, previously identified principal’s 
techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities. The United States did not adequately 
partner with South Vietnam for the long term, which hurt the relationship and the success 
of the partnership. The advisory group relied on “one year, unaccompanied tours without 
family members.”240 This frequent rotation and lack of consistent personnel did not align 
with best practices and did not encourage long term realistic assessments of the ARVN 
capabilities. Additionally, there was a massive language barrier that the U.S. failed to 
address in the advisory effort. Between 1956—1959, the U.S. advisors only had an average 
of twelve personnel with Vietnamese language training.241 
Not only did the U.S. advisors often fail to create enduring relationships because of 
short tours and language barriers, they often refrained from establishing close relationships 
with Vietnamese counterparts. Some believed that they needed close personal relationships 
to be useful. Still, others believed in keeping some “maneuver distance” from their 
counterpart in order to ensure that they could have leverage when needed, shield 
themselves from perceived corruption or unethical actions of the counterparts, and limit 
the risk of losing respect of the South Vietnamese by being overly friendly.242 
Despite failing to create enduring relationships, the United States did engage at 
multiple levels within the GVN. The amount of support provided, and the extent of the 
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partnership, was conducted through many different U.S. agencies and departments and 
provided a wide variety of capabilities in the GVN. One could say that it was not the 
amount of engagement that was the problem in Vietnam but the lack of coordination 
between the U.S. engagements. Different U.S. organizations consistently fought over the 
roles of the various GVN security forces, including the CG, SDC, and VBI. The internal 
squabbling caused a lack of clear direction for some of the units, such as the CG, which 
spent years receiving training as a police force only to be militarized later on. 
Although the United States did not adequately coordinate the extensive 
engagements or shield Diem from bureaucratic infighting, it did introduce the appropriate 
level of technology in most cases. For the most part, the United States provided necessary 
military equipment to the ARVN and GVN internal security forces. However, the level of 
technology that the U.S. provided was not always perfect. The MSUG tended to provide 
material that would not meet the insurgent threat, only routine police work. The MAAG 
provided equipment that was best suited to fight large North Vietnam divisions, not armed 
guerrillas fighting among the populace. For example, the MSUG advocated for providing 
internal security forces with only pistols, which were often inadequate to address insurgent 
attacks.243 Conversely, the MAAG advocated for providing armored vehicles and tanks 
which were not useful against guerrilla tactics. 
In sum, the initial capabilities of the GVN were meager politically, economically, 
and militarily. The ARVN and other internal security forces had limited equipment and 
experience. The United States implemented extensive vertical and horizontal 
interorganizational ties to overcome initial weakness. Despite the substantial 
interorganizational ties, the United States failed to bring the low initial capability of the 
armed forces of GVN to an acceptable level. This failure is due to a combination of several 
factors, including low initial capabilities, lack of coordination between many 
interorganizational ties, and a failure to use best practices in building partner capacity. In 
addition to producing limited willingness and capability within the GVN, the partnership 
with South Vietnam also did not have the desired effect on the enemies of the PRC, North 
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Vietnam, or the Viet Cong, who were able to continue to attack South Vietnam. The third 
and final component of the framework—effect on the enemy—identifies the impact on 
enemy decision making. 
D. EFFECT ON THE ENEMY 
In general, the United States’ partnership with the GVN did not produce the desired 
effects on the PRC, North Vietnam, or the National Liberation Front (NLF or Viet 
Cong).244 An Assistant Secretary of State in 1964 correctly predicted the coming failure 
of deterrent efforts against the communists when he said, “In my judgment, significant 
action against North Vietnam that is taken before we demonstrate success in our counter-
insurgency program will be interpreted by the Communists as an act of desperation, and 
will, therefore, not be effective in persuading the North Vietnamese to cease and desist.”245 
The primary reason for the PRC, North Vietnam, and the NLF’s reaction is because each 
placed a high value on pressuring the United States. Additional factors include a common 
desire to spread communism and unify Vietnam. Despite evidence that the United States 
deterred an all-out invasion of the GVN, the PRC, North Vietnam, and NLF all viewed the 
potential costs of subversive actions against the GVN as well worth the benefits. Also, 
cultural differences between the PRC/North Vietnam and the United States resulted in each 
misreading of the other’s signaling and communication. The partnership framework offers 
the following evaluation criteria for considering effects on the enemy: the type of cost used 
for influence (punishment or denial), the means of communication (direct or indirect 
signaling), and the impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the rivals, including the great 
power and the proxy. 
The type of cost that the United States used for influence against the communist 
organizations of the PRC, North Vietnam, and the NLF was a combination of punishment 
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and denial. Much of the early efforts of the United States were denial forms of cost. Efforts 
to build competent security forces, secure the borders of the GVN, and to secure the 
population through the strategic hamlet initiatives and predecessor initiatives all fall in the 
denial category. The United States wanted to make the GVN a hard target by increasing 
the capability of security forces, both internal and external. Efforts to secure the border 
came along the 17th parallel border with North Vietnam, along the coast with the U.S. Navy, 
and eventually along the borders of Laos and Cambodia with border surveillance missions. 
The denial forms of cost to make the population a hard target came in the form of strategic 
hamlet initiatives, which, as described earlier, utilized various security forces to protect 
consolidated communities in the countryside. 
In addition to the substantial denial costs implemented, the United States and the 
GVN eventually started to incorporate more and more punishment costs. The punishment 
costs include direct costs on the Viet Cong through identifying and targeting of supporters 
and sympathizers. The United States also punished North Vietnam through eventual cross 
border operations that ran under Operation SWITCHBACK and the CIDG program. These 
programs developed local strike forces that conducted operations inside South Vietnam 
and eventually inside Laos and Cambodia to attack North Vietnamese regulars and identify 
targets for airstrikes. The United States also began implementing offensive air sorties into 
North Vietnam under President Kennedy, as a means to apply direct costs on North 
Vietnam. 
The means of communication that the United States used to deter and coerce the 
communist block was a combination of direct and indirect. The United States directly 
communicated through statements and international media. President Eisenhower and 
President Kennedy made statements to the American people throughout their terms that 
stated their seriousness in protecting the GVN and promoting SEATO as a deterrent 
organization. The presidents’ speeches provided the bulk of the early direct communication 
to the PRC, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong because the United States did not openly 
negotiate until the later years of the war.  
Indirectly, the United States communicated through escalatory actions and by using 
intermediate countries to pass messages. Escalatory actions, or indirect communication, 
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include providing additional military equipment, training, and U.S. personnel in South 
Vietnam. Other indirect communication through escalation includes using the U.S. Navy 
in the South China Sea to signal resolve. The United States used allied nations to 
communicate because it did not recognize North Vietnam or the PRC from 1954—1964. 
For example, in 1964, the United States utilized Canada to convey a message to North 
Vietnam that “the U.S. would initiate air and naval actions against North Vietnam unless 
the Communists stopped their escalatory course.”246 This indirect communication was 
necessary until direct negotiations took place under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.  
Cultural differences inhibited much of the direct and indirect communication 
between the United States and China. Scholar Richard Betts outlines cultural differences 
as a significant problem in signaling and communicating with rivals. Betts argued that 
“cultural blinders prevent the common frames of reference necessary to ensure that the 
receiver hears the message that the signaler intends to send.”247 In reference to U.S./PRC 
relations, Betts said, “American and Chinese statesmen utterly misread each others’ aims, 
calculations, and tactics in Cold War confrontations because of societal differences in 
values and axioms.”248 A scholar with a background in both Chinese and American 
culture, Shu Guang Zhang, agrees. In his book, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-
American Confrontations, 1949—1958, Zhang argues that China and the United States did 
not understand each other’s coercive signaling and did not view indicators such as 
casualties and military killing capacity in the same light.249  
The impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the rivals, including the great power and 
the proxy, is the most important criteria to consider because it analyzes the actual output 
of the U.S. efforts. The U.S. activities throughout the early involvement did impact the 
PRC, North Vietnam, and elements of the Viet Cong, though not always in the desired way. 
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Although each was affected by projected costs imposed by the United States, each entity 
had a strong perceived desire to continue the resistance against the United States and the 
GVN. 
The PRC perceived substantial benefits from supporting North Vietnam, believing 
that the stability of communist North Vietnam was a vital interest even during the French 
years of influence. For instance, Mao Zedong committed early material support to Ho Chi 
Minh shortly after defeating the Chinese nationalists in 1949, a time when his own stability 
was not totally achieved. In 1950, the PRC provided 14,000 rifles, 1,700 machine guns, 60 
artillery pieces, 300 bazookas, 281 Chinese military advisors, and “a variety of other 
military equipment” to combat the French.250 This level of support is particularly 
impressive considering that the PRC had just won a brutal civil war with the Chinese 
nationalists and was, at the same time, concerned with U.S. participation on the Korean 
peninsula. Mao was motivated to support North Vietnam by geopolitical, ideological, and 
historical factors.251 Mao wanted a security bubble from capitalist nations, the spread of 
Chinese communist influenced governments, and the survival of past supporters of his 
revolution. Domestic and international pressures or costs also influenced the PRC’s 
perceived benefits of supporting North Vietnam. 
After the Geneva Conference in 1954, Mao temporarily reduced support while 
encouraging North Vietnam to pursue non-violent means to achieve unification. The PRC’s 
temporary reduction in support for North Vietnam could have been a deterrent effect from 
the United States’ initial partnership with South Vietnam, but it seems just as likely that 
the PRC’s domestic concerns drove the decision. Mao’s focus on the First Five-Year Plan, 
along with Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, both offer evidence of 
considerable domestic pressures.252  
While domestic pressures were undoubtedly present, perceived international costs 
also influenced the PRC’s desire for moderation after the Geneva Accords. The United 
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States shaped the PRC by instilling fear of a large Korea-like war. Mao revealed this fear 
of retaliation by the United States and SEATO during the second Strait of Taiwan crisis in 
1958 when he forbade engaging American flagged ships.253 The perceived high costs of 
direct military engagement with the United States caused Mao to simply encourage North 
Vietnam to build up support for an insurgency. Chinese leaders advised North Vietnam 
that “it is inappropriate for [North Vietnam] to wage large-unit operations” and that “[North 
Vietnam] should carry out protracted guerrilla warfare to expand their forces” for several 
years.254 
The PRC’s eventual increase in support for North Vietnam partly aligns with 
President Kennedy’s increased U.S. intervention in South Vietnam. Mao began to reject 
the idea of peaceful coexistence and start supporting national liberation movements with 
more vigor.255 Mao’s sentiment of willingness to escalate efforts in the face of increased 
U.S. pressure was echoed by PRC premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1964 when he said, “Our 
principle for the struggle should be to do everything we can to limit the war to the current 
scale while preparing for the second possibility [American intervention]. Should that 
second possibility occur, China would match American actions: if the United States sent 
troops, China would do likewise.”256 
Just like the PRC, North Vietnam also perceived substantial benefits to continuing 
the fight against the United States. Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam placed a high priority 
on reuniting North and South Vietnam under communist rule and eliminating foreign 
influence. After the Geneva Conference, Ho Chi Minh wanted to reconstruct the North, 
whose economy and country laid in ruin, and reunite the South.257 Ho looked to China for 
assistance in both matters, and due to China’s initial insistence on moderation toward the 
South, he focused on rebuilding his own country and put subversion of the South on the 
backburner. Much of China’s assistance to North Vietnam immediately following the 
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Geneva Conference was in the form of domestic support: funds equivalent to $200 million 
in U.S. dollars for various industry projects, as well as shipments of Chinese rice to help 
overcome food shortages.258 
Ho Chi Minh temporarily focused on domestic reconstruction and limited 
subversion in South Vietnam because of the insistence from China and the Soviets; 
however, he never lost sight of his desire to reunify Vietnam under communism. Following 
President Kennedy’s increase in support to the south, Ho and Mao both came to “reject 
moderation.”259 Ho and Mao’s rejection of moderation suggests that the United States’ 
increase in partnership with South Vietnam did not deter China or North Vietnam, but 
actually had the opposite effect of inciting increased vigor in violent unification efforts. 
Even during the Johnson administration, direct threats of heavy military pressure on North 
Vietnam resulted in the North’s refusal to yield and to claim that it would not stop 
supporting the liberation of South Vietnam.260 The decision-making of the NLF does not 
dictate consideration on its own because it closely follows that of North Vietnam. This 
closeness is due to North Vietnam’s role in the foundation of the group, as well as the 
oversight and direction that North Vietnam provided.261  
In sum, the United States’ partnership with GVN and ARVN did not produce the 
desired effects on the rivals (PRC, North Vietnam, NLF). The United States used a 
combination of punishment and denial as forms of cost while primarily communicating 
intent indirectly, except for public statements made by U.S. presidents. Cultural blinders 
inhibited much of the communication, especially between the United States and China. The 
United States/GVN partnership’s impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the communist 
rivals did not produce desired results because of two primary reasons: the rivals’ high 
perceived benefits of subversive and violent actions, as well as cultural misunderstandings 
and misreading of communication. Although it seems that the United States’ efforts 
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deterred an open invasion of South Vietnam, it did not stop China or North Vietnam from 
pursuing revolutionary and subversive actions increasing in intensity. 
E. CONCLUSION/LESSONS 
The United States’ partnership with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) from 
1954–1964 is an example of a failure to choose and develop a viable partner and to 
understand the potential effects on the rivals. The military and security cooperation did not 
produce a GVN that could stand on its own and that failure eventually led to the need for 
a significant number of U.S. combat troops. The U.S. partnership did deter an open 
conventional invasion but also had the detrimental effect of encouraging China and North 
Vietnam to approach the problem by supporting the revolutionary movement. 
Overall, this case indicates that the partnership framework is useful at explaining 
the failures of the U.S./GVN partnership. The willingness of the GVN was low because of 
conflicting initial interests and because of weak incentive structures provided by the United 
States. Although Diem and the United States both desired to combat communism, Diem’s 
opposition within South Vietnam and his need to consolidate internal political control led 
to disagreements. When combining these disagreements with the loose behavior-based 
incentives provided by the United States, Diem often decided to forge his own path. The 
willingness component of the partnership framework illuminates this as a problem. The 
capability of the GVN was initially deficient in 1954 and, despite some improvements, did 
not improve at an acceptable rate. The partnership framework identifies the initial 
deficiencies of GVN capability as well as the structure and execution of interorganizational 
ties as problems. Finally, the United States’ partnership with the GVN did not produce the 
desired effects on China or North Vietnam. China and North Vietnam’s high perceived 
benefit of supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam seemed to outweigh the costs that 
the United States imposed. 
This case shows how the partnership framework explains the failure of the United 
States in Vietnam, but it also provides a unique historical reference point for the PRC’s 
decision making in response to U.S. actions and partnerships. The United States failed to 
fully understand China’s willingness to challenge the U.S. influence in the region. China’s 
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perceived vital interest to support North Vietnam, along with its relatively non-attributable 
method of support, made deterring China seemingly impossible. However, China’s support 
for North Vietnam did ebb and flow. Proving direct causation for China’s fluctuating 
support is difficult, but it is reasonable to suggest that China’s domestic considerations had 
a significant impact alongside pressures from the United States. Vietnam shows that merely 
providing more support to a failing partner does not necessarily result in demonstrating 
resolve to China. Instead of backing down, China chose to challenge the United States’ 
escalation in Vietnam. 
This case is useful when considering today’s tensions with the PRC in the South 
China Sea because the government currently in power in Vietnam is the North Vietnamese 
government that the United States challenged during the war. Much has changed since this 
conflict, however. Now the current government of Vietnam does have good relations with 
the United States and is one of the major stakeholders in the territorial disputes with China. 
Today, the United States could potentially partner with its former enemy, Vietnam, as a 
viable means to pressure the PRC. Whether it is a feasible means to pressure the PRC or 
not is undetermined; but, understanding the failure of this partnership is essential when 
considering U.S. opportunities in the region today. 
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IV. THE CORK IN THE BOTTLE: 
THE “SECRET” WAR IN LAOS 
While many see Laos and Vietnam as tangled up in the same conflict within the 
Second Indochina War, both the form of U.S. support and the eventual nature of each war 
ended up being very different. Thomas Ahern, a former CIA officer, Laos veteran, and 
author of a partially declassified study, Undercover Armies, contrasted Vietnam and Laos 
when he said, “In South Vietnam, mobile Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units bedeviled 
Saigon’s road-bound heavy infantry, while in Laos, Hmong irregulars flitted over mountain 
trails or moved by air to occupy key high ground and to harass Hanoi’s tanks and 
artillery.”262 In the face of similar communist threats, the United States employed more 
limited means in the Laos partnership, which contrasts with the more extensive 
conventional means in Vietnam. These similarities and differences in Laos and Vietnam 
provide a useful contrast when comparing the nature of the partnerships. 
Laos’s neutral status caused the United States to create self-imposed restrictions on 
overt military involvement throughout the conflict. The self-imposed restrictions caused 
the United States to find and employ unique means that contrast with the conventional 
means used in Vietnam. The United States carried out the partnership with Laos using 
offices with retired or “sheep-dipped” military personnel under non-DOD authorities, 
significant reliance on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and by routing assistance 
through the intermediary nation of Thailand.263 While U.S. operations in southern Laos 
often focused on stopping the flow of military equipment into South Vietnam, operations 
in northern Laos had a different purpose. This chapter focuses on U.S. partnership efforts 
with the Royal Laos Government (RLG) and the Hmong guerillas to combat the China and 
North Vietnam backed Pathet Lao in northern Laos. While the operations that the United 
States conducted against the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos blend into the Laos 
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conflict, they will be outside the scope of this chapter because they are more closely related 
to the stability of the Vietnam government.264 
Although the conflict in Laos does not receive as much attention today as other 
U.S. conflicts like Vietnam, it is relevant for this study because both Chinese and U.S. 
policy makers viewed Laos as strategically important at the time. China’s interests in Laos 
provides insights into the direct and indirect involvement of China through North 
Vietnamese forces. In addition to providing support to North Vietnam, a significant 
supporter of the Pathet Lao, China directly participated within Laos, constructing roads 
and providing security throughout the conflict.265 Moreover, North Vietnam, which was 
supported by China, invaded Laos multiple times during this period. China and North 
Vietnam both viewed Laos as a critical national interest. Additionally, the importance of 
Laos, often overlooked in the United States today, was appreciated by U.S. leaders at the 
time. President Eisenhower famously described Laos as the “cork in the bottle” that was 
needed to contain communism in Asia.266 
A. BACKGROUND 
The conflict in Laos between 1959 and 1973 involved several different interested 
parties that applied military pressure to influence the Royal Laos Government (RLG) 
through several changes in political power. Each interested party in this conflict had vastly 
different perspectives as to the crux of the conflict. One could consider the Laos conflict a 
proxy war for the United States, a civil war for the RLG, a revolution for the Pathet Lao, a 
fight for survival for the Hmong, and an opportunity and threat for the communist nations 
of China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam. The RLG was very unstable because of 
both the influence of outside countries and the internal divisions within Laos. The 
instability of the RLG produced governments in Vientiane that changed control numerous 
times, and that never completely controlled the entire territory. This chapter will consider 
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the Laos conflict from 1959, when General Phoumi came to power, until 1973 when the 
United States ended military support with the Vientiane agreement.  
From a United States perspective, one of the unique things about Laos is that the 
U.S. Ambassadors ran the war.267 This sharply contrasts with how the United States 
conducted the war in Vietnam. Colonel (ret) Joseph Celeski, a U.S. Special Forces veteran 
and author of The Green Berets in the Land of a Million Elephants, said of the Laos 
operations, “These operations differed from the war next door in South Vietnam in that the 
authority to conduct the war and the exercise of command and control over various U.S. 
organizations was vested in the ambassadors assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, 
Laos.”268 In addition to the command and control differences, the partnerships in Laos also 
took a different form than the partnerships discussed in Vietnam in terms of size, scope, 
and structure. International and self-imposed constraints forced the United States to have a 
smaller military footprint in Laos than in Vietnam. While the Vietnam and Laos conflicts 
sometimes overlap, Guenter Lewy, a scholar on Vietnam, noted, “The complex story of the 
growing involvement of Laos and Cambodia in the Indochina conflict requires a separate, 
detailed account” from studies on Vietnam.269   
Before the United States’ role in Laos began to increase, the French ruled Laos, like 
Vietnam, as a part of its Indochina territory. The Viet Minh’s victory over the French at 
Dien Bien Phu, and the following Geneva Accords of 1954, mark the end of France’s rule. 
The accords produced a similar fate to both Vietnam and Laos, calling for “a cessation of 
hostilities and the removal of foreign military forces from Laotian territory.”270 The 
Geneva Accords of 1954 marks the real beginning of U.S. presence and partnership with 
the RLG because of the U.S. desire to limit communist expansion on the newly independent 
nation. The French influence remained after 1954, but slowly the United States would take 
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over the responsibility for partnering with Laos. By 1959, when a staunch anti-communist 
came to power, the United States had almost entirely replaced the French. 
Along with the history of French influence, geography and social history played 
essential roles in the Laos conflict. Laos was a remote, landlocked country with a variety 
of different ethnic groups. Laos was a “sparsely populated, mostly mountainous” country 
that was surrounded by the much more powerful nations of North and South Vietnam, the 
PRC, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia.271 The Plain of Jars was the prominent 
geographical feature in northern Laos throughout the conflict due to its strategic location 
and its relatively forgiving terrain when compared to the rest of the country.272 Most of 
the nation was covered by dense tropical rain forests, with monsoons turning all the 
footpaths into “soggy, muddy rivulets” for almost six months out of the year.273 Since 
footpaths were the primary means of travel through the country, the monsoon seasons 
limited operations on all sides. During the conflict, Laos was divided somewhat from east 
to west, with the communists controlling the eastern territory along the border with 
Vietnam and the RLG controlling the western region. Celeski said, “A commander could 
simply draw a crude line bisecting Laos from its north to its south and place government 
forces to the west of the line and Pathet Lao and NVA forces to the East.”274 
Four relevant ethnic groups resided in Laos: the Lao Lum, Lao Tai, Lao Theung, 
and Lao Sung.275 All of these ethnic groups were categorized by where they lived in the 
nation. This geographical, ethnic separation contributed to an inherent lack of political 
stability. In the south, the Lao Lum, or valley people, were of Thai heritage and represented 
the ruling elite and the royal family. Lao Lum made up the majority of the RLG armed 
forces.276 The Lao Tai, or higher valley people, were sometimes called “tribal Tai” and 
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generally practiced agriculture and avoided cities.277 The Lao Tai “worked both for the 
Pathet Lao and for the Royal Government, mostly as village militia and Auto-Defense 
companies.”278 The Lao Theung, or the mountainside Lao, were considered the original 
inhabitants and were referred to as “Kha,” or slave tribes.279 The Lao Theung remained 
mostly neutral in the conflict but would support the Royal Government if incentivized with 
money, weapons, or food.280 The Lao Sung, or the mountaintop Lao, were a category that 
incorporated many sub-ethnic tribes. One of the Lao Sung tribes was the Hmong ethnic 
tribe, which created a significant partnership with the United States at the outset of the 
conflict.281  
The Hmong were a warlike people that occupied the higher elevations within Laos 
in the mid-nineteenth century in order to avoid pressures from the Han Chinese in the North 
and the Lao Lum in the South. The Hmong had spiritual beliefs that impacted daily 
activities. The Hmong believed in spirits, called “Tlan” or “phi,” and were considered 
animists.282 Many of the Hmong’s beliefs created unusual obstacles for American 
advisors. The Hmong believed that evil spirits lived in certain rivers and mountains and 
would, therefore, refuse to cross them even in the face of certain death.283 Celeski said, “If 
ranges and landing zones needed creating, it was important to consult the locals and 
conduct a ceremony to please the phi of chopped down trees and cleared rocks and 
bushes.”284 On at least one occasion, the Hmong’s belief in spirits caused a delay in 
operations because of the refusal to remove a “spirit tree” from the airfield.285 The Hmong 
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also believed that they must postpone operations if the feet of their standard meal, a boiled 
chicken, curled in a specific direction while cooking, signifying a bad omen.286 
Just as the Hmong beliefs impacted operations, so did the culture and religion of 
the Lao Lum or Royal Lao troops. Aside from the Hmong, “the Laotians were not a warlike 
people; when they fought, it often bore more resemblance to a shoving match between 
preening teenaged boys than a clash between armies.”287 The Lao Lum were Buddhists, 
their beliefs often causing them to reject self-determination and to believe that their fate 
was in the hands of Buddha. The Lao Lum’s reliance on Buddha and fate often resulted in 
poor military leadership traits and an army that was discouraged from using violence. 
Celeski described the Buddhist Laotian troops as “serene, lazy and non-caring, and often 
relying on fate to determine the outcome of things rather than take matters into their own 
hands.”288 Additionally, Celeski said that Buddhist Lao commanders “often lacked 
concern for the future welfare of their troops, preferring to live in the ‘now.’”289 Buddhist 
beliefs also made Laotian soldiers extremely reluctant to kill or go on the offensive. For 
example, the Lao troops would often refuse to fire their rifles but did not have a problem 
firing mortar rounds because of the belief that “we only put the round in the mortar, but 
where it goes and what it does after that is not us, it is in the hands of Buddha.”290 The 
Laotians’ refusal to fire their weapons and their lack of self-determination inherently 
clashed with military needs. 
On top of the various ethnic groups, Laos also had three primary politico-military 
Laotian groups vying for power: the rightists, the neutralists, and the leftists. General 
Phoumi Nosovan led the U.S. backed rightists.291 Souvanna Phouma led the neutralist 
group within Laos while Souvanna’s half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, led the leftists, 
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also known as the Pathet Lao.292 These three groups fought for control within Laos and 
fought for support from external allies. The three groups occasionally shifted foreign, 
domestic, and political allegiances. The control over the RLG shifted between these three 
groups, causing enormous instability. 
Throughout the conflict, power within the RLG frequently changed hands and was 
very unstable. In 1959, the U.S.-backed General Phoumi was in control of a rightist-
dominated government in Laos. However, in August 1960, frustrations with General 
Phoumi’s recently established government led to a coup by a junior RLG officer, Captain 
Kong Le.293 Captain Kong Le took his U.S. SF trained paratroop battalion and quickly 
seized control of the Laotian capital of Vientiane while General Phoumi and most of the 
rightist leaders were in northern Laos for a conference with the Laotian king.294 Kong Le 
allied with Souvanna Phouma’s neutralists after taking power in an attempt to justify his 
coup and legitimize his newly established government. President Eisenhower chose to 
maintain support for General Phoumi, causing Souvanna to look to the Communists for 
help instead of the United States. China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam all rushed 
to support Souvanna’s neutralist government with equipment, but the support came too late 
to repulse General Phoumi’s counter-coup to take back Vientiane.295 After General 
Phoumi and the rightist government reestablished control, North Vietnam and the Pathet 
Lao continued to conduct assaults on regions surrounding Vientiane, sparking the 
prolonged conflict in Laos. The United States supported Phoumi throughout Souvanna’s 
control with airdrops of material, planning advice, and the supplementation of additional 
Lao troops recently trained by the United States in Thailand.296 The United States’ effort 
was carried out by the Programs and Evaluation Office (PEO), nominally a U.S. State 
Department office that used retired military personnel to conduct military support to the 
RLG, and Air America, a CIA-supported air program. 
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General Phoumi’s reestablishment of rightist control over the Vientiane 
government in late 1960 did not stabilize the tensions in Laos for long. The Pathet Lao and 
the neutralist armies under Kong Le and Phouma continued to receive aid and support from 
the Soviets, Chinese, and North Vietnamese. Phoumi’s rightist government also continued 
to receive U.S. aid while expanding confrontations with the Pathet Lao and the neutralists. 
In 1962, Phoumi began to position his forces to provoke an attack by the Pathet Lao, 
apparently with the hopes that a rightist military loss would spark direct U.S. military 
intervention.297 Unfortunately for Phoumi, a small force of Pathet Lao did indeed attack 
and defeat his larger army. Phoumi’s loss was an embarrassment for the RLG because the 
small Pathet Lao force was viewed as causing “five thousand of Phoumi’s best troops to 
stream in panic across the Mekong into Thailand.”298 The United States did not directly 
intervene following the loss and the poor performance of Phoumi’s army, which caused 
Phoumi to reluctantly consent to the creation of a coalition government involving the 
rightist, neutralist, and leftists. The new coalition government placed Souvanna as prime 
minister with Phoumi and Souphanouvong as deputies. Souvanna eventually drifted away 
from allegiance with the communist powers and agreed to receive support from the United 
States. In July of 1962, shortly after the creation of the coalition government, another 
agreement was signed in Geneva that declared neutrality in Laos, directed international 
support of the new coalition government, and again dictated the removal of foreign military 
presence.299 The United States agreed to the new Geneva Accords of 1962 by removing 
military personnel with hopes that peace would come to Laos. 
The high hopes for peace after the 1962 Geneva Accords did not last long. William 
Colby, then chief of CIA operations in the region, noted that North Vietnam continued to 
maintain large numbers of troops within Laos.300 The CIA estimated that over 7,000 North 
Vietnamese troops remained in Laos after the accord. Colby said, “[the North Vietnamese 
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troops] had never been acknowledged as being there, they could hardly in theory be 
officially counted out, but our intelligence showed that they were there nonetheless.”301 
While the 1962 Geneva Accords again caused the United States to remove overt military 
personnel, North Vietnam continued to conduct extensive military operations in Laotian 
territory.  
The leftists’ participation in the coalition government officially ended in 1964 when 
the Pathet Lao declared that it no longer recognized Phouma as prime minister. This 
declaration also marked a turning point in the conflict. The United States responded to the 
communists’ dismissal of the coalition government with Operation TRIANGLE, an 
offensive operation with RLG forces, Hmong troops, and U.S. airpower. Operation 
TRIANGLE, in July 1964, marked the end of the United States’ temporary accommodation 
of the 1962 Geneva Accords. It also marked a turning point in the air war in Laos. 
Operation TRIANGLE was the beginning of the reliance on U.S. military aircraft for direct 
support of ground forces to “counterbalance the superior discipline and skill of the North 
Vietnamese infantry.”302 The years following 1964 brought a long and brutal stalemate 
within Laos.  
Throughout the stalemate, the RLG forces held a numerical advantage over the 
communist troops and had U.S. military air support for operations, but they still were 
unable to push the communists out of northern Laos. In 1964, the RLG had 50,000 regulars 
and 23,000 CIA/SF supported irregulars up against an estimated 11,000 North Vietnamese 
regulars and 20,000 Pathet Lao.303 Unfortunately, North Vietnam’s superior quality of 
troops and its ability to deploy large numbers of reinforcements when needed allowed it to 
stay in the fight. The RLG’s low performance during the stalemate caused the United States 
to rely more on the Hmong and U.S. airpower to combat the Pathet Lao. Despite the U.S.’s 
efforts to improve it, the RLG army “remained incapable or unwilling to fight the North 
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Vietnamese.”304 The reliance on the Hmong forces to conduct most of the operations 
through this stalemate eventually caused them to deteriorate as a fighting force and as a 
population. In 1970, the Hmong were “no longer a functioning army, the Hmong soldiers 
of northeastern Laos had become merely a dispirited throng of war-weary people urgently 
seeking safety for their families.”305 The stalemate and constant conflict caused 
considerable devastation to the limited Hmong population. 
The stalemate ended in 1973, shortly after the Paris Peace accords, with the signing 
of the Vientiane Agreement.306 The Vientiane Agreement dictated the formation of a 
provisional government, implementation of national elections, and the removal of North 
Vietnamese, U.S., and Thai troops. Just like in South Vietnam, the United States secured 
what appeared on the surface to be a victory. The United States removed military support, 
but eventually, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese moved against rightist military 
positions and took complete control of the government. In December of 1975, the Pathet 
Lao “declared an end to the Lao monarchy and the establishment of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic.”307 The Pathet Lao declaration marked the end of the struggle for 
Laos and the defeat of the Hmong and the U.S. supported rightists. 
Vang Pao was the prominent Hmong figure who represented the interests of the 
Hmong at the military level. The Hmong could be aggressive fighters but often lacked 
interest in fighting for anything outside of their own mountaintop or village. Vang Pao 
helped change that by uniting them and instilling the importance of this conflict for their 
way of life. He was one of the few Hmong officers in the RLG forces and he directly 
influenced the Hmong to organize and fight together throughout the conflict.308 Vang Pao 
was a charismatic leader who was passionate about protecting the Hmong people and was 
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ruthless toward enemies.309 Vang Pao had a “seemingly indomitable spirit and boundless 
energy” and a “seemingly omniscient understanding of his enemy.”310 These 
characteristics made him the ideal figure to help organize a Hmong resistance. One CIA 
officer declared to his superiors after initial contact with Vang Pao that, “This is the man 
we’ve been looking for.”311 This CIA officer immediately saw Vang Pao’s strengths, his 
influential position, and his intrinsic desire to fight the communists.  
Vang Pao and the Hmong viewed the Chinese and the Vietnamese as traditional 
enemies. Vang Pao and the Hmong “feared the elimination of the local population [by the 
communists], a military tactic often used in the area.”312 In a speech to the mountain 
tribesmen, Vang Pao recalled Vietnamese abuses of the Hmong people and framed the 
struggle against the Pathet Lao as an “imperative for the Hmong people to preserve their 
way of life against the predatory Vietnamese.”313 The Hmong viewed the conflict as a 
struggle for survival against the North Vietnamese, which made them an ideal surrogate 
force. 
The area with the most significant fighting for Vang Pao was the Plain of Jars. The 
Plain of Jars was located geographically in what was known as Military Region II on the 
border with North Vietnam. Vang Pao was not only the leader of the Hmong resistance but 
also an RLG general and the commander of Military Region II. Vang Pao had 
approximately 15,000 fighters, including RLG Army troops and Hmong irregulars.314 
Vang Pao’s leadership held the mountain tribes together in order to fight the Pathet Lao 
through the prolonged stalemate. Vang Pao’s personal leadership was so important to keep 
the Hmong together that some advisors highlighted his potential loss as a weakness in the 
program. In addition to the detrimental impacts that the loss of Vang Pao would have, one 
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advisor saw Vang Pao’s “one-man-band style of leadership as hopelessly inadequate, 
involving an impossibly broad span of control.”315 Nevertheless, Vang Pao remained 
steadfast in fighting the Pathet Lao until the very end. 
The August 1960 coup marked a significant spike in U.S. policy level interest in 
Laos because of the threat that Laos falling to communism posed to surrounding nations. 
In 1960, Laos was an even more significant concern than South Vietnam. President 
Eisenhower said, “We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists, even if we have to fight—
with our allies or without them.”316 Eisenhower chose not to take military action because 
he was so close to turning over control of the White House to John F. Kennedy. President 
Kennedy was also concerned about the communist advances in Laos and what that would 
mean to the surrounding nations that relied on SEATO for protection. In a turnover meeting 
between the outgoing Eisenhower administration and the incoming Kennedy 
administration, Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter expressed their concern 
that SEATO would appear to allies and foes as a “paper tiger.”317 France and Britain, two 
critical members of SEATO, were unwilling to take military action in Laos, threatening the 
integrity of the SEATO organization.318 The lack of interest from France and Britain to 
participate in an intervention caused President Kennedy to refrain from a unilateral 
intervention and to pursue an approach that did not utilize large U.S. ground forces. 
The United States’ activities in Laos preceded the 1960 coup, however. The United 
States had been supporting France in Laos since the end of WWII. By 1952, the United 
States was subsidizing over one-third of France’s war costs.319 The CIA’s Civil Air 
Transport (CAT), later known as “Air America,” also supported French forces in Laos with 
paradrops throughout 1953.320 The United States continued to support the French in Laos 
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through the Programs and Evaluation Office (PEO) in the U.S. embassy. The PEO was run 
in contrast to Vietnam’s much larger Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) due to 
the 1954 Geneva Accord restrictions. The PEO and the United States Operations Mission 
(USOM) began providing financial and military support directly to the RLG in 1955 when 
Laotian security forces “were found to be lacking in will, equipment, and tactics to thwart 
communist forces.”321 Many retired military personnel worked for the PEO in Laos to get 
around the accords restrictions while still providing military advice.322 For example, the 
Chief of the PEO was a member of the Country Team and reported directly to the 
Ambassador as a civilian position; yet in 1957, he was a retired army general who had 
“previously held senior MAAG positions in South Vietnam and Pakistan.”323 This 
example shows that the PEO had a civilian facade, but it retained a strong military 
influence. 
The PEO had three primary missions. First, the PEO was to “advise the U.S. 
Ambassador and USOM on the military needs of the RLG and assist in preparing the 
requests for Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds.”324 Second, the PEO was to 
observe and monitor the large amount of military equipment that already existed in Laos 
through previous U.S. support to the French. Finally, the PEO began implementing training 
plans and programs, primarily through the remnant French Military Mission. Like 
Vietnam, conducting training and advice through the French was unsatisfactory and did 
not last long.325 The PEO first expanded its influence over the French in 1959 through an 
understanding that allowed U.S. “civilians” to serve as “deputies to French supervisors in 
the four Lao military regions.”326 These deputies effectively allowed the United States to 
put a U.S. stamp on the French-led training. The 1959 understanding with the French also 
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expanded the total number of PEO personnel to 514, as well as introduced almost 150 U.S. 
SF personnel on temporary rotational duty.327  
In 1961, the PEO was briefly escalated to a full MAAG, like in Vietnam, in 
response to the 1960 coup. However, like the 1954 agreement, the 1962 agreement placed 
restrictions on overt military assistance. This agreement caused the United States to remove 
the PEO’s short-lived descendent, the MAAG, from Laos.328 The official departure of the 
MAAG led the United States to run overt military assistance within Laos through a U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) “Requirements Office,” while continuing 
to expand military support through Thailand.329 Interestingly, the commander that 
decommissioned the MAAG in Laos almost immediately took command of the Joint 
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand, only one day after.330 The 
USAID Requirements Office would act as the eyes and ears within Laos, while forces in 
Thailand would provide the logistical structure for military support. This overt support 
continued while the U.S. SF and CIA support for guerillas increased. 
U.S. SF personnel began supporting the CIA under Operation HOTFOOT in 1959, 
but by 1961 it had evolved into the more extensive Operation WHITE STAR.331 Operation 
WHITE STAR was a U.S. response to the 1960 coup. Both of these operations focused on 
training the Hmong and other highland tribes because RLG forces had a “consistently poor 
combat record and showed few signs of impending meaningful improvement.”332 The 
SEATO alliance’s reluctance to intervene, combined with the RLG forces’ poor 
performance, left the United States with the need to find surrogates to take up the fight. By 
October of 1961, President Kennedy’s direction had increased the U.S. SF personnel in 
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Laos to over 300 men.333 Scholar Timothy Castle said, “The U.S. would continue to train 
General Phoumi’s lowland troops, but Vang Pao’s Hmong army was becoming the most 
important indigenous fighting force in Laos.”334  By early 1962, the United States would 
have forty-eight U.S. SF combat advisory teams operating in Laos under Operation 
WHITE STAR.335 The U.S. SF teams briefly departed Laos following the 1962 Geneva 
Accords but returned one year later with U.S. Air Force Air Commandos amid the rising 
tensions in 1964. The SF teams returned to continue to support both the Hmong guerrillas 
and the RLG forces. Additionally, SF teams supported the oversight of the MAP 
equipment, intelligence collection operations, and the identification of targets for airstrikes 
under “Project 404.”336 
The combined U.S. SF and CIA teams’ partnership with the Hmong mountain tribe 
was an impressive accomplishment. U.S. SF trained the mountain tribes on small unit 
tactics, patrolling, and ambushing. The initial engagements focused on teaching the Hmong 
irregulars to conduct fire team size operations with three to four men.337 The Hmong 
irregulars “immediately grasped the principle of fire-and-maneuver,” enabling them to 
begin conducting operations within one week of the first weapons delivery.338 Eventually, 
U.S. advisors began training the Hmong as Special Guerrilla Units (SGU). The Hmong 
SGU’s would operate in larger elements. By 1965, the SGU’s were prepared and were 
operating as battalion-sized elements with up to 350 men.339  
Before the United States provided weapons, most Hmong had never seen anything 
more modern than a flintlock rifle. Initial shipments to the Hmong consisted of M-1 rifles 
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and lightweight carbines.340 Later, the United States provided 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, 
which the Hmong would use from high ground to pin down Pathet Lao forces on the Plain 
of Jars.341 U.S. and CIA paramilitary teams not only provided the mountain tribes and the 
Hmong guerillas with weapons and ammunition but also with food and money. In order to 
ensure Hmong fighters would leave their families to conduct operations, the U.S. advisors 
had to take responsibility for caring for all the Hmong families. U.S. advisors relied on Air 
America to fly in most equipment and material to the Hmong partners. 
By 1964, the U.S. Air Force established training and advising programs for the 
RLG Air Force and began conducting unilateral operations in support of the RLG and the 
Hmong over the Plain of Jars. A declassified U.S. Air Force official history of the 
participation, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in Northern Laos, 
1954–1973, describes the vital role of the U.S. Air Force operations and partnerships that 
directly supported the RLG.342 By the summer of 1964, the U.S. Air Force had trained and 
supported thirty-five RLG Air Force pilots with T-28 aircraft.343 This training and military 
assistance continued until the end of the conflict under the name “Project Water Pump.”344 
While much of the air operations in Southern Laos focused on supporting the war in 
Vietnam by attacking North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh trail, Project Water Pump and 
operations conducted in northern Laos directly supported the RLG government and Hmong 
forces. 
The Hmong also received pilot training from the U.S. Air Force. By early 1968, the 
U.S. Air Force provided T-28 aircraft and commissioned the first two Hmong pilots.345 
The Hmong pilot program expanded to a “handful” of Hmong pilots. The program was a 
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success despite difficulties with illiterate Hmong trainees. One Hmong pilot flew several 
thousand sorties against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, and had “routinely flown 
in one week the 100 combat missions required of an American pilot over the course of a 
one-year tour of duty.”346 The Hmong pilot program had a minimal impact on the air effort 
as a whole, but it demonstrates that the role of the Hmong began to grow from the original 
scale of small guerrilla operations in 1959. 
Militarily, Thailand played a significant role in supporting the U.S. effort in Laos. 
First, Thailand provided a critical basing and staging area to move MAP equipment and 
personnel into Laos. Second, Thailand advised the RLG Army in Laos using U.S. trained 
military advisors who acted as “volunteers,” as well as trained a significant amount of Lao 
soldiers within Thailand using U.S. financial support.347 Third, Thailand provided critical 
interpreters that the U.S. advisors needed to carry out the mission.348 The vital role that 
Thailand played did not come at a low cost. The United States subsidized over 50 percent 
of Thailand’s defense budget, with over two billion U.S. dollars in assistance provided 
from 1965–1975 alone.349 
The United States used various locations within Thailand as a staging area to carry 
out support to Laos. Thailand and the United States set up secret camps in Northeastern 
Thailand to support operations focused on Laos, including Thai-led surveillance operations 
within Laos.350 Kennedy expanded facilities at Udorn, Thailand, for helicopter repair and 
maintenance and, eventually, to serve as the Air America headquarters. Timothy Castle 
said that Kennedy’s orders to expand Udorn “inaugurated a policy that would characterize 
American military activity in Laos for more than a dozen years: extensive CIA paramilitary 
operations supported by Thailand-based, covert U.S. military agencies.”351 By the mid-
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1960s, “80 percent of all American bombing missions flown against North Vietnam and 
Laos were launched from air bases in Thailand.”352 
Thai executed U.S.-funded training for a significant number of Lao soldiers. The 
Thai/U.S. training, which began in 1957, had trained “five Lao infantry battalions, two 
artillery batteries, one hundred officer candidates, over two hundred recruits, and more than 
a dozen pilots” by 1961.353 The early effort through 1961 was only the beginning. The 46th 
U.S. Special Forces Company deployed out of Thailand in order to assist the CIA and the 
Royal Thai Special Forces in training elite Laotian forces, including a significant number 
of Hmong.354 Within Laos, Thailand is estimated to have provided as many as 21,400 Thai 
“volunteers” to advise the RLG forces and conduct combat operations.355 Thailand also 
had a U.S. trained and supported unit that played a role in Laos, the Thailand Police Aerial 
Reinforcement Unit (PARU). The PARU provided CIA trained personnel in guerilla 
warfare to the Hmong forces. The PARU would combine efforts with U.S. SF White Star 
teams and CIA paramilitary teams, and later conduct special operations throughout 
Laos.356 Thailand’s role was the result of the complex political nature of the Laos conflict 
that makes the partnership worth considering in this study. While Thailand was an 
influential nation in the Laos conflict, China and North Vietnam were also two other 
powerful countries were supporting forces opposed to the United States.  
China’s interests in Laos had always stemmed primarily from Laos’s geographical 
position. China was always sensitive to potentially hostile regimes on its border, and U.S. 
activity in Laos provided a perceived threat. For its own security, China wanted nations on 
its border to prohibit basing to the U.S. military. In the view of Chinese leaders, Laos, like 
Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea, could be used by the United States to launch an invasion. In 
fact, there were remnant nationalist Chinese units that were still operating in the border 
area with Laos and Burma, and they “occasionally conducted operations against China in 
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collaboration with Taiwanese and American intelligence agencies.”357 China’s desire to 
remove U.S. influence in Laos outweighed actual territorial ambitions. China did not show 
evidence of wanting to take over Laos for itself, only to “create in Laos a regime that at the 
very least will be independent of the United States.”358 In addition to China’s perceived 
security threat of a pro-United States Laos, Chinese officials were also motivated by Laos’s 
shared border with South Vietnam. Chinese officials knew that support to the Pathet Lao 
was necessary in order to maintain control of Laos’s “crucial position in the growing 
revolution in South Vietnam,” which they utilized through the support to the Ho Chi Minh 
trail.359 
Ideologically, China also deemed support to the Pathet Lao necessary. China 
desired to exert influence over other Asian communist parties because of its “claim to 
leadership in the envisaged revolutionary transformation of the world.”360 Mao Zedong, 
the revolutionary leader of the PRC, saw himself as the ideological leader after whom other 
communist revolutionaries should base themselves. China also viewed Laos as within its 
historical sphere of influence. The Chinese embassy in Vientiane stated that “Since most 
ancient times, the Chinese and Laotian peoples have gotten along with each other 
harmoniously like kinsmen.”361 
North Vietnam’s interests in Laos also goes far back in history. North Vietnam had 
more direct influence over the Pathet Lao than the Chinese due to the number of advisors. 
Qiang Zhai, a scholar on Chinese affairs, noted that “The North Vietnamese in general 
carried more weight with the Pathet Lao than the Chinese.”362 PRC leaders at the time also 
acknowledged internally that North Vietnam had provided more assistance to the Pathet 
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Lao than either China or the Soviet Union.363 Part of North Vietnam’s significant role was 
due to China’s insistence. Mao Zedong once told Ho Chi Minh, “you must bear more 
responsibility for Southeast Asia, especially Laos.”364 The suggestions that the North 
Vietnamese had more direct influence over the Pathet Lao may be accurate, but it overlooks 
the significant impact that China had over North Vietnam. Although North Vietnam was 
known to have more direct influence and troops within Laos, China was the ultimate 
supporter of North Vietnam. North Vietnam needed China’s support against the United 
States in the region, but it also desired its own hegemony in Indochina.  
North Vietnam and China were both direct contributors to the RLG’s downfall 
because the Pathet Lao could not have survived without their foreign support. Despite 
Laos’s eventual fall to communism in 1975, the partnerships that the United States 
developed with the anti-communist forces in Laos are worth contrasting to the partnership 
with South Vietnam because of the vast difference in the U.S. efforts in the face of a similar 
threat. The next section outlines the first component of the framework—willingness.  
B. WILLINGNESS 
Overall, the willingness of Vang Pao and the Hmong guerrillas was sufficient to 
conduct guerrilla operations, but the desire of the RLG to maintain political control of the 
country was significantly lacking. Vang Pao and the Hmong had a deep-seated interest in 
defending their own way of life against the North Vietnamese and also had a war-like 
culture. Although the Hmong had some issues that stemmed from their mistrust of the Lao 
Lum and the tendency to only value fighting for their own village, Vang Pao and the United 
States overcame these issues with leadership, substantial incentives, and legitimate 
oversight of operations. The RLG armed forces had significant problems with willingness 
that stemmed primarily from instability within the RLG leadership, especially with the 
coalition governments, and cultural barriers that inhibited a high functioning army. The 
United States was unable to overcome the RLG’s lack of willingness, even with an 
enormous amount of incentives in material and aid. The first component of the partnership 
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framework—willingness—helps outline the strengths and weaknesses of the Hmong and 
the RLG. There are several evaluation criteria to consider when assessing the willingness 
of potential partners: the initial overlap of interests, the incentives used by the principal to 
influence the desired behavior, the uncertainty of the success of the task, and the 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.  
The initial overlap of interests between the United States and the anti-communist 
forces in Laos overlapped in many, but not all, respects. The United States’ primary 
interests in Laos were to stop the spread of communism in East Asia and to defend the 
United States’ international prestige. The United States feared that if Laos fell to 
communism, Thailand, India, South Vietnam, and others would eventually follow. In order 
to defend Laos from the communist threats, the United States partnered with the RLG 
forces and the Hmong to combat the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese within Laos. 
The United States ultimately wanted a non-communist Laotian government that could 
defend itself. Support for the Hmong as a society was a military necessity for defending 
against communist advances, not a direct national interest.  
The presence of a common enemy, the communists, was arguably the sole common 
interest between the RLG and the United States. Sometimes, even that common interest 
was in question. The RLG was not a stable political entity, as shown by the numerous coups 
and turnover of control within the government. Even General Phoumi, the United States’ 
primary anti-communist political leader in Laos, had difficulty motivating his troops to 
combat the Pathet Lao effectively. The neutralist-led, coalition government that followed 
General Phoumi displayed weaker anti-communist interests. Phouma, the neutralist who 
controlled the coalition government, seemed to work with the communists or the United 
States, whichever seemed to suit him best at the time. These differences in interests at the 
political level raised the cost of incentivizing for the United States.  
Additionally, the RLG political leaders often opposed supporting the Hmong 
guerillas or supplying arms to any of the mountain tribes. Even General Phoumi, the 
staunch anti-communist, opposed it. U.S. advisors eventually convinced Phoumi that 
arming the Hmong was a military necessity. However, Phoumi still expressed his doubts, 
referring to the Hmong as “crybabies” that were “too primitive to undertake the raid and 
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sabotage missions that the PEO chief had proposed and too treacherous to be indulged in 
their incessant demands for help.”365 The coalition government that followed Phoumi was 
kept out of the loop on most of the CIA funding and support to the Hmong because of fear 
that it would leak information would to the Pathet Lao. The lack of openness from the 
United States about the Hmong program was a result of different interests between the 
United States and the RLG. 
The initial Hmong interests overlapped more with the United States than the RLG’s 
interests did, but conflicts still existed. Vang Pao believed that he only had two alternatives 
to protect the Hmong way of life.366 Vang Pao could either flee the Pathet Lao invaders or 
stay and fight. Vang Pao chose to stay and fight the Pathet Lao, but not because of full 
support for the RLG. The Hmong and the lowland Laotians that controlled the RLG lived 
different lifestyles in different areas, and had mutual suspicions of each other. The CIA 
handlers who made initial contact with Vang Pao brought up the potential that “arms given 
to fight the communists might be turned against the [RLG].”367 U.S. advisors brought up 
similar concerns of Hmong separatism before beginning the Hmong pilot training 
program.368 Some were unsure if Hmong pilots would use the planes against the RLG once 
tension with the Pathet Lao ended.  
Vang Pao’s leadership and assurances to the United States represented the 
overriding factor that allowed the partnership to begin and continue. When asked about 
possible separatist aspirations of the Hmong, Vang Pao admitted mutual suspicion between 
the Hmong and the RLG, but also stated that his status as an RLG officer showed that 
assimilation was possible and that he “wanted his people accepted as part of the Laotian 
policy.”369 However, for many Hmong support for the RLG was merely an undesired 
byproduct of defending their own way of life against the Pathet Lao. Another problem with 
the initial Hmong interests was the Hmong’s notorious belief that the only thing that 
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mattered was their small village or mountaintop. Despite the differences, the presence of a 
common enemy provided enough overlap of interests between the United States and the 
Hmong for a partnership. However, the differences in initial interests raised the cost of 
incentivizing the Hmong. The United States would eventually end up providing for large 
portions of the Hmong population, including the warriors’ families.  
The incentives used by the United States to influence the RLG and the Hmong were 
extensive. For the Hmong, the United States offered Vang Pao very lenient behavior-based 
terms and incentives. These incentives include cash, weapons, ammunition, training, air 
support, food, humanitarian support, and diplomatic leverage within the RLG. The 
incentives that the Hmong required were quite extensive, partially because of differences 
in initial interests and partially because of the Hmong’s limited internal resources. The 
widespread aid and support, used as incentives by the United States, did provide leverage 
with the Hmong, but it also created a dependency. Without U.S. aid later in the conflict, 
the Hmong would have surely fallen apart.  
The Hmong’s tendency to only care about their specific valley or mountaintop was 
expensive for the United States to overcome in many respects. The CIA initially paid Vang 
Pao cash for the entire Hmong payroll, which Vang Pao acknowledged skimming from to 
pay for the relocation of Hmong populations to safe havens.370 Although the policy of 
directly paying Vang Pao did eventually change to routing the cash through the local 
commanders, the incentives of payroll to all the volunteers did not. The United States’ most 
obvious incentive was the cash payments to the Hmong, but other incentives also existed.  
The United States also supported and fulfilled the humanitarian needs of the Hmong 
such as protection, food, and relocation. USOM ran the majority of these humanitarian 
missions. Unfortunately for the Hmong, this assistance that the Hmong refugees came to 
rely on was tied to hostilities with the Pathet Lao. The 1962 Geneva Accords that brought 
the temporary political settlement and cease-fire also brought disruptions in food 
deliveries. Despite warnings that a settlement would bring changes, Vang Pao and the 
Hmong had “not really adjusted to the fact that we cannot keep shoving tons of rice out of 
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airplanes indefinitely.”371 Shortages during the temporary halt of U.S. aid caused the CIA 
to fulfill the most desperate needs through large scale purchases from Thailand. This case 
was one example where the United States showed that the incentives were dependent on 
the political situation more so than the direct behavior or outcome of specific Hmong 
actions. 
The incentives that the United States offered the RLG were just as generous, if not 
more so, than incentives to the Hmong. The MAP provided the RLG with a significant 
amount of military equipment at no cost. The United States also subsidized a large portion 
of the RLG military budget. These incentives were loosely controlled and did not provide 
the United States with the necessary leverage over the RLG. Like South Vietnam, the RLG 
became extremely dependent on the United States.372 The RLG’s dependency on the 
United States seemed to give it just as much freedom of maneuver as it gave the United 
States leverage because of the belief on both sides that a withdrawal of aid would cause the 
RLG to collapse quickly. 
The uncertainty for the Hmong to complete the given objectives was low in the 
beginning, as the Hmong were well suited to conduct guerrilla and harassing operations 
around the Plain of Jars, but increased by the end because of the Hmong’s increased role. 
For the Hmong, the objective was, at least initially, to tie down North Vietnamese and 
Pathet Lao forces in order to buy time for the RLG. Given that the United States continued 
to provide support, the Hmong were ideally suited to conduct guerrilla operations within 
familiar territory. The problem was not in the uncertainty of the initial task but in the 
uncertainty of what the initial task grew into. The convenience of using Hmong, and other 
highland tribes, to combat the Pathet Lao using guerilla tactics caused the United States to 
rely on them too much. Eventually, the Hmong conducted operations with battalion-sized 
elements, far different than the initial small raiding teams. In the case of the Hmong, it was 
necessary to remember that small guerilla forces have limitations. For instance, the ultimate 
success of the RLG required the development of conventional troops to hold territory. 
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Unfortunately, the partnership with the RLG, which focused on developing conventional 
forces, was unlikely to succeed.  
The task of the RLG was more uncertain than that of the Hmong. Developing a 
force that could defend itself against communist advances would not be easy because this 
involved holding territory. The North Vietnamese, with Chinese support, far surpassed the 
RLG in both the quality and quantity of forces, if counting the number of North Vietnamese 
forces inside North Vietnam as well. If the threat of a U.S. and SEATO led retaliation was 
taken away, the North Vietnamese could have overtaken the RLG whenever they chose to. 
North Vietnam had enormous advantages over Laos including population, economy, and 
size and quality of the armed forces. Additionally, the RLG was never totally unified, and 
its armed forces had cultural tendencies that made the use of force challenging. All of these 
factors made the notion that the United States could develop the RLG to stand on its own 
significantly uncertain. 
The information asymmetry between the principal and the agent was significant. 
Several first-hand accounts of the interactions with the Hmong guerrillas noted how 
information asymmetry inhibited communication and allowed the Hmong to tell 
Americans what they thought the Americans wanted to hear. Thomas Ahern, a CIA 
historian with first-hand experience with the Hmong in Laos, noted,  
The Hmong nearly always counted enemy forces as numbering either 
“hundreds” or “thousands,” and the altitude of an aircraft overhead as “a 
thousand meters.” Any single-engine jet airplane was a “MiG,” in fact never 
seen over Hmong country. I [Ahern] served with Vang Pao at Ban Pa Dong 
in the spring of 1961 before being sent to Thakhek in the upper Panhandle 
that summer to create an irregular force of ethnic Lao. There, I encountered 
some of the same communication problems while debriefing presumably 
more sophisticated subjects.”373  
Aside from communication problems, the inability to oversee the vast array of RLG 
operations contributed to the information asymmetry problem. This problem was similar 
to the issues faced in South Vietnam. Operations in Laos were carried out over a large area 
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with limited means of transportation. It was unlikely for the United States to monitor 
everything sufficiently.  
In sum, the willingness of the Hmong was manageable, while the willingness of the 
RLG was lacking. This disparity contributed to the course of the war and the partnership. 
First, it encouraged the United States to over-rely on Hmong and other mountain tribes for 
combatting the Pathet Lao. Instead of acting as a mere guerrilla force to buy time for the 
RLG, the United States soon advised the Hmong to grow operations and try to hold territory 
around the Plain of Jars. Second, it caused the development of the RLG to turn into a 
seemingly hopeless endeavor. The RLG’s lack of willingness, as outlined in this 
framework, contributed to the notion that the RLG would only ever amount to merely “a 
tripwire to give SEATO and the United States sufficient time to deploy military forces to 
prevent the impending collapse of the RLG.”374 The next component of the framework—
capability—outlines both the limitations of the Hmong and the painfully evident problems 
with the RLG. 
C. CAPABILITY 
The capability of the Hmong and the RLG reflected strengths and weaknesses. First 
off, the Hmong had a warrior culture but lacked in numbers, war material, economic 
support from the tribes, and existing military structure. With that said, the Hmong learned 
and adapted to guerrilla warfare training quickly. The RLG strengths and weaknesses were 
almost entirely opposite of the Hmong. The RLG had existing military equipment, training, 
and organizations, and numbers, but lacked a warrior culture and respectable leadership. 
Moreover, the RLG seemed to not advance with U.S. advisors and training. The second 
component of the partnership framework helps to identify these strengths and weaknesses. 
There are several evaluation criteria to consider when assessing the capability of potential 
partners: the strategy, the initial capabilities of the agent, the structure of the 
interorganizational ties (vertical, horizontal, the means with which collective efficiencies 
were achieved), and the principal’s techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities. 
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The U.S. strategy in the northern Laos conflict differed from Vietnam in ways and 
means, but not desired ends. The United States’ desired ends were to “prevent the 
communist takeover of the Kingdom of Laos, or at least preserve its neutrality.”375 The 
ways that the United States used were partnerships with the RLG and the Hmong guerillas, 
as well as U.S. air power. The means were principally the CIA, U.S. SF personnel, 
Thailand, and U.S. air assets. It is important to note that the decision to partner with the 
Hmong was not an end in itself; it was an attempt to “help the RLG negotiate from strength” 
and to buy time for the development of the RLG forces.376 Most of the U.S. advisors knew 
that “creating a Hmong guerrilla force would not by itself offer the means of expelling 
neutralist and communist forces from the Plain of Jars, let alone from the rest of 
northeastern Laos. But it might at least prevent the enemy from consolidating his control 
while the United States and the RLG struggled to make the regular army a fighting 
force.”377 The Hmong’s role slowly increased throughout the conflict as the United States 
began to lose faith in the RLG and gain confidence in the Hmong. 
The initial capabilities of the RLG and the Hmong were low but in different 
respects. The RLG Army was “incapable of defending the kingdom” because of poor 
leadership, morale, and training.378 The capabilities of the RLG were so low that in 1964, 
U.S. Ambassador Unger recommended that the United States continue to conceal support 
to the RLG out of concerns for U.S. prestige if “publicly linked with such an inept and 
uninspired army as the [RLG] today.”379 Much of this was a result of the difficulties 
stemming from the prevalent Buddhist faith of the RLG armed forces and poor leadership. 
Without aggressive leadership, the RLG would never develop capable armed forces. The 
RLG officer corps and the RLG soldiers would run at the sound of gunfire and refuse to 
fire their weapons or go on the offensive. No amount of military equipment or training 
could overcome these fundamental issues. The RLG already had large amounts of 
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American military equipment leading up to 1959 because the United States had supported 
the French in the region and supplied American weapons and equipment. Unfortunately, 
the equipment was not the problem. The RLG forces were simply not aggressive or 
motivated like an army should be. 
Conversely, the Hmong had a fierce war-like culture, but they had no organization, 
training, or equipment needed to be considered an army. On the positive side, “these Iron 
Age tribesmen were the best natural riflemen that [the initial CIA handler] had ever 
seen.”380 The Hmong were also able to endure life as guerrillas very effectively. Ahern 
said, “[The Hmong] displayed astonishing speed and endurance as they traversed mountain 
ridges carrying weapons and ammunition. Their cheerful acceptance of extraordinarily 
harsh conditions and their abiding hatred of the Vietnamese had to compensate for their 
lack of conventional military discipline.”381 
The Hmong’s limited conventional capabilities made the prospect of a decisive 
Hmong military victory almost impossible, but the limited objectives that the United States 
gave the Hmong were attainable. The CIA initially recognized that the Hmong could not 
“contest with regular formations for control of territory. Holding the high ground while 
they harassed enemy installations and lines of communication below was the most that 
could be expected of them.”382 Fortunately, the United States employed them in this 
manner, fitting with the Hmong capabilities and predispositions. 
The Hmong’s weaknesses limited the strategic utility and created significant 
logistical problems for the United States. For instance, the Hmong did not have a large 
population or a stable economic foundation to support them. Once Vang Pao partnered 
with the CIA, the United States slowly began to provide everything that the Hmong needed. 
The disruption to the Hmong way of life caused by the conflict soon meant that the United 
States had to support the majority of the population with food and security. The Hmong 
families could no longer support themselves with food and water, let alone support the 
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Hmong fighters. Additionally, the relatively small population of the Hmong caused 
sustainability problems for the Hmong, many of which should have been anticipated by the 
United States. Unfortunately, one CIA officer noted after the war that the conflict’s “cost 
to the Hmong in human life and in economic and social disruption… was unforeseen.”383 
Not only was the impact on the Hmong unforeseen, but the Hmong would be hard-pressed 
to control anything outside of the mountainous areas of northern Laos, especially when 
asked to contend with the large conventional North Vietnamese army. 
In order to overcome the weakness of the RLG and the Hmong, the United States 
carried out various structures of the interorganizational ties. The unique aspects of the U.S. 
partnership efforts came in the form of vertical interorganizational ties with air power and 
the Hmong. However, the United States also carried out various horizontal 
interorganizational ties, especially with the efforts to build the RLG forces.  
The United States implemented vertical interorganizational ties with the Hmong 
guerillas in several unique ways. First, the implementation of “civilian” U.S. air support 
for supply, mobility, and fires was a vertical tie because it connected U.S. capabilities with 
the capabilities of the Hmong. The CAT, or Air America, was the primary means with 
which the United States executed this tie. The “sheep-dipped” pilots, referring to U.S. 
military pilots who were temporarily transferred to civilian agencies to maintain the 
appearance of abiding by the Geneva Accords, were critical for the survival of the Hmong 
resistance. Ahern said, “from the beginning of January 1961, the survival of the Hmong 
resistance depended on air support for delivery of supplies and equipment.”384 The unique 
mode of employing “civilian” aircraft and crews in Laos, while politically necessary, did 
have its drawbacks. It gave politicians the ability to say that they were not using military 
forces, but it also dictated the use of inferior aircraft. CAT aircraft, like the H-34 and WWII 
era planes (PV-2), had deficiencies that “no amount of skill could entirely compensate 
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for.”385 The problems with these aircraft were not thoroughly addressed until the 
introduction of U.S. military planes following Operation TRIANGLE in 1964. 
The evolution of the air war in Laos following Operation TRIANGLE into one that 
utilized more U.S. military aircraft was still a vertical interorganizational tie with the 
Hmong and the RLG. Operation TRIANGLE brought more capable U.S. aircraft to 
northern Laos, which enabled U.S. forces to overcome the deficiencies of the RLG and 
Hmong forces. This vertical tie was critical for supporting the RLG and the Hmong in 
northern Laos, but it too had its limitations. The U.S. airpower was not able to break the 
stalemate because airpower cannot hold territory by itself.  
In addition to vertical ties involving U.S. civilian and military aircraft, the 
development of the Hmong guerrillas was also a vertical tie. The United States developed 
the Hmong resistance from nothing. Although Vang Pao was already an RLG military 
officer, the resistance elements that he and the CIA helped to build were previously non-
existent. The United States saw the Hmong as an opportunity because of their natural 
dislike of the North Vietnamese and their war-like culture. This vertical interorganizational 
tie was a critical component to combatting the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. 
On top of the unique vertical interorganizational ties, the United States also 
implemented horizontal ties with the RLG to build and improve existing conventional 
forces. By 1961, the United States had advisors down to the battalion level in the RLG 
forces. The United States supplied the RLG forces with weapons, ammunition, and military 
equipment through the MAP. The United States also trained the RLG forces from the 
infantry to the pilots, with much of the training conducted by U.S. forces stationed in 
Thailand. 
On top of horizontal ties with the RLG, the United States also helped implement 
horizontal interorganizational ties by employing Thai forces in Laos. Using existing Thai 
troops offered several advantages for the United States. First, the Thai forces were able to 
act as translators between the RLG and the United States. Second, many of the Thai forces 
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had already received training from the United States, including training on guerrilla 
warfare. Third, Thailand’s shared border with Laos allowed for smooth movement of 
military equipment and personnel into the theater. Finally, Thailand had its own interests 
in keeping Laos a non-communist country. All of these factors made Thai forces significant 
on the ground in Laos.  
The principal’s techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities were in line with 
some previously identified best practices, but not all. The U.S. advisors were committed to 
enduring relationships with the Hmong but not the RLG forces. The United States 
partnered at multiple levels, and with better interagency cooperation than in Vietnam, but 
similar dependency problems emerged. Finally, the level of technology that the United 
States introduced was generally appropriate for this partnership. 
The CIA successfully carried out enduring relationships with the Hmong and Vang 
Pao. Ahern said, “To most of the CIA people involved, abandoning the Hmong in the 
aftermath of defeat had been simply unimaginable.”386 Ahern thought this belief “stemmed 
more from emotional identification with a brave but needy partner than from a sober view 
of American constancy toward client allies.”387 Decision-makers in Washington clearly 
did not hold the same emotional identification toward the Hmong, but the advisors on the 
ground seemed to carry themselves as if the Hmong and the United States were tied 
together. The advisors’ attitudes ultimately benefitted the partnership and is in line with 
creating enduring relationships.  
Unfortunately, the relationships with the RLG were not quite as enduring as the 
relationships with the Hmong. The high turnover in SF and other military personnel would 
have made it challenging to create enduring relationships. Additionally, the use of Thailand 
for training separated much of the U.S. trainers from the U.S. advisors in Laos. The high 
turnover of military personnel and the separation of much of the instruction from the 
advising meant that RLG forces had to interact with many different U.S. personnel for short 
periods. One area where this was not the case is in the partnership between air forces. The 
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United States was able to train Laotian pilots, and conduct sorties from Thailand alongside 
previous trainees. This aspect falls more in line with previously identified 
recommendations for enduring relationships, but not entirely because of the rotation of 
personnel.  
Partnership at multiple levels clearly existed in this case. The massive scale of 
support came in almost every form and from many different U.S. agencies. The CIA, 
USOM, USAID, and the U.S. military all coordinated efforts and partnered with various 
RLG and Hmong components. These agencies probably coordinated out of necessity. For 
the U.S. military was not in a position in Laos to make command decisions like it was in 
Vietnam, and many of the other U.S. agencies recognized the benefit of U.S. military assets 
and personnel. The role of the U.S. ambassadors as the command and control element of 
the war also seemed to be more conducive to interagency cooperation. Everything had to 
be run through the country team and the ambassador, including military operations. The 
level of interagency collaboration in Laos seems acceptable when compared to the 
extensive interagency rivalries that existed within Vietnam. The United States’ support to 
the RLG and the Hmong was so vast that it created a dependence.  
The United States mostly provided the appropriate level of technology to the 
Hmong guerrillas. The CIA, SF, and Thai advisors understood the need for equipment that 
could be sustained by guerillas in the field. The primary weapons provided to the Hmong 
were lightweight carbines and M-1 rifles.388 The United States eventually supplemented 
these rifles with mortars and recoilless rifles, but each had a tactical and operational 
necessity. The Hmong excelled by using mortars and recoilless rifles against North 
Vietnamese regulars in the Plain of Jars. The terrain and the enemy’s use of armored 
mobility made these weapons necessary for successful resistance. Concerning 
communication equipment provided to the Hmong, the CIA and SF teams provided the 
RS-1 radio and one-time cipher pads but specially selected literate Hmong to train and 
operate them. In this case, the United States’ effort provided the appropriate equipment, 
increasing the level of technology and firepower when the situation dictated. 
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In sum, the capabilities of RLG and the Hmong were strong and weak in different 
aspects. The RLG’s limited capabilities stemmed largely from cultural beliefs, corruption, 
and low morale. The RLG had equipment, organization, and training necessary to develop 
into a capable force, but a lack of will seemed to play a significant role in that potential 
remaining unfulfilled. The Hmong, on the other hand, had a robust intrinsic willingness to 
combat the Pathet Lao but had structural and organizational weaknesses that limited their 
potential. The United States’ interorganizational ties were able to help the Hmong 
overcome many of their gaps in capabilities like equipment, technology, airpower, but the 
Hmong’s limited numbers and resources created a potential capability ceiling. No amount 
of support or material would have likely made the Hmong successfully become a 
conventional force capable of combatting the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. On top of 
problems with the capability of the RLG and the Hmong, the enemies’ interests and 
decision making also caused issues in Laos. China and the North Vietnamese were 
determined enemies. The next component of the partnership framework—effects—
explores the impacts that the United States had on enemy decision making. 
D. EFFECT ON THE ENEMY 
The United States’ partnership with the RLG and the Hmong produced some 
desired effects like tying down communist troops and delaying the conflict, but ultimately 
fell short in degrading the communists’ desire to maintain pressure on the RLG. The 
combined RLG forces, the Hmong irregulars, and U.S. airpower did buy time for the 
development of the RLG. The U.S. partnership did create a buffer area for the Laotian 
capital and Thailand. Unfortunately, China’s and North Vietnam’s ideological and security 
interests outweighed the costs of supporting the Pathet Lao. China and North Vietnam both 
ideologically wanted the spread of communism. From a security standpoint, they desired 
that Laos would deny the use of its territory to the United States and allow the movement 
of personnel and material into South Vietnam. China’s and North Vietnam’s ability to deny 
violating any of the peace agreements (1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords), allowed them to 
continue support and direction to the Pathet Lao. There are several evaluation criteria: the 
type of cost used for influence (punishment or denial), the means of communication (direct 
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or indirect signaling), and the impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the rivals, including 
the great power and the proxy.  
The type of cost used for influence by the United States was almost entirely 
punishment. As opposed to Vietnam, where the United States combined punishment costs 
with significant denial operations, U.S. strategy in Laos primarily employed guerrilla 
tactics and air power. U.S. advisors trained the Hmong to implement punishment costs on 
the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese regulars through guerilla warfare. As stated earlier, 
the Hmong would conduct sabotage operations or raids. They did not attempt to control 
territory, only cause damage to the enemy forces. 
Additionally, the U.S. use of airpower in Laos provided a means to instill 
punishment costs on the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. The United States supported 
the RLG Air Force and conducted its own air operations against the Pathet Lao and North 
Vietnam. The RLG Air Force, at its peak, had 175 aircraft, most of which the United States 
provided.389 With these aircraft, U.S. air advisors supported “1,500 to 2,500 sorties a 
month.”390 The combined U.S. and RLG air campaigns created high costs on Pathet Lao 
forces throughout the conflict, although actual numbers of destroyed enemy forces are 
challenging to estimate because of the information asymmetry. The United States knew 
that the RLG reported a dishonestly high number of enemy casualties. Finally, the United 
States threatened to use punishment costs through SEATO and conventional invasion. 
While this threat was never actually carried out, it was a relevant factor that effected 
communist decision making. 
Denial costs were still present in Laos, despite being less prominent than denial 
costs in Vietnam. Denial costs came primarily in the form of intelligence operations used 
to monitor communist movements, especially in northern Laos. The CIA, Air America, 
and the U.S. Air Force supported intelligence-gathering efforts. The CIA used its 
relationship with the mountain tribes to develop human intelligence networks while the air 
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assets flew reconnaissance flights. These efforts were meant to provide some level of 
border security to protect against communist advances.  
The means of communication that the United States used was a combination of 
direct and indirect. Although much of the support offered to the RLG and the Hmong was 
secret, making communication difficult, the United States continually signaled intent 
throughout. The United States did not communicate directly with communist rivals before 
the reestablishment of the coalition government in 1962. After the 1962 Geneva 
Conference, open communications took place more frequently. The coalition government, 
led by neutralist Prince Phouma, had communist representation forcing interaction with 
communist factions. The 1962 Geneva Conference itself also provides an example of direct 
communication with North Vietnamese and Chinese officials.391 Of course, direct 
communication continued, culminating with the Vientiane Agreement in 1973. 
Interestingly though, the Vientiane Agreement did not refer to any specific communist 
group, referring to the Pathet Lao as the “Patriot Forces side.”392 
The United States also attempted indirect communication throughout the conflict. 
The communist rivals often did not receive the indirect signaling the way that the United 
States intended. For example, Kennedy proposed the establishment of the MAAG in place 
of the less overt PEO to signal serious intentions. Unfortunately, the communist rivals 
already assumed that the United States was providing military assistance, so were 
unaffected. Other overt actions, meant to signal resolve to the communist rivals, also came 
in the form of moving large conventional forces. For example, President Kennedy ordered 
the Seventh Fleet to the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam shortly after taking office.393 
According to a presidential aid, Kennedy meant this act to signal that the communist rivals 
needed to decide whether to opt for “a cease-fire and neutralization… or American 
intervention.”394 
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The impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the rivals is the most critical aspect of 
the effects component of the framework. Unfortunately, the partnership did not appear to 
change the outcomes of communist decisions drastically. The primary rivals in Laos were 
the Pathet Lao, North Vietnam, and China. The Pathet Lao also received assistance from 
the Soviet Union, especially immediately following the 1960 coup. However, outside of 
support immediately following the coup, “the Russian involvement there [in Laos] has been 
limited.”395 A 1972 RAND study identified the two chief sponsors of the Pathet Lao to be 
Hanoi (North Vietnam) and China, not the Soviet Union.396 Due to this belief, and the 
overall intent of this study, the following section focuses on the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) as a great power sponsor instead of the Soviet Union. 
China’s perceived benefits of supporting the Pathet Lao outweighed the perceived 
costs. The costs on China came in the form of military and economic support. China 
provided aid, not only through North Vietnam but also directly to the Pathet Lao.397 The 
Chinese-built road network in northern Laos called the “Laotian-Chinese Friendship 
Highway,” helped support shipments of military equipment to the Pathet Lao, and helped 
facilitate the training of Pathet Lao units inside China.398 The road construction, involving 
over 20,000 Chinese workers, alarmed many U.S. officials.399 The road system gave China 
leverage and influence over the Pathet Lao because it facilitated Pathet Lao operations and 
Chinese military aid. 
Any significant advances toward the border of China or significant advances of 
right-wing forces in Laos consistently caused China to increase aid to the Pathet Lao. For 
example, immediately following General Phoumi’s recapture of Vientiane, Chinese leaders 
called multiple meetings with Hanoi to discuss the situation and facilitate planning and 
assistance to the Pathet Lao. Following these hasty meetings, the PRC provided the Pathet 
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Lao with “weapons and supplies that could equip 20,000 soldiers.”400 Generally, weak 
military positions drove the concessions that the Chinese and the Pathet Lao made. Going 
into the 1962 Geneva Conference, Chinese leaders encouraged the cease-fire in order to 
“win time to build base areas, mobilize masses, and develop its armed forces for the 
eventual success of the revolution.”401 
Overall, North Vietnam was motivated by ideological and security factors similar 
to China. Ideologically, North Vietnam viewed the Hmong irregulars as a threat to the 
revolutions in both Laos and Vietnam.402 From a security standpoint, North Vietnam’s 
own military history “seems to have made Vang Pao look to Hanoi like a threat to [North 
Vietnam’s] territorial integrity.”403 North Vietnam saw the Plain of Jars as a region that 
the United States could use to invade, but also an area that could foster separatist 
movements in Vietnam. North Vietnam’s ideological and security concerns show the 
importance of at least pressuring the RLG and the United States in Laos. 
The Pathet Lao’s decision-making appears to be more influenced by direction from 
the North Vietnamese than the Chinese. International observers noticed this, stating, “the 
main decisions and plans of the Pathet Lao were ‘a joint enterprise’ with leaders in 
Hanoi.”404 Foreign assistance to the Pathet Lao, like assistance to the Hmong and the RLG, 
was indispensable. A RAND study stated that “the primitive state of the economy of the 
Communist zone of Laos and the scarcity of its resources preclude any hope of rapid 
modernization with substantial outside aid. The Pathet Lao/[North Vietnamese Army] 
forces operating in Laos are entirely dependent on imports for their weapons and 
ammunition, and in the case of the [North Vietnamese Army] units also largely for 
food.”405 The role of foreign assistance to the Pathet Lao and the RLG was similar, but the 
foreign influence obtained over the Pathet Lao seems to be higher since the Pathet Lao was 
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not a recognized government. Due to the Pathet Lao’s closeness with China and Hanoi, 
along with its inability to conduct operations without direct support, likely, United States’ 
actions did not change Pathet Lao decision making directly. Instead, the United States first 
had to influence Chinese and North Vietnamese decision making.  
Ultimately, the primary goal when the United States partnered with the Hmong 
resistance was to buy time for the RLG forces to develop. The Hmong did successfully 
accomplish this by tying down Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces for years. 
Unfortunately, the RLG forces still failed to create the necessary capabilities for 
maintaining control over Laos. The communists knew the limitations of the RLG once the 
United States removed its airpower and they took advantage of them. Despite the ultimate 
fall of RLG, the partnership with the RLG and the Hmong had other benefits. Undoubtedly, 
it forced North Vietnam and China to commit resources that they could have used against 
the United States in South Vietnam. North Vietnam had three entire divisions focused on 
combat in northern Laos at its height, which could have been, and were indeed eventually 
used against South Vietnam.406  
In sum, the United States’ partnership with the RLG and the Hmong had mixed 
results concerning effects on communist rivals. On the one hand, the partnership delayed 
communist advances and their ability to control the Laotian capital. On the other hand, the 
partnership ultimately failed to develop an RLG that was capable of standing on its own. 
China’s and North Vietnam’s interests in Laos outweighed the costs. The type of cost that 
the United States used for influence was primarily punishment. The means of 
communication were both direct and indirect signaling of intent. The impact on the cost-
benefit analysis of the rivals cannot be determined precisely, but it is reasonable to assume 
that the partnership merely forced the conflict into a stalemate. North Vietnam and China 
remained clear in their ultimate desire to eliminate U.S. influence. They simply chose to 
refrain from openly invading the capitol in Vientiane while they chipped away at the 
international norm in Laos. Without the United States’ direct presence, the fall of Laos was 
only a matter of time.  
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E. CONCLUSION/LESSONS 
The ultimate failure of the war in Laos, shown by the collapse of the RLG in 1975, 
is a poor measure to judge the partnership effort, especially with the Hmong. The United 
States’ partnership with Laos is important for this study for three primary reasons: it 
provides a contrast to the U.S. actions taken in Vietnam, it provides a look at Chinese 
security considerations in the region, and it provides a look at political constraints that 
forced the United States to incorporate unique modes of executing the partnership. Some 
of the unique modes include CIA/SF covert support to irregulars, the reliance on U.S. 
airpower in the second half of the conflict, and the non-military command and control of 
the operations. Although the United States also used airpower and irregulars in Vietnam, 
it was not the primary focus as in Laos. This partnership also shows the limitations of 
guerrilla operations, even when successful. The limitations of guerrilla operations is even 
recognized by Mao, who said, “guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.”407 
Guerrilla operations may hinder operations for determined enemies like North Vietnam 
and China, but not completely stop them. 
Overall, the Laos case reinforces the value and explanatory power of the partnership 
framework. It explains the success that the Hmong irregulars had, at least in obtaining 
limited objectives. The Hmong did keep the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam tied down in 
the Plain of Jars for several years. Even after South Vietnam fell to communism, Vang Pao 
“still ruled the mountains southwest of the Plain of Jars” and remained one of the last 
remaining anti-communist forces in Laos.408 This framework also shows the failures of 
the partnership with the RLG as a whole. The framework highlights concerns with the RLG 
in terms of every component—willingness, capability, and effects. Thomas Ahern said it 
best when he stated, “No amount of American aid or advice could make the Lao the masters 
of their own fate.”409 Ahern’s comment suggests a similar notion that the partnership 
framework suggests: that the real root of the problem with the RLG was a lack of 
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willingness against a determined enemy, not necessarily of capability. Maybe Ahern was 
correct in his evaluation, but Laos’s fate was indeed sealed after the United States ended 




V. THE FRIENDSHIP PROJECT: A LOOK AT SACO 
From 1942 to 1945, the U.S. Navy orchestrated a seemingly stunning 
unconventional warfare (UW) campaign in China through the Sino-American Cooperative 
Organization (SACO). SACO partnered with the Chinese Nationalist government with the 
focus of competing against the occupying Japanese Empire. A complicating factor was the 
Chinese Nationalist Government competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
This case is unique because it involves unconventional warfare that was primarily executed 
by conventional U.S. Sailors and Marines. The success of this particular partnership within 
a complex political environment is worth investigating because the nature of the conflict 
and the means to initiate and sustain the partnership are distinct from the previous two 
cases in Vietnam and Laos. SACO provides a look at a partnership in a declared war but 
within a low priority theater without significant American armed forces operating 
unilaterally. The fact that this partnership was one of the last U.S. military experiences in 
mainland China also makes it relevant today because of the context it provides for current 
tensions.  
The Chinese have their own phrase for UW. They call it “quxian jiuguo,” which 
means “saving the nation in a devious way.”410 SACO’s use of quxian jiuguo was a 
stunning military success operationally; however, it experienced strategic drawbacks 
because of multidimensional competition between several players, including the Imperial 
Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, CCP, British, and even inter-governmental rivalries within 
the United States. This seemingly successful military partnership in a complex 
environment provides an excellent case to test the partnership framework and to explore 
China as a unique rival of the United States.  
A. BACKGROUND 
While SACO itself is controversial and polarizing between the United States and 
the PRC, so too is the earlier Western history in China. A brief description of the sources 
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of contention in the century leading up to WWII will help put SACO into the broader 
context of western relations with China. China’s interaction with the Western world during 
the Opium Wars in the mid-1800s led to “The Century of Humiliation.”411 The Opium 
Wars resulted in China’s loss of power and stability. China capitulated to Western powers 
and signed what it viewed as unequal treaties that enabled foreign economic and political 
domination. Anger over these treaties sparked the Taiping Rebellion in 1850, resulting in 
devastation, fourteen years of war, and twenty million dead.412  
The end of the 1800s seemed to expose more weakness within China as coups, 
failed reforms, and lost wars mounted. The Boxer Rebellion, which was supported by the 
Imperial Court, resulted in foreign intervention and humiliating reparations.413 The 
Wuchang Uprising, seen as the birth of modern China, brought a brief period of stability, 
followed by what is known as the warlord period.414 Throughout the warlord period, up 
until the unification campaigns of Chaing Kai-Shek (CKS) in 1928, the warlords were the 
law and government within China.415 The warlord period was rife with violence and 
desperation. During this period, WWI treaties forced China to forfeit territory to Japan, and 
the perceived unjust loss of territory provided an additional source of contention with 
Western powers and Japan. China recalls the period following the Opium Wars with 
resentment toward colonial empires, and that resentment colored the Chinese thinking 
throughout the SACO partnership. It fueled the dislike of colonial powers such as the 
British but also caused suspicion of Americans. The SACO partnership emerged in this 
context of fear and resentment, making its successes even more unlikely.  
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The SACO partnership, like all U.S. and Western interests in China before this 
period, is best described as both complicated and controversial. This particular partnership 
was driven primarily by two vastly different men, U.S. Navy Officer Milton Miles and 
Chinese Nationalist Major General Tai Li.416 Miles was able to create a successful 
partnership with Tai Li despite significant doubts by many members of the U.S. State 
Department and military attachés. Many said that, at best, Tai Li would never work with a 
foreigner and, at worst, critically described him as “the Himmler of China.”417 The 
personal relationship between Tai Li and Miles was so significant that Miles was able to, 
in a highly unorthodox arrangement, bypass the theater commander and report directly to 
the Joint Chiefs. This unorthodox arrangement was even supported by the China-Burma-
India (CBI) “Theater Commander,”418 General Joseph Stilwell, who wrote to General 
George Marshall that “SACO’s success depended on complete cooperation from Tai Li, 
who would never accept having a U.S. Army general between himself and Miles.”419 It 
was Miles’s personal partnership with Tai Li, a vicious anti-communist, which has led to 
controversy.  
The SACO partnership started with a small, modest operation, codenamed 
“Friendship Project,” primarily focusing on reporting weather and scouting the Chinese 
coast for potential amphibious landings by U.S. forces. The Friendship Project grew and 
evolved into SACO, and later Naval Group China, with Miles agreeing to train and equip 
Tai Li’s 50,000-man guerrilla army.420 U.S. officials reported this partnership as a 
stunning success with a significant contribution to the war against the Japanese at a 
relatively low cost in lives and treasure. The reports from Miles claim the partnership 
supplied critical intel, rescued over seventy downed U.S. pilots, and killed 26,000 Japanese 
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while only losing five Americans.421 These are impressive numbers that would point to a 
successful partnership, yet following WWII and the takeover of China by the CCP, 
American political support to the Chinese Nationalists has contributed to complicated 
relations between the United States and Communist China. The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), the descendant of the CCP, has used SACO to accuse the United States of providing 
partisan support to a robust and corrupt security apparatus that committed war crimes, 
atrocities, and prolonged the following civil war.422 
Miles arrived in China for participation in SACO in April 1942.423 The U.S. Navy 
wanted intelligence on future landing sites on the mainland of China and weather reports 
to enable operations in the Pacific. Although it may seem trivial today, gathering weather 
data was no easy task and required placing men on the ground in forward locations. Lack 
of appropriate weather forecasts and data was a contributing factor to the strategic surprise 
at Pearl Harbor for the United States and at Normandy for Germany.424 Weather data in 
China was necessary to project offensive operations in the Pacific and to anticipate 
Japanese activities. SACO became responsible for obtaining weather data throughout the 
vast territory of China.  
In addition to collecting weather and coastal data, SACO set up camps throughout 
China to conduct training and operations against the Japanese. Miles built a specific type 
of command in SACO that pushed for acceptance of the Chinese culture, as opposed to a 
British Empire mindset of superiority. He demanded that all his men showed respect for 
the Chinese, and this resulted in enhanced and reciprocal cooperation.425 Miles’s approach 
was key to SACO’s success in adverse circumstances. It enabled an unorthodox group of 
U.S. Navy Sailors to spearhead an inland guerrilla warfare campaign. 
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The Kuomintang (KMT) party, or the Chinese Nationalist government, was led by 
Chiang Kai-Sheck (CKS), a well known and imposing historical figure who certainly 
wanted to rid China of the Japanese presence, but was also in a deep struggle to retain and 
consolidate his own domestic power. CKS came to power officially on October 10, 1928, 
at the end of the period when opposing warlords controlled the various regions of China.426 
As historian Barbara Tuckman wrote, CKS “was never to be free of these challenges by 
rival members of the pack, never to be wholly secure in authority. The necessity of 
bargaining and maneuvering to keep the warlord challengers off balance and maintain his 
own was the condition of his rule.”427 CKS, despite U.S. beliefs to the contrary, was in 
charge of only a loosely unified China. He had fragile control over many areas, as shown 
by the fact that even warlords who helped him obtain power often refused to disband their 
armies and submit to the central authority.428 To make matters worse for CKS, the KMT 
government had been resisting the Japanese, at great cost, since 1937, several years before 
the official entry of the United States. Weak domestic control and military hardship under 
Japanese occupation led to CKS’s desire to shift as much responsibility for fighting the 
Japanese as possible to the Allies. 
Owen Lattimore, an expert on China and the U.S. political advisor to CKS before 
the U.S. entry into the war, outlined China’s and CKS’s resentments on the perceived share 
of the fighting. Lattimore observed China’s perception that Britain and the United States 
were warning Japan against aggression in East Asia everywhere except for within 
China.429 Additionally, Tuckman said that China perceived that the “American effort to 
improve transport over the Burma Road was not to help China per se but to keep China 
fighting Japan so that America and Britain would not have to fight her.”430 Much of the 
resentment toward the Allies came from CKS. 
 
426 Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945, 147–51. 
427 Tuchman, 150. 
428 Tuchman, 163. 
429 Tuchman, 275. 
430 Tuchman, 275. 
126 
CKS’s preferences were completely natural; he wanted consolidation of his power 
both internationally and domestically, and he realized that support from the Allies would 
ultimately help him against the Japanese and his future domestic competitors. However, 
CKS resented several actions taken by the Allies. He believed that the Allies’ desire to 
prosecute the war in Europe first would result in China lacking a seat at the peace table and 
the restoration of British colonies in East Asia. CKS also felt betrayed by the Allies 
following the second Cairo Conference when the decision was made to postpone an 
offensive operation already planned against Japan in Burma. Some argue that CKS’s sense 
of betrayal from this led him to wage “passive war against Japan” and to have a “virtual 
truce between the Kuomintang and Japanese.”431 The KMT always hid its resentment 
under the surface of gratefulness. In one way, the KMT resented certain actions by the 
Allies, but in another, they understood how critical the assistance was. The Republic of 
China (Taiwan), the descendant of the KMT, summed up the importance of the relationship 
with the United States in its official history of the Sino-Japanese War stating, “The United 
States moved from sympathy to assistance and co-operation with China in WWII. Such 
assistance which can never be forgotten has left a glorious page in the annals of the 
twentieth century.”432 
CKS became the Supreme Allied Commander China Theater with a spot for a U.S. 
officer as Chief of Staff. General Stilwell filled this position for most of the war until 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) replaced him with General Wedemeyer. CKS’s 
authority as Supreme Commander seemed to be undermined at times by the Allies, chiefly 
the British, who did not always submit to his positional authority.433 The Allies’ 
undermining of CKS is exemplified by the Quebec Conference, which created a new South 
East Asia Command under a British officer without consulting the Chinese.434 
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Comparatively, the United States demonstrated sympathy and support for China, 
which began well before WWII. American Christian Missionaries were prevalent in China 
and they cultivated sympathy for the Chinese people within U.S. public opinion. The 
impact of these foreign missionaries in China is significant, even contributing to Chinese 
frustrations leading up to the Boxer Rebellion and necessitating U.S. intervention in 
1900.435 FDR had grand plans for the KMT government under CKS as a major world 
power next to the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.436 FDR was the dominant 
political driver who shaped relations with China. When General Stilwell asked FDR before 
reporting to China if he had a message for CKS, FDR responded by saying, “tell him we 
are in this thing for keeps, and we intend to keep at it until China gets back all her lost 
territory.”437 FDR’s strong statement demonstrates his serious intent to support CKS, 
despite his later statements near the end of the war that requested control of CKS’s armed 
forces.438 
It is important to note, however, that the United States had dissenting and 
pessimistic views about the importance of China as a partner in a financial and democratic 
sense leading up to WWII. The optimistic projections of enormous trade through the Open 
Door policy disappointed many with dismal investment and trade numbers in the 1930s 
(As percentage of the total U.S. foreign trade and investment, China represented only 1% 
of total worldwide investment and 4% of total foreign trade).439 Even throughout the war, 
pessimistic views of China and the KMT government continued. Tuchman stated that “the 
consensus of most American officials and correspondents working in China was that the 
Kuomintang was incompetent, corrupt, oppressive, unrepresentative, riddled by internal 
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weakness and unlikely to last.”440 Indeed, many at the time argued that the KMT 
government was not truly a democracy.441 
The KMT’s attempts to manipulate or overpower Western leaders often strained 
diplomatic relations. For instance, in what looks to be the tail wagging the dog, CKS would 
give ultimatums to the United States, threatening to stop fighting the Japanese. Many 
Chinese believed that they could manipulate westerners in positions of power. The chief of 
a Chinese military mission once said mockingly, “Let me see the British officials and I will 
turn them around my little finger.”442 In the summer of 1942, CKS issued an ultimatum to 
the United States, demanding that America commit three of its own divisions to restore 
communication between Burma and China, sustain 500 combat planes within China, and 
deliver 5,000 tons of military equipment per month via air over “the hump.”443 The hump 
was the nickname given to the difficult but sole logistical route into China. While Japan 
occupied all other roads and ports, the logistical route required flying over the Himalayan 
mountains. CKS’s ultimatum was most likely a bluff because it is unlikely that he would 
obtain a separate peace with the Japanese. A separate peace would have been outside his 
interests because his goal rid China of all Japanese influence. In another case, CKS 
demanded a one billion dollar loan to keep fighting after the United States backed out of a 
commitment made at the Cairo conference for an amphibious landing in China. This 
demand outraged many U.S. officials.444 Stilwell warned CKS that “our people are fed 
up.”445  These ultimatums demonstrate that CKS desired American troops, air support, and 
as much war material as he could get, but that he also had diverging interests from the 
United States at times. While CKS’s interests occasionally diverged from the interests of 
the United States, they did not diverge very far from General Tai Li. 
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General Tai Li was an absolutely loyal servant and believer in CKS with a deep 
level of trust between them going back to the beginning of their relationship at the 
Whampoa Academy (Chinese military academy). Tai Li showed his loyalty early as a 
student when he began to pass intelligence on the communist tendencies of his classmates 
to CKS, who was the academy’s commandant.446  CKS gave Tai Li the nickname “‘Rain 
Hat,’ a nod to his knack for shielding the Generalissimo in times of trouble.”447 Tai Li was 
fiercely loyal in both a good and a bad way. Frederic Wakeman, the author of the Tai Li 
biography Spymaster, observed that Tai Li likely was responsible for the death of over 
2,000 of his own agents and carried out politically motivated killings ordered by CKS.448 
His fierce loyalty to CKS and China is what makes Tai Li such a complicated figure. He 
was, on the one hand, a very competent military leader and intelligence officer for China, 
and on the other hand, a monster. The monstrous side of Tai Li coordinated assassinations 
of political enemies, executed his agents for mistakes, and utilized brutal methods of 
torture.449 However, the competent and loyal commander side of Tai Li was observed by 
many. Many American SACO members saw Tai Li as an active military leader who could 
motivate his men with powerful speeches.450  
Tai Li’s fierce loyalty and desire to support CKS’s regime carried over to his 
disgust for communism. Tai Li was staunchly anti-communist and was continually thinking 
about the nationalist position in the post-war years against the communists.451 His answer 
for securing post-war positioning was simple; he wanted to strengthen his security 
apparatus and intelligence gathering functions while gathering equipment that he could use 
in the inevitable future fight against the communists. To further this end, he wanted to 
reduce the losses of his forces and equipment fighting the Japanese. Miles described Tai 
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Li’s desire for F.B.I. type training as his “most earnest wish—a wish so important to him 
that he was willing to trade almost any service for it.”452 The KMT knew that they would 
need this internal policing capability in the fight against communism after the war. 
Tai Li also desired international recognition of China as a sovereign power. This 
desire led to his hatred of the British, who he viewed as having imperialistic intentions in 
China, as well as his resentment of what was referred to as “old China hands.”453 The old 
China hands were people who proclaimed themselves as China experts because of pre-war 
business dealings in China but often were prejudice against the Chinese people and lacked 
respect for China’s sovereignty. The presence of the British secret police within China 
before the war contributed to Tai Li’s resentment. He advocated for the expulsion of 
Britain’s China Commando Group before SACO arrived due to Britain’s insistence on total 
command and control.454 In some ways, the removal of the China Commando Group made 
Tai Li free to demand more control over the partnership with the United States in SACO, 
but it also opened the door for the Americans. Following the expulsion of the China 
Commando Group, Tai Li told his agents, “don’t be discouraged by the departure of the 
British. They have gone away, and that’s all right. But the Americans have already packed 
their luggage and are on their way to Chungking now!”455 
The American heading to fill in the role of Britain’s China Commando Group was 
then Commander Milton “Mary” Miles. Miles had significant experience working in China 
before the war, but contrary to the “old China hands,” he developed a deep respect for the 
Chinese people. He implemented policies in SACO that showed his respect: men were 
forbidden to use derogatory terms for the Chinese, disrespect for Chinese food and utensils 
was not tolerated, and the men were never allowed to show impatience with the Chinese.456 
Critics of Miles say that he was naïve to KMT’s actual agenda, duped by Tai Li, and even 
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accuse him of “going native.”457 Whether Miles was fooled or not, it is clear that his 
interests aligned very closely with the KMT government. CKS sent Miles a gift after the 
war that summed up Miles’s attitude; it was a scroll with the saying, “Two men in the same 
boat help each other.”458 In Miles’s mind, the KMT government and the United States 
were in the same boat. 
While Miles believed the KMT and the United States to have identical interests, 
not everyone within the United States agreed. Patrick Hurley, FDR’s personal 
representative to Chungking, and General Wedemeyer, General Stilwell’s replacement, 
both supported opening up relations with the CCP in Yenan to support a potential offensive 
in CCP controlled areas.459 The KMT advised against any support to the CCP because 
resources were limited and any support offered to the CCP would have been diverted away 
from the KMT. Despite being in a temporary truce with the KMT, the CCP’s most 
immediate goal was “arms acquisition for a final military showdown with the Nationalist 
government.”460 Scholar Maochun Yu stated, “It was known that Yenan’s ultimate goal 
was not to defeat the Japanese, as all in China believed that Japan would be defeated sooner 
or later. The final showdown was to be with the Nationalists; this the Communists did not 
hide.”461 The CCP’s ability to take advantage of the war to build and consolidate its power 
frustrated the Republic of China, the successors to the KMT, for decades after the war.462 
The CCP’s primary goal clearly contradicted the efforts of the United States to 
support the KMT. For many within the OSS, though, the intelligence and guerilla warfare 
potential of the CCP against Japan was irresistible. OSS officers observed that “there is 
virtually no spot in Japanese-occupied China in which the Yenan armies do not have 
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permanent agents of guerrilla troops.”463 Ultimately, support to the CCP did come for a 
time, but it did not come close to the level of support to the KMT. This variation in support 
is because Washington pushed back on Wedemeyer and the OSS’s initiative.464 The 
support given by the OSS to the CCP was known by the United States to have adverse 
long-term impacts with CKS and Tai Li. The relationship also ended abruptly over, among 
other things, the CCP’s killing and mutilation of an OSS agent named John Birch.465  
Following the surrender of Japan, SACO quickly and unceremoniously stood down 
and sent personnel back to the United States. President Truman dissolved the OSS, which 
made the SACO agreement no longer active.466 Officially, SACO was terminated on 
October 1, 1945, but it took members several months to completely redeploy from China. 
Shortly after the official end date, a “small and hurried ceremony” was held to honor the 
partnership and the KMT.467 This brought an end to the war in China for the United States, 
but not for the KMT, which still had to contend with the growing threat from the CCP. 
Between 1945 and the KMT’s downfall and retreat to Taiwan in 1949, CCP forces 
destroyed most of the elite KMT units that SACO trained.  
The SACO partnership is a case of a successfully executed military partnership in 
GPC. SACO, though, had weaknesses that are outlined in the partnership framework, 
primarily the disparity of willingness at the political level. The next section is the first 
component of the framework, willingness, applied to SACO. 
B. WILLINGNESS 
There are several evaluation criteria to consider when evaluating the capability of 
the partner: the initial overlap of interest, the incentives used by the principal, the 
uncertainty of the tasks, and the informational asymmetry. Overall, SACO proved to be a 
willing partner despite a few deviations in long-term interests and disagreements over 
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incentive structures. The initial overlap of interests was high because of the common 
enemy of Japan. The incentives used were very generous behavior-based loans, military 
equipment, and training. The uncertainty and the informational asymmetry were both 
decreasing throughout the partnership. All the above factors lead to an acceptably willing 
partner. 
The initial overlap of interests between the two SACO partners, the Nationalist 
Chinese government, or the Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the U.S. government requires 
a more in-depth look. The KMT’s and the United States’ interests both clearly overlap with 
respect to the desire to remove Japan and its puppet governments from China, but the 
interests also conflicted in several areas. The overlap and the conflicts of interests should 
be examined at the political level with the KMT and U.S. governments, as well as the 
military level with General Tai Li and U.S. military leadership.  
At the political level, the KMT and the United States had overlapping interests with 
respect to the desire to defeat Japan and the desire for a stable and sovereign China. The 
interests at this political level conflicted due to CKS’s insistence on retaining domestic 
power against potential political rivals and military power for the coming conflict with the 
CCP. The United States wanted CKS to expend his effort against Japan, while CKS wished 
to gather and reserve forces and material to secure his own power after the war. FDR 
wanted to support CKS fully as a great power nation but showed frustration at his lack of 
initiative to fight the Japanese.468 For FDR, China was only one region in the global 
conflict, and CKS was only one of several vital allies. The need of the United States to 
balance resources in China with other theaters meant that, politically, FDR could not 
provide CKS with everything he wanted. 
The Chinese military partner most influential to SACO, as stated previously, was 
General Tai Li, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military 
Council of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Tai Li’s initial preferences were primarily 
to support CKS’s regime, which included the expulsion of the Japanese, the eventual defeat 
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of the communists, the strengthening of his own security apparatus, and the recognition of 
a sovereign China by the international community. 
Miles’s initial interests were to support the U.S. war effort against Japan by both 
supporting the U.S. Navy and the KMT as the sovereign power in China. Miles initially 
focused on prepping the environment for the U.S. Navy’s potential amphibious landings 
on the China coast.469 Miles believed that the only way to achieve this was to work through 
the KMT government; cooperation was necessary vice the British tactic of domination. 
The incentives used by the principal to influence the desired behavior came 
primarily in material and political benefits offered to CKS. These carrots offered were 
behavior-based incentives with little or no strings attached to actual outcomes. The United 
States wanted to defeat Japan and support a stable East Asia region following the war, so 
offering military equipment and international recognition to the KMT as a sovereign world 
power was within the United States’ own interests. Because the United States viewed the 
incentives as within its interests, limited strings were attached to specific end states or 
objectives specified at the higher levels. Although General Stilwell consistently tried to 
obtain the authority for quid pro quo to use Lend-Lease material as leverage against CKS, 
Washington regularly denied him.470 
Secretary of the Treasury Hans Morgenthau proposed outcome-based incentives in 
1942 through loans issued to the KMT government. The outcome-based stipulations were 
rejected by CKS, ultimately leading to financial support with virtually no strings 
attached.471 Morgenthau also proposed bypassing the KMT central government to pay the 
troops directly every month, which would have reduced possibilities for corruption and 
would have encouraged operations. CKS refused to accept the transferred risk and turned 
down every proposal for more U.S. control or supervision of the loans. CKS claimed that 
loans to help fight a common enemy should not require pre-arranged terms. Thus, to keep 
the KMT government in the fight, the Americans capitulated to loosely controlled, 
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behavior-based incentives. These incentives encouraged China to commit only enough 
resources in the fight against the Japanese to continue receiving payments and material. 
The United States eventually resented the 1942 loan stipulations and the rate of exchange, 
both of which caused problems with further loans in 1943.472 The exchange rate, which 
was estimated at six times the real value, actually placed a high cost on incentivizing CKS, 
leading some to believe that “even the United States was not rich enough to fight in 
China.”473 
The material provided to the KMT government from the beginning of Lend-Lease 
was a significant factor for incentivization. Tuckman stated succinctly that, following the 
declaration of China as eligible, the “Lend-Lease became the core and foundation and, 
from the Chinese point of view, the most important aspect of the Sino-American 
relationship.”474 The KMT government was isolated, without access to an uncontested port 
to receive supplies. Before the completion of the Burma Road, which Stilwell spearheaded, 
the United States had to fly all the equipment into China at a great expense.475 Prior to and 
throughout the war, Lend-Lease brought vital military equipment over “the hump” from 
Burma/India. The logistical challenges and costs to provide these incentives proved tasking 
to the United States.  
The uncertainty within partnerships, with respect to both completing and 
monitoring the specified objectives or tasks, is important because it directly affects the risk 
for the principal and the agent. In the case of SACO, the tasks were ambitious: establishing 
weather stations throughout a vast geographical area in enemy-held terrain, fighting a 
modernized Japanese Army, and building intelligence networks to monitor the Japanese. 
These ambitious tasks, though, did not have an unreasonable amount of uncertainty to them 
in either the ability to measure the success or the ability to obtain it. Japan even realized 
low uncertainty was a strength for the KMT, when they noted in an estimate of KMT forces 
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that the single greatest tool that the KMT had was its belief in the eventual victory of Britain 
and the United States.476 Essentially, the main thing that the KMT government had to do 
was to continue fighting the Japanese and not give up. The task at hand for the KMT 
government was never to defeat the Japanese by themselves, which would have increased 
the uncertainty significantly. The plan for the KMT was a part of a broader strategy to put 
pressure on the Japanese, with American offensives through the Pacific. Additionally, the 
ability to provide support to weather monitoring stations was well within Tai Li’s abilities. 
He already had an established network of spies and informers throughout China that could 
support movements and locations. 
The information asymmetry between the principal and the agent was significant in 
the beginning despite the special relationship between Tai Li and Miles. Tai Li was risk-
averse when it came to American lives, which resulted in him vetoing all the proposals for 
Americans to accompany Chinese counterparts on operations until October 1944. Before 
allowing American SACO personnel to accompany the KMT on operations, historian 
Linda Kush said, “[the DOS] accused Tai of using SACO to hoard American arms and 
equipment rather than to defeat Japan. Rumors had been flying that Tai Li did not want 
Americans out in the field because they would discover his deceit.”477 Some SACO 
officers suspected similar problems with Tai Li, noticing that he always asked for more 
American weapons and equipment while requiring Americans to stay within the protected 
camps.478 This is the classic information asymmetry problem that occurs when it is 
impossible or costly to monitor activities. Initially, Miles and his American counterparts 
had to trust Tai Li at his word. The information asymmetry decreased, however, after the 
American SACO personnel were allowed to accompany the KMT on operations. 
In summary, General Tai Li and the KMT government were willing partners for the 
United States despite some conflicts in long-term interests at the political level. The initial 
overlap of interests was substantial at both the political and military levels. At the political 
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level, FDR and CKS were strong supporters of a sovereign China, free from imperialist 
intervention and Japan. At the military level, Tai Li, although anti-communist, was 
similarly anti-Japanese. This framework would suggest that the overlap of interests in 
SACO was enough to make the cost of incentivizing low. The incentives offered through 
SACO were loosely controlled, behavior-based incentives, mainly in the form of war 
material and training. The incentives through loans and Lend-Lease provided minimal 
stipulations for the KMT government. The uncertainty in the environment was also 
relatively low, both in the ability to measure the agent’s output and ability to achieve it. 
The information asymmetry between the United States and the KMT government was high 
initially, but decreased as U.S. SACO personnel started to accompany the Chinese in 
operations. Even a completely willing partner, however, needs some level of capability to 
be successful. The next section analyzes the second component of the framework—
capability—as it relates to the KMT government and armed forces. 
C. CAPABILITY 
There are several evaluation criteria to consider when evaluating the capability of 
the partner: the strategy, the initial capabilities of the agent, the structure of the 
interorganizational ties (vertical, horizontal, the means with which collective efficiencies 
were achieved), and the principal’s techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities. 
Although the KMT had several capability gaps, the United States successfully created 
interorganizational ties and used proven BPC techniques to improve the KMT and fulfill 
the Allies’ strategy against Japan.  
The strategy of the United States stemmed primarily from the idea that the United 
States would supply airpower, money, and equipment while the KMT government would 
provide the manpower and access within China. SACO’s mission within that broad strategy 
was more specific. Then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King, gave secret 
verbal orders to Miles to “go to China and set up some bases as soon as you can. The main 
idea is to prepare the China coast in any way you can for U.S. Navy landings in three or 
four years. In the meantime, do whatever you can to help the Navy and to heckle the 
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Japanese.”479 Although in this initial concept it seemed like heckling the Japanese was an 
afterthought, it became a primary component shortly after a handshake deal between Miles 
and Tai Li in a rice paddy while under fire from Japanese airplanes.480 
The desired end-state in the Pacific was the unconditional surrender of Japan, as 
explicitly stated by FDR following the Casablanca Conference.481 Although the 
declaration of unconditional surrender has sparked debate, it nonetheless led to a plan to 
place maximum pressure on Japan.482 Scholar Robert Pape argued that it was this 
maximum pressure on multiple fronts, not the atomic bombs, that led to the military 
vulnerability of Japan and eventual surrender.483 Japan’s military vulnerability was 
achieved through a variety of means, with the pressure in China through SACO as a small 
part. Initially, when the plan for landing allied forces in China was still a priority, SACO’s 
role in preparing the environment was critical. Once the United States eliminated this 
option, China’s role was diminished. The plans for the U.S. Navy to land forces in China 
never materialized because U.S. leadership deemed it unnecessary once air campaigns 
could reach Japan from territory outside of China, such as the Marianas and Okinawa.484 
After plans to bypass the Asian continent took place, the United States moved the China 
theater to a secondary position. The risk in this strategy lies in the lofty desired end state 
of unconditional surrender, which was only partially achieved in conjunction with an 
enormous offensive by the Soviets in Manchuria.485 
The initial capabilities of the KMT government were limited despite their 
enormous manpower. The KMT government lacked sufficient technology and equipment 
to stand up to a modern armed force such as Japan’s and had to resort to guerilla warfare 
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as a resistance effort. On paper, the KMT government had 300 Army divisions standing by 
for use against Japan, but the reality was that most of these divisions were insufficiently 
manned and inadequately trained. General Stilwell often argued that the Chinese Army was 
of low quality, as shown by his constant pursuit of sweeping reforms. Stilwell’s desired 
reforms consisted of reducing the number of Chinese divisions in total so that there could 
be some capable divisions versus the many worthless divisions.486  
The KMT government was in control of a tremendous amount of personnel that it 
often could not afford to take care of. Many of the Chinese personnel that the SACO camps 
received were starving, weak, and illiterate.487 A former SACO supply officer, Roy 
Stratton, had duties that allowed him to stay in contact with all of the camps and he outlines 
this problem in his book, SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy.488 The low quality of personnel 
made training difficult for many of the SACO instructors. The U.S. instructors noted that 
many Chinese students also “suffered from scabies, conjunctivitis, ulcerations and poor 
eyesight.”489 Additionally, the wide variety of Chinese dialects used by the students made 
training and coordination with the units difficult.490 The combination of these factors 
points to the conclusion that the initial capabilities of the Chinese guerrillas were deficient. 
This view was supported by General Stilwell, among others, who assessed that the morale 
and capabilities of the KMT army as a whole were low and needed to be revitalized.491 
The assessment of the Chinese as having limited capabilities is, of course, not 
agreed upon by everyone. Miles had high regard for the Chinese guerrilla warfare 
capabilities, as did other members of SACO.492 Ted Cathey, a U.S. Marine in SACO, said 
that his Chinese column was “comparable to an American battalion if operating under 
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similar conditions.”493 The reports from various other observers also suggest differing 
thoughts on the initial capabilities of the Chinese guerillas; some of them were seen as 
extremely competent by members of SACO. However, others received in the SACO 
camps, and much of the Chinese regular army had limited capability. This wide range of 
ability is understandable when considering the large number of Chinese recruits and the 
inevitable variances between them. 
While the individual potential of the Chinese SACO students had a wide variance, 
the aerology and technical capabilities of the Chinese were extremely primitive. The KMT 
government lacked the equipment and knowledge to obtain the necessary weather data 
needed to make forecasts. Despite this, Miles was able to obtain a historical weather data 
book that helped the United States anticipate weather patterns. The Japanese had a 
geographical advantage against the United States in the Pacific predicting the weather 
because they generally attacked from the West, moving in the same direction as weather 
systems. That is why the access within China for weather data was so important. The 
United States needed to match the extensive Japanese network that reported weather data 
from a wide range, even from within the Soviet Union.494 
Technical capabilities of the KMT guerillas were limited primarily because of a 
lack of equipment for communications and weapons. Tai’s army had previously relied on 
runners to transport information instead of radios. Miles pushed for the creation of a radio 
communication network in China using American radio equipment to remedy the time 
delay of the runners.495 The communication network was needed to relay time-critical 
intelligence and weather data to General Claire Chenault’s Fourteenth Air Force and the 
U.S. Navy. Transmitting time-critical information could not have been accomplished with 
the KMT’s initial capabilities. 
The initial intelligence capabilities of Tai Li were high. Miles and many who 
observed Tai were often impressed with his vast networks. After traveling through 
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Japanese held territory shortly after meeting, Miles noted the extent of Tai’s intelligence 
network, amazed that he even “had—or had had—access to the Imperial Palace itself!”496 
Tai Li’s network was extensive, with agents reporting to him from everywhere from 
Washington to India. This high initial intelligence capability of Tai Li allowed the United 
States to gain access to an already mature network of information. 
The weaknesses in initial capabilities were fixed or accounted for through the 
interorganizational ties between the United States and the KMT. The structure of the 
interorganizational ties involved a combination of vertical and horizontal efforts. The 
scope of the SACO partnership was quite broad. It encompassed camps all over China that 
conducted training on a variety of topics. The SACO headquarters in Chungking, referred 
to as Happy Valley by the Americans, was where coordination with Tai Li took place and 
where Miles’s famous “What the Hell” pennant flew.497 This headquarters element 
controlled and organized vertical and horizontal integration through a variety of means. 
Additionally, efforts from other U.S. military services and organizations accompanied the 
interorganizational ties made through SACO. 
Vertically, the United States partnered with China on several levels to build new 
capabilities or complement Chinese capabilities with American ones. The American 
Volunteer Group (AVG), known as the Flying Tigers, was a vertical integration effort to 
complement Chinese ground capabilities with a capable air force. The AVG effort was 
carried out by General Claire Chennault, who eventually came to command the Fourteenth 
Air Force.498 This effort, authorized before Pearl Harbor by an Executive Order in April 
1941, recruited Army and Navy pilots by using high salaries and bonuses for shooting 
down Japanese planes.499 These pilots were released from active duty to act as, essentially, 
mercenaries for China. CKS and Chennault had high hopes for this air centric effort 
throughout the war despite what Tuckman said was the realization by many that “Stilwell 
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had been right all along in predicting that the effectiveness of the Fourteenth Air Force 
would only provoke counterattack on the airfields.”500 
In addition to vertical integration efforts through the AVG, SACO also delivered 
vertical integration efforts through the introduction of new tactics and ideas to Tai Li’s 
secret police and cryptology Radio Intercept Units. In what became a controversial 
decision, Miles authorized the training of Tai Li’s soldiers, specifically the Juntong secret 
police, in interrogation and other police tactics.501 Unit Camp Nine is what formed into a 
SACO School of Intelligence and Counter-Espionage, led by a former FBI agent, Charles 
Johnston.502 Camp Nine was unique in that it did not only build on existing capabilities 
but introduced new ones. Additionally, the SACO Radio Intercept Units introduced new 
capabilities and equipment to intercept and decode Japanese radio transmissions.503 Camp 
Nine and the Radio Intercept Units both created vertical interorganizational ties within 
SACO by adding entirely new skills. 
Outside of Camp Nine and Radio Intercept Units, SACO integrated horizontally 
through supplying and training existing Chinese commando troops and intelligence 
networks. SACO had fourteen major camps that conducted training, the majority of which 
focused on Tai’s commando troops.504 Camp One, the oldest camp in SACO, was 
responsible for training and equipping Tai Li’s Loyal Patriotic Army (LPA). Camp One 
trained 6,976 LPA students, more than any other SACO camp.505 Camp Two trained 3901 
guerrillas in water raiding and river mining by the end of the war; these guerillas then went 
into the Chinese Commando Army following training.506 Some camps received their own 
names for the operations they conducted. Camp Thirteen was referred to as “The Yangtze 
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Raiders” because of the success of the sabotage against Japanese shipping in the Yangtze 
River by guerrillas trained and accompanied by SACO personnel.507 
SACO’s scope also involved training and equipping Chinese pirates on the South-
Central coast of China to highjack Japanese vessels.508 These pirates added to Tai Li’s 
network by providing intelligence via radio, helping rescue downed pilots in Japanese 
territory, and providing safe passage for SACO members.509 The relationship with the 
Chinese pirates was another horizontal integration effort carried out by SACO. 
While executing vertical and horizontal integration efforts, the United States also 
effectively carried out the partnership in alignment with best practices. When applied to 
the framework, the principal’s techniques of increasing the agent’s capabilities align with 
previously identified best practices of engagement at multiple levels, enduring 
relationships, and appropriate level of technology. Because of the wartime needs and the 
strong U.S. desire to put pressure on the Japanese wherever possible, the United States 
made efforts across the entire government and military enterprise.  
The United States engaged with the KMT government at multiple levels throughout 
the SACO partnership. The extensive engagement included Chennault’s Fourteenth Air 
Force and Stilwell and Wedemeyer’s initiatives with the Army. Within SACO, Miles 
trained Tai’s units on intelligence, military, and police capabilities. The extent of economic 
aid to China was also substantial, as seen through the amount of cargo delivered over ‘The 
Hump.’510 Accounting for all support to China through SACO and other means, the United 
States seems to have partnered with KMT sufficiently at multiple levels. 
While in the context of partnership at multiple levels, the SACO partnership was 
also an enduring relationship, a factor that contributed to the overall success. True to how 
most of the U.S. military operated during WWII, Miles stayed in China until the war was 
over. The United States was committed, if not entirely to the KMT government, then at 
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least to the unconditional surrender of Japan. The attitude of this long-term commitment 
carried over to the men of SACO, whose enduring relationship resulted in an appreciation 
of Chinese culture and the building of genuine friendships with their Chinese partnerships. 
SACO members often tried to learn the language and often built relationships by playing 
sports with the Chinese.511 The ability of the SACO personnel to stay in the China theater 
to continue to develop the relationships aligns with previously identified best practices for 
building capabilities in partners. 
SACO introduced the appropriate level of technology for Tai’s units to be 
successful. The Chinese commando troops, which made up the majority of SACO’s focus, 
received basic American-made weapons and ammunition like .45 caliber pistols, .38 
caliber revolvers, carbines, Thompson submachine-guns, and grenades.512 With a basic 
level of training, Chinese commando students were able to operate and maintain this 
equipment, so long as they continued to receive ammunition. On the other hand, the 
technology introduced to the Chinese with regard to weather data, communication, and 
radio intercept equipment was more complicated. This technology was controlled, 
however, through the presence of American personnel. The Radio Intercept Units that were 
designed to intercept and decode radio communications actually excluded the Chinese in 
their operations.513 The weather data training, although introducing new technology, was 
done with “very simple equipment, such as barometers and thermometers.”514 The ability 
of SACO to introduce simple equipment that did not exceed the Chinese ability to operate 
or maintain proved successful for a sustainable partnership.  
In summary, Tai Li’s forces and the KMT government had a sufficient level of 
capability for a successful partnership. The strategy demanded the unconditional surrender 
of Japan through attrition or annihilation, with China’s role evolving into one purely of 
resistance and intelligence. The initial capabilities of the Tai Li and the KMT had gaps but 
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were sufficient enough in the areas of intelligence, access, and the sheer number of 
personnel to justify the partnership. The structure of the interorganizational ties provided 
substantial connections both vertically and horizontally, filling the required capability 
gaps. Finally, the principal’s (U.S.) techniques for increasing the agent’s capabilities were 
in line with best practices.  
D. EFFECT ON THE ENEMY 
In the case of SACO, it initially seems that SACO’s efforts had limited deterrent 
effects on Japan despite the high costs imposed. The seemingly limited effect is partly 
because this partnership took place in the context of total war, partly because of the high-
cost tolerance of Japanese forces, and partly because of the high priority Japan placed on 
controlling China. Although SACO was successful at imposing costs on Japan through a 
resistance strategy, it is unlikely that this directly deterred Japan in China. In fact, Japan 
was still occupying a large portion of China when they surrendered at the end of WWII. 
Digging deeper, though, SACO and the KMT army were able to tie up almost one million 
Japanese troops in China, enabling other offensive operations with coercive effects in the 
Pacific. Therefore, this section will consider not only the direct deterrence effects of 
SACO’s resistance in China but also SACO’s impact in enabling the greater effort in the 
Pacific theater through weather mapping and intelligence networks. 
The most common type of cost used by SACO against the Japanese was punishment 
through sabotage. SACO claimed a large number of Japanese lives and destroyed a 
significant amount of property: twenty-seven thousand soldiers killed, eleven thousand 
wounded, five hundred captured, eighty-two railways destroyed, three hundred forty-three 
railroad cars, sixty-four railroad bridges, and various other acts of sabotage.515 This 
destruction was a significant cost imposed on the Japanese “with a smaller expenditure of 
men and supplies than any other force in the Far East.”516 
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Additionally, SACO enabled other allied units in deterrence efforts through 
intelligence and weather reports. Reports from coastal lookouts did, in fact, result in the 
sinking of Japanese naval craft and transports.517 The intelligence of Japanese ship 
movements enabled specific targeting. The coastal lookouts were even able to identify 
hidden Japanese targets to bombers. Sergeant Stewart, a SACO coastal lookout, used a 
radio to talk U.S. bombers onto a Japanese destroyer that was unseen from the air because 
it was camouflaged in trees.518 Even though the coastal watchers’ primary role was to 
prepare the coast for landings that were never to come, gaining the nickname within SACO 
as the “Dead End Kids,” their intelligence on Japanese movements was valuable because 
it allowed U.S. forces in the Pacific to allocate resources to specific threats.519 
For any form of coercion to work, a nation must clearly communicate the threat. 
The means of communication used by the SACO partnership was entirely indirect. No 
known open negotiations took place between the political entities of KMT and Japan, so 
SACO guerrillas had to rely on demonstrating their capability and intent to cause damage 
through action.520 Although this attempt at coercion may seem unimportant because both 
sides were at war and were not merely threatening, but actively seeking to do damage in 
any way they could, even in total war adversaries attempt to influence enemy decision-
making by their actions. 
The impact on the cost-benefit analysis on the Japanese is difficult to determine, as 
is the success of any deterrence efforts. The Japanese did view Tai and Miles as a threat, 
however. Miles documented specific Japanese attempts to target SACO leadership. While 
hiding in a rice paddy due to Japanese bombing runs, Miles’s translator turned to Miles 
and said, “They know you are here, you and General Tai.”521 Miles and Tai Li thought 
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that the Japanese specifically targeted them on this occasion. The Japanese also worked to 
uproot the resistance efforts throughout Japanese-occupied China. The Japanese were also 
known by SACO to have sent out “trained assassins” to attempt to kill guerrilla column 
leaders. 
Additionally, there is evidence that the punishment through sabotage conducted by 
SACO had limited impacts on stopping specific Japanese advances. Miles himself 
admitted, “Though the ninety-three saboteurs (from Camp One) were successful in many 
of their missions and may have delayed the Japanese push a little, they did not prevent 
it.”522 The Imperial Japanese mindset was to always move forward, sometimes in a 
fanatical way, to their objectives during WWII. Even a particularly determined stand by 
the KMT’s 10th Army in the city of Hengyang resulted in Japanese escalation and 
commitment of forty thousand additional troops.523 
Japan was not always deterred by offensives in China by the Fourteenth Air Force 
either. After the Fourteenth built up airfields and conducted bombing runs, Japan simply 
advanced and took the airfields by force.524 Japan’s China Expeditionary Army responded 
to increased U.S. air operations with an offensive called Operation ICHI-GO.525 Japan 
intended ICHI-GO to disperse the significant KMT divisions and advance to seize two 
critical airfields being used by the Fourteenth in Kwangsi province.526 This advance put 
Chungking in danger of being overrun, pressed the very existence of the KMT government, 
and contributed to Wedemeyer’s support to opening relations with the Chinese 
Communists.527 The OSS’s initiatives to partner with the CCP had consequences that 
degraded the partnership with the KMT; however, these initiatives were a response to the 
violent Japanese offensive against the Fourteenth. 
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Despite SACO’s limited ability to stop Japanese advances, SACO’s resistance 
efforts did seem to tie up Japanese troops, benefiting the larger war effort. While imposing 
costs on the Japanese forces, many of these SACO guerrilla columns were successful at 
keeping entire Japanese divisions in place, such as Camp Five’s First Column.528 The 
Japanese Army did become tied up because of the threat from the KMT army divisions and 
the resistance efforts. In 1942, the Japanese leadership committed approximately 820,000 
troops in China to maintain control.529 When Japan surrendered in 1945, Japan had 
1,050,000 soldiers in the China Expeditionary Army.530 Although SACO’s resistance 
efforts did not seem to deter the Japanese directly, they clearly imposed costs on the 
Japanese by creating the need to dedicate men and equipment that could have been used in 
other theaters. 
In addition to tying up troops that Japan could have used against the United States 
in the Pacific, the Chinese resistance limited the amount of territory Japan desired to 
control. In early 1942 (at the very beginning of SACO), the Japanese Army High Command 
and Japan’s China Expeditionary Army estimated KMT forces as governing power as 
extremely weak and ripe for destruction.531 The Japanese developed initial plans for 
Operation CHE-KIANG and Operation FIVE in order to “conduct large-scale operations 
aimed at Chungking itself” and to “crush the Chinese power to resist.”532 Although 
offensives took place in eastern China, Japan never executed the Chungking operation 
because of the need to divert attention to the struggle in the Pacific.533  
The aggressive intent of the Japanese Army High Command in China shifted by 
the end of the war. Japan no longer desired to contest the KMT resistance everywhere, and 
instead only focused on areas where the KMT was strategically important. For instance, 
despite fears within the United States and CKS in 1944, “Tokyo had no intention of driving 
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as far west as Chungking. The acquisition of more Chinese territory held no attraction; the 
eastern China air bases did.”534 Although preparation for handling the potential entry of 
the Soviet Union in the war against Japan also played a role in Japan’s cost-benefit analysis, 
Japan realized that the more territory it took in China, the more troops would be required 
to contend with stiff resistance. Essentially, the Chinese resistance drove the struggle into 
a stalemate. 
Tokyo’s later estimates also show KMT’s impact on Japanese decision making. In 
early 1945, the Japanese Army High Command provided the China Expeditionary Army 
with the following intent in China: stop attempts by large American forces to advance into 
China, secure strategic areas on the continent (eastern air bases), and “strive to eliminate 
the influence of Chungking.”535 The intent to strive to eliminate influence was vastly 
different from earlier plan to crush Chungking. By Japan’s own admission, all it could hope 
to do in 1945 was to pester, not break the KMT resistance as it had expected in 1942. The 
Japanese Army High Command’s later estimate of Chinese strength in the summer of 1945 
also shows the importance of the U.S. partnership with the KMT. The Japanese estimates 
specifically considered the fifteen to twenty American-equipped KMT divisions (out of the 
KMT’s 300 total divisions) to be the “nucleus” of the army and that the “fighting capability 
of organized militia units could not be discounted in actions against the Japanese.”536 
Although the KMT Army and Chinese resistance efforts did not stop Japan from the ability 
to take a specific military objective, they did dictate tough choices for Japan and provided 
a stiffer resistance than Japan expected. 
SACO’s efforts at impacting the cost-benefit analysis of Japan are most easily seen 
through enabling operations in the Pacific. SACO’s coastal lookouts provided intelligence 
on the movement of the Japanese fleet and air force along the entire Chinese coast from 
Shanghai all way to Swatow, seven hundred miles south down the coast.537 This 
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information, along with the reported weather data, allowed the U.S. Navy to plan offensives 
and anticipate Japanese operations in the Pacific. The weather data helped create a map to 
ensure that “long range planning can be made for carrier strikes in the Far East.”538 The 
information that the coastal watchers gave also allowed American forces to target and sink 
Japanese troop transports full of soldiers heading to the fight.539 
In summary, although the direct deterrent effects on Japan may not be easily seen, 
despite the high costs implemented on the Japanese, SACO’s comparatively cheap price 
tag and its ability to enable operations in the Pacific contributed to its overall effectiveness. 
Although China’s strategy against Japan in WWII is summed up by General Stilwell as 
“winning by outlasting”540 instead of trying to deter, the SACO operations in China 
indirectly enabled other military operations that were important in the coercion of Japan. 
Additionally, SACO directly implemented high costs on Japan through the development of 
a Chinese resistance, which tied up significant Japanese forces in the area. SACO 
communicated capability and intent to Japan indirectly through its active operations. 
Overall, the effect on Japan caused by SACO seems worth the effort put in. 
E. CONCLUSION/LESSONS 
SACO is an example of a partnership that delivered wartime goals of resistance and 
intelligence against the Japanese in China, yet its value depreciated in the long run due to 
the eventual fall of KMT to the CCP in 1949. Miles himself considers SACO a success, 
yet the whole effort in Asia a failure. Miles said, “If there is anything to be saved from the 
mess the United States helped create in Asia it can be done only by learning from the 
lessons our failure should have taught.”541 SACO was not a failure because of the 
successes during the war, but because of the United States’ short-sightedness in not staying 
with their KMT partners following the end of the war to ensure stability in China.  
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Overall, this case indicates that the partnership framework is useful at explaining 
the operational military success of SACO. The willingness of the KMT government and 
Tai Li were sufficient when accounting for the amount of political control exerted through 
the loans and funding at the political level. The capabilities of the KMT partners, while 
lacking in many respects, were integrated in a way that allowed for U.S. support to enable 
their strength in manpower and local knowledge. The effects on the enemy are harder to 
identify directly, but the SACO partnership indeed enabled massive offensives in the 
Pacific and tied up almost one million Japanese troops.  
Where this partnership failed, it failed in the conflicting interests at the political 
level. The willingness component of the framework captures this divergence. 
Commitments in other theaters of the war, higher priority allies, and perceived corruption 
within the KMT all contributed to the United States’ decision to reduce support following 
Japan’s surrender. If the willingness component of the partnership was managed properly 
following the war, potentially, the KMT government could still be in power today.  
The immediate military successes of SACO provide an opportunity to see a 
genuinely impactful military partnership in a unique environment on the periphery of total 
war. As Miles said, SACO’s guerrilla operations show the “ability of a few men with 
limited supplies and equipment to strike and run, and poke and pinch, and grab and turn up 
elsewhere.”542 It was the ability of the United States to identify and carry out this 
partnership with the guerrillas who were willing, capable, and had desired effects on the 
enemy that made it operationally successful. It is also a uniquely relevant case concerning 
China’s rise today because it serves as a prelude to the current friction between the United 
States and the PRC. 
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VI. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS/CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter offers a critique of the partnership framework as well as suggestions 
concerning security cooperation partnerships today. The first section discusses the 
relevance and importance of the framework, as well as the significant lessons learned from 
the three cases. The second section explores potential gaps in the partnership framework 
by challenging each component’s foundational literature and by offering other relevant 
factors that could complement the existing framework. The third section outlines 
considerations for partnerships to compete with China in the South China Sea (SCS). This 
section will also comprise an overview of China’s interests in the region and a background 
of the tension points, followed by broad observations and recommendations that the 
partnership framework provides. Admittedly, the SCS Sea is merely one challenge among 
many with China. The SCS is undoubtedly affected by global events and interactions, but 
focusing on one specific area allows for a more in-depth analysis. The challenges that 
China presents today are increasingly demanding on a global scale. As scholar Eliot Cohen 
has stated, referring to China, “No geopolitical challenge to the American world role comes 
close to that posed by the newly prosperous, nationalistic, and sometimes belligerent 
Middle Kingdom.”543 His statement captures China’s threatening traits and the importance 
of China as a U.S. rival. 
A. FRAMEWORK LESSONS: COMMON THEMES FROM THE CASES 
The partnership framework and cases provide an opportunity to identify various 
observations on the identification and development of security cooperation partners in 
GPC. These observations do not create an exhaustive or all-encompassing list of how to 
execute partnerships in GPC, but only note items that uniquely stand out in the collective 
study. This study does not prove any of these observations, as the scope of the study means 
that they may only apply to specific cases. Additionally, many of the observations may 
seem obvious to the reader; however, sometimes, these obvious statements are needed, as 
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these cases show. This section divides the observations into three different categories: what 
type of partner the United States should look for; what actions the United States should 
take to develop the partnership; and China’s typical responses to U.S. partnerships. 
1. Observations on Partners 
This study suggests that some characteristics of potential partners are valuable to 
the United States. The first observation is that interests matter, both at the political and 
military levels. Second, partners often have limited potential capabilities. Third, some 
partners are better suited to specific tasks.  
The first observation is that interests matter, both at the political and military levels. 
Each case exemplifies the importance of the political and military levels of partnerships. 
In Vietnam and Laos, the politics of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and the 
politics of South Vietnam and RLG altered the nature of the partnership. Eisenhower relied 
on the deterrent initiatives of SEATO, airpower, and nuclear weapons in order to conserve 
American resources.544 Kennedy’s desire for flexible response options drastically 
increased the number of advisors and the amount of support to South Vietnam and the 
RLG, changing the nature of the partnership. The interests of Diem and the South 
Vietnamese government created problems for the partnership, as did the interests of the 
various leadership personalities of the RLG. Diem’s lack of control over the government 
caused him to create policies that alienated the population and fueled the insurgency.545 
The RLG’s instability and turnover of authority between the rightists, neutralists, and 
leftists left the question of what the RLG’s intentions were utterly ambiguous. 
SACO also presents an excellent example of why military planners need to 
understand the political environment that they are operating in when choosing partners. 
CKS and FDR completely drove the partnership. CKS’s fear of the inevitable civil war 
following the defeat of the Japanese drove him occasionally to make outrageous demands 
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for equipment and to withhold expending resources against the Japanese.546 CKS’s 
political interests positively and negatively impacted the various U.S. efforts with the 
Chinese. His interests made Stilwell’s initiatives in Burma difficult, Chennault’s initiatives 
with the Air Force easier, and SACO somewhere in between. Political interests also caused 
CKS to reject British ambitions in the region while causing Tai Li to use U.S. training and 
material to suppress political opposition.547 
The second observation is that the United States should take into account that 
partners often have limited potential capabilities. Military planners should account for 
each partner’s limits and develop achievable capabilities, even if these capabilities are 
below U.S. military standards. A 2014 RAND study similarly stated that “fragile partner 
states may not be able to use [security cooperation] effectively.”548 This observation is 
about expectation management. Many partner nations will not be able to effectively support 
the quantity of military equipment that the United States asks of them because of political 
or economic reasons. Each case illustrates this observation. Several studies indicate that 
the United States problematically overlooked South Vietnamese limitations and tried to 
build the GVN into an exact copy of itself by delivering enormous amounts of military 
equipment.549 In reality, South Vietnam was not suited to the political ideals, the military 
way of war, or the massive military structure of the United States because it was, at least 
in the short term, not going to have political stability or the resources needed to sustain that 
type of effort. The same can be said of the partnerships in Laos, although it seems that the 
United States grasped the RLG’s and the Hmong’s inherent limitations better than it 
grasped those of South Vietnam.  
In the case of SACO, Tai Li’s organization and the KMT’s limitations seem to have 
been realized and employed accordingly, which benefited the partnership. The United 
States never thought that it could defeat the Japanese through a partnership with the KMT 
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government or SACO alone. The orders that Admiral King gave to Miles were to “do 
whatever you can to help the Navy and to heckle the Japanese.”550 So the policy-makers 
in the United States saw this partnership as a supporting effort to keep Japanese forces tied 
up on the Asian mainland, not as the main effort. Even Mao recognized that “guerrilla 
operations alone cannot produce victory.”551 The United States set achievable expectations 
of the KMT and Tai Li’s organization, demonstrating that when limitations of partners are 
understood, it can better incorporate the partnership into broader efforts in a region.  
The third observation is that some partners are better suited to specific tasks. While 
this observation may seem obvious, stating it and understanding it is critical. Laos and the 
Hmong show the most evident positive example of this observation. The CIA, at least 
initially, employed the Hmong in a manner that suited the Hmong’s natural strengths and 
inclinations. The Hmong’s networks and their way of life were well suited to guerrilla 
warfare around the Plain of Jars; however, the Hmong were not suited to sustain 
conventional military operations. Conversely, the Hmong’s guerrilla warfare would not 
have suited the majority of the RLG armed forces. The use of the Hmong guerrillas in their 
local areas was different from some of the guerrilla warfare cross-border operations carried 
out from Vietnam. In Vietnam, the Montagnard tribes conducted guerrilla operations far 
away from their familiar territory, often with grave consequences.552 Essentially, the 
United States should find a partner’s natural skills and tendencies and employ them 
appropriately. 
2. Observations on United States Partnership Efforts 
This study suggests that the actions the United States takes can influence the 
success of the partnership. The first observation is that the United States should carefully 
use incentive structures. Second, the United States should use interorganizational ties to 
improve specific partner capabilities and limitations. Third, the United States should 
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balance long-term commitments with short-term objectives. Finally, partnerships benefit 
from culturally conscious leadership and practitioners.  
The first observation is that the United States should carefully use incentive 
structures to reduce the cost of oversight. Principal-agent theory and the first component 
of the framework suggest that outcome-based incentives provide the best leverage for a 
principal partner. In practice, however, the cases show that partner nations often reject 
these outcome-based incentives. The suggestions from principal-agent theory, therefore, 
may be more difficult to relate directly to relationships between nations. In Vietnam, Laos, 
and SACO, the United States struggled to put reasonable stipulations on aid and support. 
While outcome-based incentives seem harder to implement in security cooperation, that 
does not mean the United States should give up trying to put some stipulations and control 
measures on aid and support.  
Providing huge incentives without stipulations can often backfire. In Vietnam and 
Laos, the United States created a dependency problem by giving aid to the point of 
diminishing returns. An extensive 2014 RAND study also noted diminishing returns in 
security cooperation with its finding that effects were “strongest at the low end of 
expenditures per country, and there [were] diminishing returns from increased 
expenditures.”553 In South Vietnam, the United States paid for over 80% of South 
Vietnam’s military expenditures.554 In Laos, the Hmong became dependent on the United 
States for not only military equipment but for food and necessities.555 The vastness of U.S. 
aid to South Vietnam and Laos did not give the United States the leverage it needed. Robert 
Komer observed that the very massiveness of U.S. support actually reduced leverage 
because it showed Vietnam and Laos that the U.S. was overcommitted.556 
The SACO case also provides an example of the importance combined with the 
difficulties of incentive structures on partnerships. The United States struggled to 
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implement controls over the lend-lease material given to the KMT. CKS consistently 
denied outcome-based stipulations, while demanding that financial support came with 
limited strings attached.557 The lack of stipulations and control measures gave CKS 
leverage over the United States, leverage that CKS utilized on several occasions. The ideal 
business-like incentives, described by agency theory, are what the United States should 
strive to reach, even while acknowledging that falling short is almost guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, the more thought-out incentive structures are, the more the United States can 
reduce cost and increase leverage.  
The second observation is that the United States should use interorganizational ties 
to improve specific partner capabilities and limitations. The United States should decide 
whether vertical or horizontal relationships are most suitable to a particular partner force 
capability. Vertical and horizontal ties each have positives and negatives in certain 
situations. Each can carry more risk with specific partners. The United States also does not, 
and should not, consider partnerships as completely vertical or completely horizontal. Most 
efforts to build capability or fill in capability gaps require both vertical and horizontal 
efforts. For example, after 1964, the U.S. Air Force effort in Laos and Vietnam was mostly 
unilateral. The United States recognized a significant gap in Laos’s and Vietnam’s air 
capabilities, which required vertical ties (unilateral U.S. efforts) to fill. However, Thai, 
Laotian, and Hmong pilots eventually complemented the U.S. Air Force’s unilateral 
operations in support of RLG ground units. 
The SACO partnership also saw a blend of horizontal and vertical ties on the same 
capabilities. SACO focused on building on Tai Li’s existing guerrilla and intelligence 
organization with new equipment and funds, but SACO also filled gaps vertically where 
required: all technical weather collecting and radio intercept equipment were run by U.S. 
personnel. Miles deemed the time and cost of training and supplying Tai Li’s personnel 
with this technology too high, so he implemented vertical ties instead of horizontal ones. 
Miles set up this structure of ties deliberately. The United States should attempt to find the 
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proper balance between these different types of interorganizational ties as each situation 
dictates.  
The third observation is that the United States should balance long-term 
commitments with short-term objectives. This observation is also not new. A RAND 
analyst testified to Congress on security cooperation: “It is long overdue for the United 
States to prioritize long-term support to good governance over rapidly equipping tactical 
military units.”558 In each case presented here, the United States found itself in a clash of 
long-term and short-term interests. The actions of the United States in SACO provide the 
clearest example of this tension. Although the United States wanted a stable and secure 
China in the long term, it was willing to sacrifice China’s stability to put short-term military 
pressure on the Japanese Empire.  
Balancing long and short-term interests is difficult to implement in practice. For 
example, when looking back on historical cases, it may seem obvious to the contemporary 
observer that the KMT government was bound to fail and that it was only a matter of time 
before the Japanese Empire would surrender. The importance of the KMT’s eventual 
failure would have been more difficult to forecast in the middle of WWII when the focus 
was on Japan as the imminent threat. So, it may be slightly unfair to say that the United 
States deliberately sacrificed long-term for short-term interests. This observation merely 
suggests that planners should put considerable thought into the second and third-order 
consequences of specific actions. A military planner can only project long-term benefits 
and consequences to a certain level with the information available. However, careful 
thought should be put into this balance between short and long-term objectives because, as 
SACO shows us, unforeseen long-term consequences can be considerable. 
Finally, partnerships benefit from culturally conscious leadership and 
practitioners. This observation aligns with the general notion that security cooperation 
benefits from “investment in human capital.”559 The most obvious positive example of this 
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is SACO, where Milton Miles’s organization prided itself on respecting and appreciating 
Chinese culture. The close ties and relationships that SACO formed with their Chinese 
counterparts undoubtedly contributed to the success of an endeavor that many believed was 
hopeless.560 Laos is the less obvious positive example of the importance of cultural 
knowledge. The United States essentially outsourced this requirement by using Thailand 
to provide interpreters and cultural intermediaries for U.S. advisors.561 When the inherent 
cultural experience is unavailable within the U.S. military, the best answer may be to hire 
local nations that are more familiar with the United States. Vietnam seems to be a 
cautionary tale for this observation. In Vietnam, U.S. advisors consistently failed to 
understand the local political and security environment. Much of that likely had to do with 
the cultural distance between the U.S. advisors and the South Vietnamese. The United 
States had glaring deficiencies in Vietnamese language training and often kept “maneuver 
distance” from South Vietnamese counterparts.562 These deficiencies likely contributed to 
the failure in Vietnam. 
3. Observations on China 
This study also suggests insights into the decision making of rival great powers, 
specifically China. The first observation is that even successful U.S. partnerships may not 
deter China and may, in fact, cause China to escalate tensions. Second, China has a 
distinct military culture, but not one that is beyond comprehension. Third, China often acts 
opportunistically, exploiting perceived weaknesses in rivals when it is in a position of 
strength. Finally, China has internal disagreements and domestic considerations over 
policy decisions like other nations. 
The first observation is that even successful U.S. partnerships may not deter China 
and may, in fact, cause China to escalate tensions. Admittedly, this observation is not 
unique or new, but it is nonetheless essential to highlight. Even before Vietnam, in late 
1950, the United States witnessed China’s massive escalation in Korea as U.S. troops were 
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approaching the Yalu River. China’s massive response has impacted U.S. military thinking 
ever since.563 However, it is important to note that China does not escalate in every case. 
China certainly values security along its borders, but it only escalates when it is willing 
and able. For example, it is plausible to claim that China would not have responded to a 
U.S. military escalation against North Vietnam in the mid-1950s because of domestic 
concerns and the Chinese fear of a Korea-like war.564 China was not prepared for another 
confrontation with the United States, and discussions among Chinese decision-makers 
indicates that such concerns may have restrained its actions. On the other hand, following 
President Kennedy’s increase in support to South Vietnam, Ho and Mao both came to 
“reject moderation.”565 This rejection suggests that the United States’ increase in 
partnership with South Vietnam did not deter China or North Vietnam, but actually had the 
opposite effect of inciting increased vigor in violent unification efforts. Even during the 
Johnson administration, direct threats of heavy military pressure on North Vietnam resulted 
in the North’s refusal to yield and to claim that it would not stop supporting the liberation 
of South Vietnam.566 In sum, China challenges U.S. influence where and when it can, not 
everywhere, all the time.  
Second, China has a distinct military culture, but not one that is beyond 
comprehension. U.S. military planners should not overstate the success of China’s military 
culture and way of thinking. Eliot Cohen noted, “Understanding Chinese strategy, and the 
appropriate American response, is made more difficult by myths—some consciously 
concocted and spread by the Chinese government, some rooted in American romantic 
conceptions of China.”567 He went on to say, “It is easy to construe Chinese military 
thought as a kind of occult wisdom before which American naivete and muscle-bound 
 
563 Cohen, The Big Stick, 105–7. 
564 See discussion on Mao’s restraint against U.S. Forces in Strait of Taiwan crisis. Zhai, China and the 
Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, 69,82. 
565 Zhai, 129. 
566 Herring, America’s Longest War, 131–33; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, 130. 
567 Cohen, The Big Stick, 103. 
162 
strength are powerless.”568 Americans also occasionally give the Chinese too much credit 
when they unjustifiably misread Chinese statements and actions as having intelligent long-
term strategic forethought. For example, in the early 1970s, many Americans 
misunderstood an exchange between the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, and Henry 
Kissinger about the impacts of the French Revolution.569 Zhou Enlai famously responded, 
“It is too early to tell,” but unfortunately, Enlai misunderstood the question and thought 
Kissinger was referring to the on-going student riots in France.570  Recognized strategist 
Edward Luttwak argues that not only did the often glorified ancient Han Chinese leaders 
struggle with military strategy, but the modern Chinese state also often has failing military 
strategies because of Chinese strategic culture.571  
This study seems to indicate a similar notion about China’s military culture—that 
some aspects of Chinese decision-making differ from the United States’ but that China’s 
can be analyzed and understood nonetheless. In all the cases examined, Vietnam, Laos, and 
SACO, the Chinese communists seem to be willing to stoically accept enormous losses and 
combat the United States indirectly and ruthlessly. However, after considering China’s 
decision-making process, it appears that China acts in much the same way as the United 
States. China is and has been willing to use masses of military force to protect perceived 
interests, just as the United States. The conventional thinking is that China and the United 
States differ in that while the United States has shown the tendency to rely on a mass of 
military power, China has shown tendencies to rely on psychologically oriented uses of 
military power. This contrast is slightly unfair to both China and the United States because 
each nation uses both strategies. The Laos and Vietnam cases provide examples of China’s 
and the United States’ variations in approaches.572 In Vietnam, the United States relied 
primarily on developing South Vietnam’s conventional military by providing mass of 
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equipment and firepower. In Laos, on the other hand, the United States chose a much more 
psychological partnership approach, by working with the Hmong and other various tribes 
to focus on guerrilla warfare. China and North Vietnam’s strategies in Vietnam and Laos 
were opposite of the United States, showing that they too rely on mass as much as 
psychological military options. 
Third, China often acts opportunistically exploiting perceived weaknesses in rivals 
when it is in a position of strength. China has consistently recognized weaknesses in the 
U.S. position as opportunities for exploitation. In Vietnam, China appeared to view the 
United States’ increase in military commitment to South Vietnam as not only a threat but 
also an opportunity to challenge the United States. China’s method of support to North 
Vietnam and the Viet Cong provided a way to challenge the United States and to force 
them to commit resources indefinitely. In SACO, the Chinese communists also took 
advantage of the United States by accepting training and equipment while secretly limiting 
military attacks against Japan. It is important to remember, as the cases show, that China 
does not always act according to a master grand plan. China responds to changes in the 
U.S. position and looks for opportunities to exploit. So it is not just understanding Chinese 
plans and intentions that matter, but also understanding how China will perceive U.S. 
actions as either weakness or strength.  
Finally, China has internal disagreements and domestic considerations over policy 
decisions like other nations. It is easy to assume that China’s powerful autocracy is entirely 
in control, but that is not what history or the cases show. China has a long history of 
revolution, causing China to be often “preoccupied by internal stability.”573 In Vietnam 
and Laos in the late 1950s, domestic problems contributed to China’s de-escalation and 
openness to non-violent means of revolution. Zhou Enlai and Mao needed to turn inward 
to fix dissatisfaction, poverty, and food shortages.574 In addition to domestic 
considerations, there was also significant internal debate within the communist party about 
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how to support North Vietnam.575 Mao ultimately won in his desire for a hardline 
approach, but he still had to contend with other influential individuals. Even with the 
apparent intolerance for challenges to political authority, the CCP will inevitably have 
dissenting views within it. Even China’s harsh response in the Tiananmen Square incident 
of 1989 had to make it through “battles between hardliners and reformers” within the 
communist party.576 China’s policy decisions concerning responses to U.S. security 
cooperation and partnerships seem likely to continue the trend found in this study. 
4. Summary of Observations 
This study identifies eleven total observations from the cases. These observations 
fall into three categories: identifying potential partners, identifying areas to improve U.S. 
efforts, and commentary on Chinese responses to security cooperation partnerships. The 
first category’s observations on identifying partners are: 1) interests matter, both at the 
political and military levels, 2) partners often have limited potential capabilities, and 3) 
some partners are better suited to specific tasks. The second category’s observations on 
U.S. efforts are: 1) the United States should carefully use incentive structures, 2) the United 
States should use interorganizational ties to improve specific partner capabilities and 
limitations, 3) the United States should balance long-term commitments with short term 
objectives, and 4) partnerships benefit from culturally conscious leadership and 
practitioners. The third category’s observations are: 1) even successful U.S. partnerships 
may not deter China and may, in fact, cause China to escalate tensions, 2) China has a 
distinct military culture, but not one that is beyond comprehension. 3) China often acts 
opportunistically, exploiting perceived weaknesses in rivals when it is in a position of 
strength, 4) China has internal disagreements and domestic considerations over policy 
decisions like other nations. 
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B. FRAMEWORK CRITIQUE: OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS 
A critic of the partnership framework may correctly point out that it does not 
account for everything that goes into engaging in security cooperation partnerships. While 
this is undoubtedly true, the intent is to simplify the complex phenomenon of partnerships 
in GPC environments to aid in our understanding, not predict every nuance. While this 
framework proposes three critical components for evaluating partnerships, considering 
other relevant factors may provide practitioners an evaluation of partnerships that is closer 
to all-encompassing. At first glance, several additional factors could contribute to a 
beneficial partnership: potential benefits to the principal, leadership, geography, 
organizational challenges, ethics, and domestic politics. While this list is undoubtedly not 
all-inclusive, it may move a practitioner closer to a complete assessment. Some of these 
factors addressed below could be captured within the three-component framework, but 
some extreme cases may call for consideration of the additional factor on its own.  
Before considering other additional factors that could benefit the partnership 
framework in some instances, it is important to challenge the foundation that the 
partnership framework rests on. Fundamentally, the lens of GPC may not always suit every 
situation. Each component of the partnership framework rests on a theory or body of 
literature that offers an abstraction of reality in order to aid understanding. These 
abstractions inevitably cannot fit reality perfectly. While it may be beneficial to challenge 
the abstractions and the assumptions that they rest on, the framework offers a useful 
baseline guide that military planners can deviate from.  
In some cases, military planners may have more success by focusing on local issues 
instead of trying to deter other rival great powers. David Kilcullen, a practitioner and 
scholar of counterinsurgency, suggests that focusing on great powers can enflame local 
grievances and actually make matters worse, in what he calls the “accidental guerrilla 
syndrome.”577 One step further than the accidental guerrilla syndrome is also plausible, 
that framing problems as GPC could lead to poor strategic decision making. Of note, some 
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argue that the Vietnam War is an example of a loss at the local level. Bob Andrews, a 
Vietnam veteran who had experience in small villages south of Saigon, argues that the 
critical aspect of this conflict was at the local level.578 The United States’ decisions in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s also indicate poor decision making because of over-focus on the 
Soviet Union. Soviet leadership directly asked for “cooperation in limiting the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism.”579 Unfortunately, the United States overlooked this threat from 
the local level because of its fear of the Soviets, a mistake that the United States is still 
witnessing today not only in Afghanistan, but across the Middle East. 
The first component—willingness—rests on principal-agent theory, which assumes 
that partnerships in GPC have one partner who has control (principal) and another who 
lacks control (agent). This notion of specific roles for the principal and the agent may not 
paint the whole picture, as often ‘weaker’ nations can exert a disproportional amount of 
control over ‘stronger’ nations. Scholar Douglas Borer describes this phenomenon as 
inverse engagement, arguing the small, dependent, and vulnerable nations may actually 
have more significant influence over policy decisions in engagements with more powerful 
nations because of variances in political sensitivity to economic and political pressures.580 
Autocratic governments are often much less sensitive to political pressure than the United 
States and other democratic nations. The cases also seem to indicate that the phenomenon 
of inverse engagement may exist. In SACO and Vietnam, ‘weaker’ governments put 
pressure on the ‘stronger’ United States because of the position they were in. Essentially, 
practitioners who utilize the partnership framework should recognize the limitations and 
abstraction of using principal-agent theory to address willingness in partnerships. 
Additionally, principal-agent theory focuses on positive incentives to produce desired 
behavior in a partner, overlooking inherent coercion that takes place between sovereign 
nations. 
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The second component—capability—rests on business integration and building 
partner capacity literature, which also is an abstraction that has limitations. The application 
of business integration literature to security cooperation partnerships admittedly has some 
problems. First, partners are generally not in direct competition with each other like 
businesses. Direct competition is what the business literature rests on to delineate the 
differences between vertical and horizontal ties, making a direct application of the literature 
challenging. Second, all the partnerships in this study, and presumably all security 
cooperation partnerships going forward, cannot be categorized as purely vertical or 
horizontal; the partnership appears to typically be a combination of the two. The difficulty 
of classifying the relationship as either vertical or horizontal makes the analytical 
evaluation of either challenging because there is no one end of the spectrum to compare. 
Despite the challenges to this foundational literature, this study found the abstraction useful 
as a way to consider specific interorganizational ties conceptually.  
The third component—effects—uses deterrence theory to help consider possible 
enemy responses. Although this study found this foundation useful, deterrence theory is 
also an abstraction of reality, with corresponding limitations. The SACO case is the best 
example of a challenge to the deterrence concept in the framework. Many of the SACO 
efforts to supply weather and intelligence information are arguably supporting larger 
deterrence efforts in the Pacific, but they were not deterrence efforts in and of themselves. 
Additionally, the nature of the conflict in SACO made the application of deterrence 
difficult. The goal of keeping Japanese troops tied up on the mainland of Asia through 
guerrilla action was not directly a deterrence effort, but a supporting effort that would allow 
more extensive operations in the Pacific. Finally, applying deterrence theory to non-state 
actors has challenges because of various communication problems, the ambiguity of actors, 
and in some cases, limited material to threaten. Nevertheless, this study found deterrence 
theory to be a useful starting point for most situations.  
In addition to challenging the foundation of the framework, practitioners may 
benefit from expanding it with additional factors. 
This framework may overlook potential benefits that an agent can deliver to the 
principal outside of building a capability to conduct its own action. Sometimes security 
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cooperation is simply a bargaining chip to achieve some other political end, such as trade 
benefits or access to critical territory. A military planner should not overlook the 
importance of taking action on something that the agent is particularly interested in so that 
the agent is more willing to do something that the principal is interested in. Trade benefits 
are one example of something that the partnership framework may have difficulty 
capturing. However, most potential benefits from the agent can be captured with an 
analysis of initial capability, especially if initial capability assessment is expanded to the 
political level. While the framework may capture most benefits, some cases may require 
separate consideration. None of the three cases present good examples of the need for this 
additional factor, but other cases surely exist that would be good examples. Partnerships 
often require bartering; a principal may have to work with a specific foreign security force 
that does not directly benefit U.S. interests in order to obtain access to something else that 
the nation has to offer. 
This framework may also overlook the impact that leadership and specific 
personalities have on partnerships. Although leadership may be incorporated into the 
analysis of the willingness component, there may be a factor of inspiration stemming from 
leadership that the framework cannot completely capture. Is the leader that the principal is 
aligning themselves with going to be able to rally support for a cause, or will their support 
dwindle? Also, is the leader that the United States puts forward to carry out the partnership 
able to rally the necessary support to make the partnership successful? 
Leadership was a significant factor in the successes and failures of the partnership 
with South Vietnam, particularly the leadership of Diem. Although accounts of Diem’s 
leadership abilities differ, Diem ultimately was unable to unite South Vietnam under his 
leadership.581 Whether anyone else could have provided adequate leadership is arguable; 
nevertheless, Diem was the critical component on the Vietnam side of the partnership, and 
the quality of his leadership should have been thoroughly scrutinized. The framework did 
account for Diem’s leadership briefly in the initial overlap of interests, yet his leadership 
was a significant factor in the partnership that could require its own consideration. On the 
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United States side, while many leaders rotated through and had impacts on the partnership 
in Vietnam, none stand out as a make or break individual. This rotation of leadership and 
lack of a strong personality to see the partnership through likely contributed to the failure. 
U.S. leaders seemed to be a part of a bureaucratic machine where the bureaucracy drove 
the partnership more than individual leadership. 
Leadership also played a role in the case of Laos. Vang Pao was essential in the 
start and continuation of the relationship with the Hmong. Vang Pao seems to have been 
the perfect Hmong individual to lead the effort because of his charisma, his passion, and 
his intelligence.582 His respect among the Hmong and the RLG was essential for the 
success of the program; his standing as a high ranking officer in the RLG showed the trust 
that the RLG had in him. Without Vang Pao’s leadership, the partnership with the Hmong 
seems likely to have fallen apart. No less noteworthy were the leadership and ability of the 
CIA handlers in Laos who carried out initial contacts. It took the right personality with the 
right skills to identify Vang Pao’s potential and to secure his trust.583 
In SACO, Milton Miles’s leadership throughout the partnership was an integral part 
of SACO’s success. His ability to gain the confidence of Tai Li was critical for opening 
and maintaining the partnership. Additionally, his positive example and direction for his 
men to respect the Chinese partners set SACO apart from other Chinese partnership efforts 
like the British Chinese Commando Group.584 The mutual respect that was prevalent 
throughout the SACO culture enabled success. The SACO culture was unlikely to have 
developed as it did without Miles. 
Geography is another potential factor that could affect the framework. How does 
the geography of the region impact the relationship, including the geopolitical situation and 
the terrain? While difficult operating terrain can create logistical and operational 
challenges, geopolitical considerations can drive the interests of partners and dictate the 
manner in which the partnership is carried out. Although this factor is a more important 
 
582 Quincy, Hmong, 170–72; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 156. 
583 Ahern, Undercover Armies, 31. 
584 Miles, A Different Kind of War, 140; Yu, The Dragon’s War, 56. 
170 
driver for the principal’s strategy, geography clearly played a role in all three cases. While 
the partnership framework does not necessarily critique the principal’s strategy, it is 
essential to consider how and why geography drives operations and partnerships. 
Geography played a significant role in Vietnam and Laos. Geopolitical drivers were 
the main factors, but difficult operating terrain also shaped the character of the partnerships. 
The presence of China on the border was the most significant geopolitical factor in the 
conflict, but the presence of other regional nations like Thailand also played a significant 
role in shaping the nature of the partnerships. Geopolitics made the fate of Laos and South 
Vietnam important to all surrounding nations because neither Thailand or China wanted to 
share a border out of fear of the other. Operationally, geography shaped the partnership 
and the operations by making logistical movements difficult and creating ungoverned 
spaces favorable to guerrilla warfare. Both Vietnam and Laos had remote jungle 
environments with limited infrastructure, which drove logistical and operational 
considerations.585 
Geography also played significant roles, both positive and negative, in the SACO 
partnership. On the positive side, the SACO partnership allowed U.S. personnel critical 
access and placement to strategically vital locations throughout China to collect 
intelligence and weather data. Without this access and placement, the Allied forces would 
have been at a disadvantage in the Pacific theater. On the negative side, geography made 
the implementation of SACO very difficult. Logistical challenges were always a limiting 
factor. The United States could only fly so much equipment over ‘the Hump.’586 Once 
equipment did get to China, moving it around to support all the different SACO camps 
spread over vast distances was a challenge.  
Another potential factor that could inhibit successful partnerships is the concept of 
organizational challenges or the challenges of operating in a complex Joint Interagency 
Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) environment. Multi-national environments can 
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make partnerships even more difficult because of the many competing interests. 
Organizational theory would suggest that organizations fight for their own interests and 
may not act in line with the overarching strategy.587 In some instances, organizational 
challenges may require separate consideration when engaging in partnerships. The 
framework partially captures organizational challenges within initial interests at the 
military level, but, in each of the three cases, organizational challenges impacted the 
success of the partnership.  
Organizational challenges famously played a significant role in Vietnam. The 
MAAG and the MSUG did not view the conflict through the same lens, and each advocated 
its own method as the way U.S. policy makers should move forward.588 The tension 
between the MAAG and the MSUG was only one of many organizational conflicts that 
inhibited a unified U.S. effort. The title of Richard Komer’s book on U.S. failures in 
Vietnam, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, says it all.589 In it, Komer argues that it was the 
very massiveness of the U.S. effort with the slow-moving and self-interested bureaucratic 
organizations working on their own projects that contributed to the failure. On an 
international scale, differences in national interests with the French also caused tension and 
inhibited progress in the partnership efforts in both Vietnam and Laos.590 The activities in 
Laos also had organizational challenges internal to the United States, but the central 
command and control of the U.S. ambassadors mitigated most of the challenges.  
Organizational interests also played a role and negatively impacted the SACO 
partnership, both internationally and within U.S. organizations. Internationally, relations 
with the British and the French often conflicted with the SACO partnership. SACO was 
running under the assumption that CKS was the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in 
the vast region running from Mongolia to Indochina to Burma. Britain’s national interests 
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caused its leaders to oppose a SACO-run guerrilla and intelligence operation in Thailand 
that intended to “instigate an uprising to overthrow the Thai government” as well as 
provide a diversion for an advance by General Stilwell in Burma.591 Britain pushed back 
on Chinese and American operations inside “their territory,” which caused wasted time, 
effort, and resources, including, curiously, the need to sell back U.S. Navy purchased 
horses bought to support the invasion.592 Additionally, SACO operations against the Vichy 
French-controlled Indochina were wasted because of internal French squabbling over who 
should be in power within the exiled government.593 
Organizational interests between U.S. organizations was as much of a problem in 
SACO as dealing with the variances in the national interests between the allied nations. 
Miles recognized that “the OSS, on the one hand, and SACO, on the other, were each 
attempting to progress in their own ways toward their divergent objectives.”594 Miles and 
Bill Donovan would often get in arguments over the direction to take in China. Yu noted, 
“In case after case, Miles’s military mind and Donovan’s legal mind collided.”595 Miles 
saw the OSS as trying to “bypass the Chinese,” as they often did through attempts to 
execute special intelligence activities without notifying Miles or Tai Li.596 These 
disagreements led Donovan to relieve Miles of his position as coordinator of the OSS in 
the Far East, while being unable to relieve him from the head of SACO.597 By Miles’s own 
admission, the relief did little to improve the “problems having to do with the division of 
work between the OSS and the Navy in China.”598 In addition to tensions between the 
OSS and SACO, General Stilwell often had a very Army-centric view of the problem in 
China, causing him to focus more on the territory to the West in Burma. 
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This framework does not consider ethical concerns on their own. The framework 
primarily considers how to carry out partnerships to successfully achieve objectives, not 
whether the means required are morally acceptable. Partnering with foreign organizations 
that act unethically can have second and third-order consequences, even if the partnership 
achieves immediate objectives. The question of where morality and ethics should inhibit 
partnerships is not new and is not likely to go away. Scholar David Rapoport noted, “Cold 
War concerns sometimes led the United States to ignore its stated distaste for terror. In 
Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere the United States supported terrorist activity—an 
indication of how difficult it was to forgo a purpose deemed worthwhile even when 
deplorable tactics had to be used.”599 Leites and Wolf also noted potential ethical problems 
of building military capabilities in questionable partners when they said, “Improvements 
in these capabilities provide instruments with which more efficient repressive dictatorships 
can be developed.”600 Essentially, even if a military security cooperation partnership is 
exceptionally effective at developing a partner, the partner’s new capabilities could be used 
for more than the initially-intended purpose.  
From a practical standpoint, even if partners are willing and capable of conducting 
a task, they could cause potential political and informational fallouts if it becomes known 
that a global power was supporting an organization that has committed crimes or used 
deplorable tactics. This political and informational fallout could occur even if the principal 
has good intentions, such as a desire to address a specific ethical or humanitarian concern 
in a region, which drives a principal to partner with an ethically questionable organization. 
Joseph Nye suggests a potentially useful addition to the framework for considering 
morality in foreign policy implementation, which incorporates intentions, means, and 
outcomes.601 While military planners do not have to make policy-level ethical 
considerations, they should understand the potential ethical drawbacks so they can 
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promptly report relevant observations and provide thoughtful recommendations to policy-
makers. The partnership framework can partially capture ethical concerns in the overlap of 
initial interests assessment; but, in some instances, it may be a significant enough factor 
for its own consideration. Each of the three cases had varying amounts of ethical concerns. 
Vietnam and Laos each had some consequences that stemmed from unethical 
behavior in the partner. In South Vietnam, the United States had to overcome corruption 
within the ARVN and significant partisan problems within the internal security forces, 
mainly the VBI, but also the SDC and the CG.602 The VBI had a notably recognized history 
of being used by the various Vietnamese leadership as a political instrument to retain 
power.603 Any abuses from these units that the United States partnered with likely resulted 
in further alienation of the population. Ethical concerns with partnerships in Laos are less 
noteworthy but surely were present. 
In the SACO case, ethical considerations likely should have been a significant 
factor in the decision to partner with Tai Li. Unfortunately, WWII and the implementation 
of total war against Japan seemed to blind the United States as to the true nature of both 
CKS and Tai Li. The SACO partnership clearly caused problems for the Japanese and 
contributed to the Allied effort in the Pacific, but the long controversy and image of 
supporting these two individuals have tainted the Sino-American relationship since Mao 
consolidated power. Tai Li was a spy and, by all accounts, a ruthless leader.604 CKS was 
seen by many as a dictator, not the grand supporter of democracy that the United States 
had hoped.605 Both of these points were known and reported by the DOS and various 
military officials, yet the United States decided that the benefits of the partnership would 
outweigh the ethical concerns. General Stilwell famously did not get along with CKS. In 
his diary, he wrote that America was “forced into partnership with a gang of fascists under 
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a one-party government similar in many respects to our German enemy.”606 He also 
thought Tai Li ran a Gestapo-like organization. To be fair, the United States seemed to 
favor the lesser of two evils, the other more significant evil being the Chinese communists. 
The need for the United States to choose between two evils seems likely to continue even 
today.  
Finally, this framework does not consider the role of domestic politics in military 
decisions. Although this should not directly impact a military planner’s analysis or 
recommendation to policymakers, it could be a factor that influences political direction. In 
each of the cases, we saw domestic politics play a role, but particularly SACO. In SACO, 
for instance, FDR’s interests in supporting CKS and the KMT government was driven 
partly by domestic concerns. The population in the United States had somewhat of an 
attachment to the Chinese people, with a history of missionaries and presence in the 
country.607 Many Americans wanted to see the United States support the Chinese people. 
When military leaders deemed an occupation of the China mainland by U.S. forces as 
inefficient and questionably feasible, it drove U.S. military efforts into security cooperation 
partnerships. 
In summary, each component of the partnership framework is an abstraction of 
reality that may not fit every situation. Each component draws from a theory or body of 
literature that may not entirely apply to security cooperation partnerships. While this study 
proposes the components of willingness, capability, and effects on the rival as the primary 
considerations in this framework, other relevant factors may have an impact. These factors 
include outside benefits that an agent delivers, the impact of leadership, geography, 
organizational interests, ethical considerations, and domestic politics. While this study 
proposes that these additional factors can mostly be captured through the primary three 
categories, willingness, capability, and effects as they have been outlined, certain cases 
may require additional consideration.  
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C. FRAMEWORK APPLICATION: SOUTH CHINA SEA VIGNETTE 
The United States and many east Asian nations are particularly concerned about 
China’s incursions into the South China Sea (SCS). This section will consider the problem 
and offer suggestions on what type of partnerships may influence the situation in favor of 
U.S. allies. First, this section provides a brief background of the strategic scenario and 
various interests. The competition in the SCS is complicated because of the many players 
that claim territory, the complexity and ambiguity of international laws of the sea, and the 
interests of several considerable powers in addition to China and the United States. China 
has advanced its territorial claims in the SCS by building military structures and airstrips 
on man-made islands and using paranaval forces to assert control gradually.608 Several 
regional powers also claim rights to the South China Sea, including the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Malaysia.609 The various regional powers make the 
situation much more complicated than a pure two-sided competition. 
China’s interests in the South China Sea are significant for several reasons: security, 
history, and ideology. As in the earlier cases in this study, China may perceive the SCS as 
a border security threat. However, the SCS is different from the Vietnam and Laos cases 
in that the security threat seems to stem primarily from economic threats. Not only could 
this area be used by China’s rivals to move military equipment, but they could also 
potentially disrupt trading through the region using sea denial. The potential disruption of 
trade routes is a particular vulnerability to not only China but also to the world economy. 
While an estimated 3.5 trillion USD in international trade transits the SCS annually, nearly 
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forty percent of China’s trade, including eighty percent of its oil imports, goes through the 
SCS.610 The possibility of this trade route closing is a severe threat to China. 
China also may see the presence of potentially hostile nations near its shore as a 
threat. The “first island chain” is significant because it refers to the “offshore archipelago 
that envelops Eurasia’s eastern seaboard in its entirety” and is controlled mainly by U.S. 
allies, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.611 In addition to the first island chain, 
which to China must appear to “[resemble] a Great Wall in reverse where Americans and 
their allies occupy the sentinel towers,” there is a second island chain that centers on Guam 
and is also controlled by U.S. allies.612 The SCS is a means to extend maritime influence 
by allowing sea control off Chinese shores through forward basing, and to enable China to 
“puncture” the perceived hostile fortification of the first island chain if needed.613 
China uses a historical argument to justify its actions in the SCS. China views the 
sea as historically under Chinese control and protection. China, traditionally a land power, 
recognized the importance of sea-power long before the current president Xi Jinping.614 
According to China expert Toshi Yoshihara, President Xi “may be today’s most vocal 
proponent of China’s pivot to the Pacific, but he is only the latest among five generations 
of CCP leaders to gather rudiments of sea power.”615 Essentially, China has placed 
importance on sea power and the SCS for generations, even if the United States has only 
recently recognized the threat. 
Ideologically, China views itself as a growing world power and sees expansion into 
the SCS as a logical way to protect and advance itself. Xi describes this expansion as, “a 
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strategic pivot for building the nation into a great maritime power, and an important 
component of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”616 This rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation that Xi speaks of seems to be one of the many driving factors that 
have encouraged China to purse maritime power and aggressive claims in the SCS.  
In order to control the SCS, China uses a variety of military means: conventional 
naval power, anti-access equipment, and irregular naval power. Conventional naval power 
includes China’s significant increase in conventional naval power, including aircraft 
carriers, submarines, and advanced surface combatants.617 Anti-access area denial 
includes land-based means that can engage rival fleets offshore, such as Chinese Air Force 
assets and anti-ship missiles.618 China’s irregular naval power is the “heart of [China’s] 
approach” in the SCS and should be particularly focused on by military planners when 
looking at partnerships.619 
China has employed a variety of paranaval forces including the China Coast Guard 
(CCG), Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces, civilian fishing fleets, and the People’s 
Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) to “advance its territorial and maritime 
claims.”620 China is using so-called “cabbage tactics,” which relies on “surrounding a 
contested area with myriad fishing boats, maritime law enforcement vessels, and navy 
warships such that the location is wrapped in layers like a cabbage.”621 These so-called 
cabbage tactics are China’s way to achieve its objectives to establish control in the SCS 
through gradual and non-escalating actions. 
Access and stability are the United States’ specific interests in the SCS. A 
Congressional Research Service report states that specific policy-level interests include 
“dissuading China from carrying out additional base construction activities in the SCS, 
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moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it 
occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at 
Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims 
in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS.”622 
General U.S. interests include fulfilling security commitments to allies, maintaining a 
regional balance of power that is favorable to the United States, and defending the 
principles of freedom of navigation and peaceful dispute resolution.623 While the United 
States has interests in the SCS, it does not take a position on the territorial claims of one 
nation over another, only that the countries resolve the disputes peacefully.624 
While conventional naval power is likely required to deter China, meeting China’s 
so-called cabbage tactics also requires building friendly paranaval capabilities. Managing 
the broader U.S. coalition is undoubtedly essential, but unless partner military forces are 
willing and able to contest China’s incursions on the same paranaval level, China’s ability 
to expand control in the region seems likely to continue. Partnerships are indeed one part 
of the current administration’s strategy. A Congressional Research Service study explicitly 
states the need for “maintaining and strengthening diplomatic ties and security cooperation 
with, and providing maritime-related security assistance to, countries in the SCS region; 
and encouraging allied and partner states to do more individually and in coordination with 
one another to defend their interests in the SCS region.”625 
International law and conventional military force, however, may not be enough to 
deter China’s advances in the SCS. Even the July 2016 ruling by the international arbitral 
tribunal United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which ruled against 
China, did not change China’s stance. China released a statement shortly after the ruling, 
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which “maintained that China has territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests 
in the South China Sea.”626 Jonathan Odom argues that China is breaking various 
international laws including, state responsibility, the law of territorial sovereignty, the law 
of the Sea, and the law for the use of force.627 Referring to China, Odom writes, “When 
the gray zone of paranaval activities by one state meets the black letter of international law, 
other states must be willing to draw a red line and do what is necessary to enforce it.”628 
Until other states find a way to counter China’s actions, China will likely continue.  
Cooperation from willing partners is critical for competing against China in the 
SCS. Although other forms of U.S. national power are required to encourage the U.S. 
partners, security cooperation with regional partners could also be useful. The partnership 
framework helps to identify several suggestions. First, military planners should look at the 
current state of partners, including initial interests and initial capabilities. Second, the 
United States should consider the structure of interorganizational ties, incentive structures, 
and best practices when the right partner is identified. Finally, the United States should 
undertake constant strategic reassessments to consider China’s likely responses. 
The framework identifies that finding a partner that has an adequate level of initial 
capability and willingness will reduce the overall cost of incentivizing and building 
capabilities; however, identifying which initial capabilities and interests are essential is 
needed for the framework to be sufficiently useful. Concerning interests at the political 
level, U.S. military planners must consider a potential partner’s national interests in the 
short and long term. In each of the cases in this study, the U.S. military traded long-term 
interests for short-term military gains. Military planners should carefully consider the 
potential long-term interests of various partners. Without long-term considerations, U.S. 
effort and resources can turn out to be all for nothing. On the other hand, in every 
partnership, there inherently is some level of risk that interests will split and resources will 
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be wasted. Security cooperation partnerships often take a long time and do not produce 
immediate results. Patience is necessary, but so is some level of objectivity toward a 
partner’s potential. Initial capabilities are just as important as initial interests.  
Once a suitable partner is identified, military planners should consider how specific 
interorganizational ties will fill specific capability gaps and how incentive structures will 
motivate the partner and provide leverage for U.S. advisors. There are positives and 
negatives of vertical and horizontal ties. Vertical ties allow the United States to create 
capabilities to the exact specification of the needs, but they are also more expensive and 
risk failure in implementation. Horizontal ties could be cheaper, as the efforts would build 
upon an existing capability of a unit. The existing unit, however, may be more difficult to 
shape because of existing tendencies.  
Once adequate interorganizational ties and incentive structures are planned, U.S. 
military planners should do an initial assessment, and constant reassessments, of likely 
Chinese responses. The cases indicate that Chinese military decisions are not beyond 
comprehension, but they change over time with the environment. The United States must 
change with the environment as well. Deterrence is a critical component in challenging 
China’s actions, yet it is also problematic. Expert in gray zone competition, Michael 
Mazaar, noted, “There is also a clear asymmetry of interests at work on these issues [in the 
South China Sea]; China’s interests in staking its claims are greater than the U.S. interests 
in restraining them.”629 The asymmetry of interests, as the earlier cases showed, represents 
a problem for the United States if using unsustainable approaches. Developing partner 
forces that can contest China’s paranaval force, while maintaining the broader conventional 
deterrence with China could prove to be one way that the military component of U.S. 
national power can contribute to addressing China’s so-called gray zone tactics. Even 
Leities and Wolf, in their 1970 RAND study, identified that it often takes paramilitary 
forces to address other paramilitary forces.630 This assertion, of course, needs further 
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justification as well as reassessment throughout execution. It is merely one example of one 
security cooperation option that could address the problem 
Admittedly, the suggestion to develop partner paranaval forces represents a narrow 
view of the problem in the SCS. Addressing China’s actions in the SCS, as well as its 
global gray zone tactics requires not only other military efforts, but also efforts in the 
diplomatic, economic, informational, and legal realm. Without the other elements of 
national power to support, one single effort is surely doomed to fail. However, 
fundamentally, each element of national power should strive to make its efforts both 
effective and efficient. Failed efforts and waste in one element of national power can affect 
the United States’ position to carry out activities adequately in another element of national 
power. The military, in particular, can be quick to expend enormous resources once given 
a mission. Military planners owe it to the U.S. government and to the people to have clear 
justification and reason for the expenditure of resources.  
Not only are these suggestions narrow-minded because they only focus on the 
military component of national power, they also are narrow-minded because of geographic 
constraints. While this section only considers developing partner paranaval forces to 
contest China’s paranaval forces’ cabbage tactics, other geopolitical regions and events 
inevitably affect events in the SCS. Protests in Hong Kong, civil unrest due to the 
coronavirus, or resistances in the Uyghur population are three of many examples that could 
impact China’s decision making in the SCS.631 They also represent additional 
opportunities for the United States to apply pressure against China if needed—a way to go 
on the offensive instead of defensive. 
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In sum, the tensions in the South China Sea are a challenge to every form of U.S. 
national power, and security cooperation partnerships are merely one possible contributing 
effort to the solution. The partnership framework offers a mental framework for 
considering potential partners, refining U.S. actions, and projecting possible Chinese 
responses in order to make security cooperation partnerships efficient and effective. While 
precise recommendations for U.S. actions would require a more detailed study, the 
framework offers a way to consider security cooperation through willingness, capability, 
and effects. If military planners and practitioners apply this framework to theater plans, 
including those supporting allies in the SCS, the United States could potentially improve 
on past partnership failures.  
D. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
Security cooperation partnerships have been, and will likely continue to be, 
significant in GPC. The complexity of security cooperation partnerships, along with its 
essential role in GPC, makes this topic worthy for consideration. Commenting on the 
complexity of partnerships and the need for constant analysis of security cooperation 
efforts, RAND analyst Michael McNerney states, “Make no mistake: Working with foreign 
militaries is more art than science. But it certainly shouldn’t be abstract art.”632 In order to 
reduce the ‘abstract art’ of security cooperation into something closer to science, this study 
provides a vehicle to guide further discussion and analysis—the partnership framework. In 
addition to looking internally at improving security cooperation efforts, this study also 
looks externally at the reactions of near-peer rivals, specifically China. The complexity of 
security cooperation partnerships is compounded by the United States’ view of China as a 
rapidly rising and, yet, somewhat exotic and foreign culture. 
China is one particular rival of the United States that is successfully degrading the 
position of the United States by using every means of national power available. While 
conventional U.S. military capabilities are necessary, the U.S. military should look to 
improve other ways of challenging China below traditional military conflict. The U.S. 
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military should not solely focus on unilateral conventional capabilities because it could 
give China an advantage in the competition space. Author William Holstein states, “There 
is absolutely no reason for a U.S. military confrontation against China. The two countries 
have, in effect, merged their economies. Military conflict would be incredibly destructive 
and perhaps not successful from our perspective.”633 Military conflict, indeed, should be 
avoided. However, that does not mean that the military is useless outside of deterring total 
war. Finding and developing the right partners, while striving to understand potential 
Chinese responses is one crucial option that the U.S. military should consider prioritizing 
and improving. Although the organizational interests of the U.S. military generally do not 
incentivize military members to prioritize partnerships and security cooperation, this study 
argues that it is essential to success. In GPC, success seems unlikely without security 
cooperation.  
Indeed, the U.S. military has put a priority on developing partnerships. The 2018 
NDS directs the U.S. military to strengthen existing partners and attract new ones, while at 
the same time make tough choices about where to place resources to reduce waste.634 In a 
sense, the NDS asks the military to create more partnerships effectively and efficiently. 
The NDS’s direction seems reasonable when considering the extensive amount of security 
cooperation in both quantity and variety that the U.S. carries out. The United States spends 
between fifteen and twenty billion dollars on up to 4,000 security cooperation events per 
year.635 The DOD, however, does not lack in analyzing security cooperation; there is a 
vast amount of strategic guidance and direction, including Theater Campaign Plans, 
country coordination plans, and extensive coordination requirements.636 Despite 
significant attempts to control and guide security cooperation from senior levels, much of 
it seems to happen haphazardly, and much of that likely falls on military planners, not 
senior leaders or policy makers. This observation is reinforced by the author’s own 
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experience—and frustrations—working with foreign partners, which was, in large part, a 
motivation for this study. This study is the first step for military planners to help improve 
potential partnerships to carry out the NDS’s intent of creating effective, but cost-efficient 
partnerships. 
This study strives to provide a logical and necessary justification for security 
cooperation partnerships in GPC. The primary means of achieving this logical justification 
is through what this study defines as the partnership framework. The framework is 
developed and then illustrated through three historical cases involving U.S. security 
cooperation partnerships, GPC, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This partnership 
framework can help guide military planners to do their own analysis on whether or not a 
specific partner is worth engaging, how the United States should justify spending specific 
resources (incentives and interorganizational ties), and finally, how to consider potential 
rival responses.  
This study focuses on identifying the critical variables and enabling further 
discussion of wise and effective security cooperation partnerships against China. The cases 
show the reader that the United States has struggled with similar challenges in the past. 
They also show the reader that the U.S. military, especially, has enormous impacts on local 
and geopolitical environments when it introduces money, equipment, and training. When 
the United States puts its heavy thumb on the scale in many of these smaller nations, the 
impacts resonate significantly. Sometimes these impacts are positive, but sometimes they 
are harmful. The United States expends enormous resources on security cooperation with 
huge impacts on host nations; U.S. military planners owe it to their own nation, and the 
nations they are partnered with, to make the best possible choices. If this study is in any 
way a guide to finding the best choices for the United States and its partners, it will have 
served its purpose well. 
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